

Grupo de Investigación
Historia Militar



American Operational Planning and Its Prewar Basis part II: How The War was fought based on prewar plans and conceptions

Roger Cirillo, PhD

Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, Retired

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Balancing the Preconceptions with an Organization for Implementing Grand Strategy

The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl harbor and attacks against Wake Island, Guam, and the Philippines enraged Americans and settled Roosevelt's stated policy, that America would only fight if attacked. Germany and Italy followed their Axis ally into war unnecessarily, as their agreements had stipulated mandatory response, only if a partner was attacked. Hitler knew that Roosevelt was an enemy and sought to attack before American ships and supplies could be decisive. Italy, whose seesaw campaign in the Libyan and Egyptian deserts, benefited from British dispersion of forces to her threatened Far East possessions, followed Germany into war against the US, as foolishly as she had by sending troops to Russia to fight in the east. Having a limited, unmodernized industrial base, Italy built modern ships, outdated aircraft, and relied heavily on World War I ground arms and prototypes from the early 1930's for its army. It was totally outclassed in equipment to fight a modern war. Yet it could not be ignored as it straddled the Mediterranean, a key short cut to the Far East as well as the oil fields that supplied Britain's war machine. Italy, the most incapable of the three Axis powers, thus became a primary target for British strategists.¹

While America's prewar plans seem to align with the war as fought, this alignment was totally contingent on the eventualities of campaigns as they played out. Military plans state a series of "assumptions" upon which the plans are drawn. These preconditions are estimated or predicted, and the further from these conditions that exist, the lower the probability of success at achieving the goals in strategic plans become. Since future events might produce an unworkable set of conditions, the exact translation of plans into action was often hazardous, thus the creation of new assumptions and goals in strategic plans were tailored throughout the war. Nevertheless, early detailed planning made changes more efficient as the ramifications and details of situations, and the means available had already been examined. Many plans merely needed updating or a fresh perspective and current intelligence. Most

¹ Walter Warlimont. *Inside Hitler's Headquarters*. Navato: Presidio Press, 1964, pp. 207-212. Neither the German High Command, nor the Naval High Command had planned for a war with the United States. Doenitz, the Commander of Submarines, had viewed the Americans as already acting offensively and appears to be the only senior German officer who did not believe entering the war against the US was a mistake. *Doenitz: Ten Years and Twenty Days*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1959, pp 195-200. See also John Ellis. *World War II. A Statistical Survey*. New York: Facts on File, 1993.

important was the idea that key industrial products, weapons, ships, and vehicles, could be obtained from a common source, and be “pooled” for use by the allies. A combined allocation process was thus needed to allocate means and ship them to the war fronts.

Three documents summarized much of US war planning as it existed in December, 1941. The ABC-1 Conversations Report covered the state of strategic ideas for a multifront war, including details of what areas would be designated “Areas of Interests,” later known as theaters, a composite proposed order of battle for divisions, planes and ships proposed for each theater, a command structure for the theaters, and designated sea lanes or lines of communication essential for the war effort. Moreover, a series of follow on “Conversations” took place further elaborating planning or commitments. Lend Lease requests were assessed and programmed for fulfilment as soon as weapons were produced and supplies gathered.

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The “Victory Program,” was a composite of the orders of battle with the required numbers of planes and ships, and totals of men to be mobilized by the armed services. These were proposed and approved by the Secretaries of War and Navy. Mobilization and training of manpower, and the production of weapons thus were programmed and initiated. This provided the planners with an approved force structure and a timeline in which those forces would be trained, and ready for deployment.³

Last was RAINBOW 5, November, 1941, which was the final draft of the strategic plan governing a war in both oceans against the full Axis. It stipulated that Germany and her allies would be the prime enemies, inferring that “Germany, First,” would predominate in a World-wide war.⁴ This established the vital priority against which strategic plans could be drawn in an emergency. RAINBOW 5 did provide forces for the threatened theaters, but these were estimates, and final deployments and operational plans had to be made. Pacific commands had basic war plans for the defense of Hawaii and the Philippines, as well as a Pacific Fleet deployment plan to give battle to an assumed aggressor, these relied upon an aggressor initiating war, not the United States.⁵

While other plans were incorporated in these such as Air War Plan-1, the Army’s Protective Mobilization Plans, the Two Ocean Navy Bill of 1941, plus a variety of plans and memos from the Army-Navy Board, these three documents were foundational. From these stemmed the basic outline for Grand Strategy that would be followed by the US as part of the Allied cause. While these were not a road map or a blueprint as specific plans and policies would change in scope or detail, the core foundation in broad terms remained constant. These plans saved countless thousands of hours of computation and argument as the basic foundation for specific actions and detailed planning. From the results made at the highest level of military command, the theater commanders crafted their own operational design, and basic strategy for each campaign.

Once America was plunged into the war by attack and declarations of war by the Axis, Churchill immediately sought to confer with Roosevelt and his military chiefs. Recognizing the immediate threat in the Pacific and Far East which had both enraged and dismayed America, Churchill wanted assurance that

² Steven T. Ross (editor). *US War Plans 1938-1945*. Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 2002. Chapter 5.

³ Op. cit., Chapter 6. The Victory Program would have to be emended to meet the contingencies of situations, a process often fought against by planners who saw their initial work as a definitive road map “for the way ahead.”

⁴ Op. cit., Chapter 7.

⁵ Ibid.

the provisions of ABC-1 would be followed. While stemming the enemy advance was crucial, he wanted Roosevelt's agreement that Lend Lease would not be interrupted, and that American troops and planes be immediately sent into the Atlantic-European theater to anchor American resolve.⁶

These were first on Churchill's list of needs outlined in correspondence even before he arrived in Washington. Roosevelt, he knew, would understand, despite his own Pacific woes. The presence of American air units and army divisions in Northern Ireland and the UK would signal help from America to the beleaguered people of the United Kingdom, but would also release trained troops from England to finish the Mediterranean campaign and aid in the Far East campaign. These early meetings were an immediate introduction to the Americans on the realities of coalition warfare, that their ally would not be self-supporting in many ways, and that Allies who frequently brought essential contributions to the alliance, especially in basing, trained elements, and intelligence, also needed assistance. The basic rule, "Never hurt your ally," was a bitter pill for some Americans to swallow under all conditions, especially by those who took every decision made personally, and every contrary opinion an affront, and not part of the process called "the Higher Direction of War."

Despite its plan to involve itself in the anti-German war, American planners immediately sought to stem the Japanese tide, and to react to the multipronged advance of Japanese forces in the Pacific. Pearl Harbor took out the twin capabilities of the American Battle Line of the Pacific Fleet, as well as hundreds of planes needed for Hawaiian defense that might have been used to reinforce other American possessions. Rather than mount a counteroffensive, the Pacific Fleet now assessed its own capabilities to defend its main base. Wake Island, Guam, and the Philippines, it was decided, would have to fend for themselves, and eventually be sacrificed. There was, however, a basic guide in the prewar conversations, though no prediction of massive defeat had been considered at the outset of war.

ABC-1 was a complicated, but prescriptive allocation of forces and tasks should the United States and the British Commonwealth become involved in a World War as allies. Besides addressing strategic direction and identifying forces, it also incorporated a "Basic War Plan" from which the powers could begin their strategic deliberations. The United States areas for operations were defined as the Western Atlantic, and Pacific Ocean areas including the coasts of North and South America and designated areas to include the Malay Barrier, plus it posited the need to establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Islands, while holding Oahu as its main outlying base.

In reality, America drew its defense line in the Pacific from Alaska to Midway Island and eventually expanded it, encompassing Australia, American Samoa, and New Caledonia to encompass the defense of Australia and New Zealand. America would guarantee the western Atlantic, and task forces (armies) were expected to fight in Northwest Africa or in Europe. The main European Theater would be a shared

⁶ Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*. London: Cassell, 1950, Book II, War Comes to America, passim. Churchill's perspective is now sourced with all the previously classified messages, staff papers, and correspondence that passed through his hands in World War II. See the Churchill Papers, volumes for 1939-1945. Lend-Lease was indeed frozen, upon the Japanese attack, but Roosevelt immediately ordered that all shipments be restored, despite the services fears that they might be giving away materials that they could draw upon. In the event, the Americans did not lose any capabilities, and the goods sent were immediately employed by Russia and England in their ongoing operations.

responsibility, but no plan existed for operations in European Theater, beyond the immediate reinforcement of the United Kingdom and its Atlantic approaches via Greenland and Iceland.⁷

The Far East, to include the coasts of China, would be under British strategic direction with the exception of the Philippine Islands. This area included Hong Kong, the Netherlands East Indies, Java, Malaya, and Singapore. While Britain was to assume protection of Australia and New Zealand, it also held responsibility for the Mediterranean and Middle East, and India and the East Indies. China, not covered in ABC-1, was recruited to be an “Ally,” by the Americans.⁸

ABC-1 had indicated that the British were committed to a Mediterranean Campaign to clear their naval lines of communication, but were also committed to knocking Italy out of the war first, as the weakest link in the Axis. Half of the Commonwealth’s ground forces were already concentrated in Western Desert of Egypt and Libya engaged against the Italians and Germans, with a large logistical footprint, airfields, and ports at both ends of the Mediterranean. This was the geographic center of the Empire, and it was the essential air and sea link between both the Far East and Western Europe. It was vital to Britain’s war effort and the ultimate survival of her Empire. England’s oil was obtained in the Middle East in Iraq. Due to the Mediterranean campaign, oil was shipped through the Red Sea and south of Africa and up through the South Atlantic to the UK.⁹

While United States Army Air Force elements based in the UK would be tasked to conduct air operations over the European continent, no specific land missions were planned for the European or African continents. Assumed was, that strategic direction would be given by the heads of state upon the outbreak of the war, and specific operations would be carried out. GYMNAST was the first operation discussed as a possible Combined operation during the Atlantic Charter meeting, and it existed in bare outline. Based on an expansion of PLAN BLACK drawn by the War Department for landing in West and North West Africa in August 1941, a task force commander for the United States was designated and planning began immediately after Pearl Harbor. Both Roosevelt and Churchill showed keenness on this operation during their Atlantic meeting. Nothing that happened during their meetings in Washington changed their mutual assumption that this plan would be carried out.¹⁰

RAINBOW 5 as modified in November, 1941, recognized that the most likely war was on multiple fronts, not the single front war against the Germans described in the original RAINBOW 5 plan. It was updated to incorporate the ABC-1 agreements, as well as Canadian and American agreements concerning the coasts. RAINBOW 5 noted, “*The Broad strategic objective of the Associated Powers [the allies] will be the defeat of Germany and her allies.*”¹¹ The Americans called this, “Germany First.”

⁷ “United States-British Staff Conversation Report, ABC-1, March 27, 1941,” in Steven T. Ross. *US War Plans: 1938-1945*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp.67-101, passim. While it appears that the British didn’t stray far from ABC-1 in proposing actions, the shuffle and then increased numbers of American planners seemed to be unaware of what had been basically already agreed to or mentioned as important.

⁸ “ABC-1 Conversations”, *op. cit.*

⁹ *Imperial Military Geography, op. cit., Chapters VIII, XVII, and XVIII, passim.*

¹⁰ Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild. *A Framework for Hemisphere Defense*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1989, pp. 141-142; Mark S. Watson. *Chief of Staff: Pre-War Plans and Preparations*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1950, pp. 116-117; Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell. *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953, p 103.

¹¹ RAINBOW 5, in *US War Plans, op. cit., p. 137.*

Included in this plan was the key statement, “*The security of the sea communications of the Associated Powers is essential in the continuance of its war effort.*”¹² For Britain’s war effort, two avenues were essential, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. ABC-1 had already confirmed the necessity of both freeing the Atlantic shipping lanes, and for British maintenance of control in the Mediterranean basin. ABC-1, in fact, reflected the maritime nature of the war, and was easily embraced by the President and Prime Minister as both had been the civilian in charge of their respective Navies during the Great War.¹³

The Allies had decided at the first war conference held in Washington after Pearl Harbor, that their cardinal principle for Grand Strategy would be that, “only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany.”¹⁴ While such “vital areas” were easy for the United States to define as it had limited possessions in the combat zones, the extent of the British Empire meant that vital possessions, particularly those upon which the Commonwealth’s war economy, manpower, and natural resources were concerned, would have to be secured. It also led to contrary requirements. While Britain wanted to secure India as the Empire’s “Crown Jewel,” it found itself mounting operations to assist China, which Britain was neither allied with, nor which it had faith in its being a productive member of the coalition. American military planners were quick to deride Britain for defense of her possessions, particularly after they showed such little energy in holding on to America’s largest overseas possession, the Philippines. Having “chewed this bullet,” they were unsympathetic to many of Britain’s concerns. She would lose Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma, all of which figured prominently in her economic survival.¹⁵

While the Allies may have come to the conclusion that the survival of Russia was essential for them to conquer Germany, the survival of Britain was even more important to the United States. It granted the United States key bases in Europe, Africa, and the Far East, all needed to defeat Germany, and also to keep China in the war in the Pacific. The planners had decreed that Britain and her Empire was essential, but this was before the addition of Russia, a key consideration to US Army planners who counted on the Russians fixing at least 200 enemy divisions on their front.¹⁶

Would the Pearl Harbor attack change the basic premises of the early plans? The Americans had already begun to reinforce the Philippines before Pearl Harbor, and the perception that the Philippines was simply to be written off, had subtly changed. Pearl Harbor stopped the air reinforcement and shipment of more ground troops. While stressing Europe, the two service Chiefs and Secretaries had agreed to bolster their Pacific defenses before a war prevented any further reinforcement of the Pacific. Air power, especially the movement of B-17 bombers and modern P-40 pursuit aircraft, was seen as a

¹² Op. cit., p. 138.

¹³ ABC-1, op. cit.

¹⁴ *Grand Strategy, Volume III/II, op. cit., p. 563.*

¹⁵ Admiral King and the naval planners spent the war deriding the Philippines as militarily unnecessary, while Roosevelt eventually sided with MacArthur whose pledge to return in no sense violated any of Roosevelt’s promises to the Philippine people while they were buying time for America against the Japanese. Roosevelt, emotionally, was in sync with Gen. MacArthur on this topic. Whether this was a personal decision made to cement his 1944 election, or ego decision based on MacArthur’s pride, the basic fact that American territory was to be liberated, especially since American troops died “to liberate countries” whose sole worth was that they were temporary or traditional allies.

¹⁶ Both China and Russia would be considered under Lend Lease terms, though the Americans would attempt to dominate Chinese military strategy by inserting their own “commander,” Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell who was removed from the GYMNAST task force. See Matloff and Snell, op. cit., Chapters II and III passim.

game changer in a possible Japanese invasion. Neither arrived in the numbers adequate to affect the Philippine situation. The bulk of the ground troops and ammunition shipped for the Philippines, were in mid-Pacific when the war started, and though the Navy demanded that these be sent to Hawaii, they eventually proceeded to Australia, and held there for its defense.¹⁷

More importantly in their view of ABC-1, American planners did not believe the United States would enter the war at such a disadvantage in the Pacific and the new Joint Chiefs of Staff organization (JCS) grappled badly with staving off total defeat in the Pacific, a far different view that merely maintaining a stout defense. American policy had laid this trap. Before the Japanese attack, Roosevelt stressed that America would only go to war if attacked. The service chiefs had warned that Japan was being provoked into attack, and asked for diplomatic caution until America was ready to defend its bases in the Pacific and that air power in particular, could be deployed to its Far Eastern garrison in the Philippines. America's embargo had pushed Japan to strike, and that strike was not only against the Philippines as it was predicted, but was a multipronged attack that began with the strike at Pearl Harbor, and the United States battle line. Despite expecting Japan to attack, the results were emotionally devastating. They had not believed that the centerpiece of their naval plan, the battleships, would be lost. Moreover, the destruction of the bulk of the AAF's force in Hawaii was destroyed on the ground.¹⁸

The loss of the Philippines was predictable; the extent to which Japan would move southward and westward to include the Netherlands East Indies, and northern New Guinea and the Solomons had not been predicted, nor had the invasion of Burma. The only cushion against the Japanese strengthening of their position, was a limited offensive designed to regain the initiative, and to absorb Japanese forces in a series of limited objective attacks. This required both a reinforcement of Hawaii and establishing a large base of operations in Australia. Besides military necessity, these decisions were taken within the political context of what American and British society would accept and support as essential by their governments.¹⁹

Japanese Attacks towards the South and South West Pacific caused consternation in both the UK and US. The Allies had predicted that there would be a fight for the "Malay Barrier," the line drawn from Malaya through the East Indies and Middle New Guinea. They did not foresee such an easy loss of Malaya, nor invasions from Indo-China threatening Burma or Japanese naval operations in the Indian Oceans. Both

¹⁷ Glen M. Wilford, *Racing the Sunrise. Reinforcing America's Pacific Outposts, 1941-1942*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010, passim. Note the lack of a mature air warning system proved fatal, as well as MacArthur's decision to let Japan commit the first overt act in the Philippines as per his instructions from Marshall. The extent to which the Pacific had absorbed modern combat aircraft was that it was estimated that only 600 modern combat types remained in the Continental United States, though factories were already producing them at an increasing rate, a number of which were already designated for Britain, China, or Russia. Air crew were already in training from early 1941, though units had to be cobbled together and trained as a team.

¹⁸ Japan's Imperial Rescript Declaring War is reproduced in *The Reports of General MacArthur. The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1966, Volume 2, part 1, plate No. 1. The Japanese decision for war is analyzed by former Japanese officers in Volume 2, Part 1, pp. 1-20; "Japan's Decision for War." Louis Morton in *Command Decisions*. Kent Roberts Greenfield, editor. Washington: Center of Military History, 1960, pp. 99-124.

¹⁹ Louis Morton. *Strategy and Command. The First Two Years*. Washington: Center of Military History, 2000, Chapters IX, XI, XIII; and John Miller, Jr., CARTWHEEL: Reduction of Rabaul. Washington: Center of Military History, 1958; and Grace Person Hayes. *The History of the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF in World War II, The Pacific*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982, Chapters V, VI, VIII, IX, passim.

America and Britain had lost their Pacific battle lines unexpectedly, and the Japanese amphibious landings made with light cover of air or capital ships proceeded at an unpreventable rate.²⁰

The perception that the loss of the battleships at Pearl Harbor was, that the United States was powerless to strike back at Japan. This perception gripped both services despite the fact that apart from the battle line of 9 battleships which was destroyed or damaged, only 3 destroyers and a minelayer were actually destroyed at Pearl Harbor. This left carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and a sizable submarine fleet. The heavy loss of aircraft was almost immediately replaced. Japan had more carriers, and was dominant in battleships, but it was also spread from the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific, and throughout 1942, the Japanese “Mobile Fleet” fought single operations in several successive places. The concept of Carrier Task Forces, though practiced, was seen as a limited naval response. It emerged to be the dominant naval strategy used in the Pacific, used by both the Japanese and the Americans.²¹

While the Coral Sea, Midway, and naval battles off Guadalcanal proved this perception to be false, in December of 1941 this was commonly held, particularly after the sinking of the *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales* left the allies with no operational capital ships in the Far East. Roosevelt searched for a way to change this perception, particularly as the main islands of the Philippines were invaded by the Japanese, and the reinforcements planned for Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s command, now were held in Australia, and were part of America’s new found mission to hold open lines of communication to Australia and New Zealand, a mission ABC-1 had given to the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth.²²

The Allies were a family that could not abandon one cause for another. None of these options fit “Germany First,” in 1942, as the OPD planners saw it. While both heads of state realized that ‘while one child might be supported for school, the other children had to be fed.’ Marshall became very narrow, seeing the only way into Europe was via the English Channel into France, as he had traveled in 1917. He supported MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific out of loyalty to the soldiers there, but his support of China and other “minor” theaters was diminutive and contradictory to his stated aim. His army was organized

²⁰ *Grand Strategy Volume III Parts I and II and Hayes, JCS: The War Against Japan, op. cit., chapters I-V, passim.* The British Commonwealth story is told in Maj. Gen. S. Woodburn Kirby. *The War Against Japan. Volumes 1-3*, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957, 1958 and 1960. *Passim.* These volumes cover Singapore, Malaya and the early Burma Campaigns and illustrate how heavily pressed British and Indian Armed Forces were in the Japanese War. Unspoken in these histories is the common feeling that “No white nation would fall to the Japanese,” a racial prejudice common at the time. This burden fell to the US, to assume the defense of Australia and New Zealand.

²¹ E.J. King. *US Navy at War 1941-1945. Official Reports of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King.* Washington: The Navy Department, 1946, “First Report, Chapter 3 *passim.* See Thomas C. Hone and Trent Hone, *Battle Line. The United States Navy 1919-1939.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006, and *Learning War. US Naval Warfighting Doctrine, 1898-1945.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2021. Note that the US Navy due to shipbuilding begun in the Two Ocean Navy Act, had added 36 plus aircraft carriers to the fleet, and also 10 new battleships, by the end of 1943, making the fleet both balanced in gunpower and air power, though air power remained the center of its offensive capabilities. 124 aircraft carriers were built in US by end of war *World War II: A Statistical Analysis, op. cit., pp.294-295; also, Carriers,* in *World War II-Oxford Guide, op. cit., pp. 150-155.* Significant to nullifying US superiority in submarines was the chronic problems experienced with torpedoes in 1942-1943. Once corrected, the US submarines accounted for about 6 million tons of Japanese shipping. See James H. Belote and William M. Belote, *Titans of the Seas. The Development and Operations of Japan and American Carrier Task Forces During World War.* New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1975, *passim.*

²² *Racing the Sunrise, op. cit., passim.*

to fight the main European battle and the Army Air Force belief in strategic bombing, all told about 3 million men, minus logistics, the fleet and maritime resources, were programmed for the German war.²³

The Navy's crusade to revive ORANGE, and MacArthur's loyalty to liberating the Philippines were "handled" but not major considerations in the final design of the army or its strategy. The stumbling block became the declaration that, "...only the minimum force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany."²⁴ This required a constant practice of judgment calls by the Allied military chiefs on individual cases, and the mere fact that Germany was also fighting in the Middle East was a bone of contention with some U.S. planners, who believed the Pacific should receive more, or who believed the Pacific should be constrained as much as possible.

Despite Roosevelt's demur at holding an immediate meeting, Roosevelt and his unprepared Chiefs of Services agreed to meet Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff Committee (BCOS). The Prime Minister and his military staff, traveled by battleship HMS Duke of York to Washington, arriving on the evening of 22 December, 1941. Churchill and Roosevelt immediately met in private. During the trip across the Atlantic, the BCOS worked with Churchill on basic papers summarizing both recommendations for war strategy and listing points to be discussed. Churchill dictated several papers to summarize the British positions, and these were transmitted in code for approval of the War Cabinet, and also to the British Embassy for reproduction to present to their American counterparts for study prior to their meetings.²⁵

Britain had been at war for over two years, and had gained much experience both in planning and executing strategy. It had been harnessed to an ally whose Army was not equipped for a modern war in 1939, and had withdrawn its forces before they were destroyed, but had lost much of its equipment. It had successfully parried the German Air Force in the Battle of Britain, but had suffered badly during the bombing of cities at night during the "Blitz." It was struggling to survive rising losses at sea due to U-boats, and had fought a see-saw campaign in the Libyan and Egyptian deserts, successfully against the Italians, but less successfully against the Germans that had reinforced them. It was teetering on the edge of disaster in Malaya, and had lost both its capital ships sent to reinforce Singapore in the Far East. Burma had been invaded threatening India, and the East Indies, vital to communications with Singapore and Hong Kong, were threatened. Thus, with her very homeland threatened and bombed, the British prospects were far darker than America's, which was only threatened in the far Pacific.²⁶

Despite this perilous view, gaining America as a wartime partner gave the British hope that all would be reversed with time, though its Chiefs of Staff Committee remained realistic about what

²³ Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell. *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1953; Maurice Matloff. *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*. Washington: Center for Military History, 1959; Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley. *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1955; Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton. *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1968.

²⁴ *Grand Strategy, Volume III, Part ii, op. cit., p. 563*.

²⁵ *The Churchill War Papers. The Ever-Widening War. Volume 3, 1941*. Edited by Martin Gilbert. W.W. Norton and Company, 2000, pp. "Memorandum on the Conduct of the War, part I, Atlantic Front; Memorandum on the Conduct of the War, part 2, Pacific Front, Memorandum on the Future Conduct of the War, Part III, 1943, and Memorandum on the Future Conduct of the War, Part IV, Notes on the Pacific. Pp. 1633-1637; 1639-1641; 1642-1644; 1649-1653. See also Andrew Rawson. *Organizing Victory. The War Conferences. 1941-1945*. Stroud: History Press, 2013.

²⁶ Kirby, *War in the Far East*, *Ibid*.

resources had to be focused to avoid unnecessary disasters, though clearly the Far East would suffer the loss of Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong. The British readily grasped that Russia's army would fight the bulk of Germany's land forces, and Britain sought to play its high cards, the Air Force and the Navy, wherever applicable. As in the First World War, the new British Liberation Army (as opposed to Expeditionary Force), would be an ally with the larger sized forces provided by a nation with a larger population.²⁷

While America was unthreatened on the ground by the Germans, America was about to suffer stinging defeats in shipping losses immediately off her east coast throughout most of 1942, and was reeling from losses at Pearl Harbor, Wake, and the invasion of the Philippines. Churchill and his military planners were concerned foremost with the extent that the Pacific would draw America away from its ABC-1 agreements and her Lend-Lease agreements. Moreover, Churchill placed a high premium on the arrival of US combat aircraft in the British Isles, not simply to demonstrate unanimity with the beleaguered British people, but to begin air operations across the Channel, which always was a priority for the Prime Minister as a way to hit back at the enemy in Europe. He was also concerned that America would immediately send troops to help secure the UK, to release British divisions to be sent to both the Middle East and Far East. Roosevelt readily agreed with these requests.

No surprises were intended by the British. The group on HMS York signaled ahead that its aim was to agree on the basis for a joint strategy; to implement immediate measures required including distribution of forces based on this strategy; to allocate forces needed to follow that strategic program including a calendar of training and equipment production to support the strategy. They also recommended the creation of joint committees for logistical planning and allocation of resources.²⁸

Churchill had produced three major papers by narrating his ideas, and had then harmonized them with the attendant Chiefs of Staff Committee, and sent copies to the War Cabinet²⁹. They were finalized and delivered to Roosevelt and his service chiefs upon arrival, thus giving them a basis to begin discussions. His paper on the "Atlantic Theater," was concise, and outlined not only basic strategic intentions as seen by the Prime Minister, but had synopsised the basic ideas that Churchill had unveiled in his nearly daily correspondence with the President.

To Churchill, basic strategy for the Atlantic had to include the prompt and continuous support of the Russian war effort. Expecting that the Libyan campaign would conclude fortuitously in the near future,

²⁷ The shortage of manpower, and the huge size of the RAF and Royal Navy/Merchant Navy meant that the UK deployed an army half as large as in the First World War. Until 1943 when manpower limits were imposed, the US Army planners sneered at British concerns over losses, numbers of divisions that could be raised, and the idea of protracted continental warfare. For British concerns, see *Churchill War Papers, Volume 2, Never Surrender, July-December 1940*-New York: W.W. Norton, 1995, pp. 492-493. Churchill informed his chief of production of the necessity of switching to bomber production after defense of UK is successful. S

He said an "exterminating bombardment of Germany" is strategically, the only way out of war with Germany. He notes specifically that British do not have "a continental army," referring to the size correlated to that of Germans.

²⁸ John Ehrman. *Grand Strategy Volume III, parts I and 2, and appendices*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964. This comprises the most concise statement of British Strategy as it evolved during the war, and reproduces several key documents as appendices. The entire series covers the war at strategic, operational and tactical levels.

²⁹ It is apparent the Churchill shared his correspondence with the War Cabinet and thus the BCOS, but that Roosevelt often did not share "discussions" with his Joint Chiefs. Field Marshal Dill on occasion shared copies with Gen. Marshall that were never given to him by the President.

he noted that impelling Turkey to join the Allies would be important, but that the complete capture of North Africa would be necessary to end the problems in the Mediterranean. It also followed the ABC-1 proposition that French North Africa should not be ceded to German control. He noted that a combined landing of US and British forces in French Northwest Africa would give the Allies free play from the coasts from Dakar to Suez. Thereafter they would invite the French to both join the Associated Powers as well as send their fleet from Toulon and Oran to join the Allied fleets. This would totally blockade France, which upon violation of their armistice, would immediately be occupied by the Germans. This occupation would draw more divisions forward, and hopefully away from the east, and leave the Germans in France open to raids and air attacks from the Mediterranean.³⁰

Churchill's strategy paper, "W.W.1," reaffirmed the Europe first policy, asked for American troops to replace British forces in Northern Ireland and England to permit British reinforcements being sent to the Middle East, and asked that American bombers be sent to the United Kingdom to cooperate with the Royal Air Force Bomber Command, in both winning air superiority and beginning the destruction of key German industries.³¹ This was positively received by the Americans who were still adapting to war time conditions. It did not differ from any of the ABC-1 discussions and agreements.

Despite their preoccupation with "aiding" the Philippines by hiring blockade runners to attempt to penetrate the blockade surrounding the Philippines, the Americans agreed with W.W.1 and its thrust. No comparable document then existed in American War Plans.³² During the conference, specifics were dealt with by the military and naval leaders, while the political leaders solidified their trust. For the American military, this conference broke new ground in strategic cooperation as to the participation of the American Chiefs of the military services in both coalition planning, and joint planning among services, as well as meeting with an allied heads of state in formal conference.

Called "ARCADIA," the first Allied military conference met in Washington from 23 December, 1941 until 14 January, 1942. Several immediate decisions were made, not only to confirm the basic tenets of ABC-1 into concrete actions, but also to establish a permanent war council, called The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) along with a permanent combined staff, to be established in Washington, DC. The CCS would consist of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee (BCOS) and their American counterparts, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, technically Marshall's subordinate. (This gave an air counterpart to the Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force.) The CCS became a permanent body for the duration, and its influence over all military operations

³⁰ *The Churchill War Papers, Volume 3, 1941. The Ever Widening War.* Martin Gilbert, editor. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001, "Memorandum on the Conduct of the War. Part I-The Atlantic Front, December 16, 1941, pp. 1633-1637. Discussion of this argument and the American response is contained in both Grand Strategy Volume II, part 2 and Coalition War Planning, 1941-1942. A detailed examination of shipping and supply is in Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley. *Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943.* Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955.

³¹ Grand Strategy, Volume III, Part I; Volume III Part II, Appendix 1. "W.W.1" reproduced in Part I, pp. 345-348.

³² Dwight D. Eisenhower would oversee a series of papers in February commonly called the Eisenhower studies that would be the basis for Marshall's discussions throughout 1942. See Matloff and Snell, *Coalition Strategic Planning, op. cit., pp. 156-159.* Many of these papers are reproduced in full in *The Eisenhower Papers: The War Years. Volume 1.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.

was supreme. The new American organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (JCS), became a permanent sitting body with a separate staff, and would be institutionalized by law after World War II.³³

Nothing occurred at ARCADIA that was a new policy idea. Initially, Churchill requested that Iceland be taken over by the Americans to free forces for combat employment. Churchill's intent was to free up British divisions for use in the Western Desert to complete that campaign and if necessary, create reserves for use in the Far East. Divisions in the UK besides defending the coast, also maneuvered and rehearsed tasks for the eventual invasion of France, as well as developing methods, equipment, and plans for the future invasion of Europe.³⁴

The outgoing Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Sir John Dill, remained in Washington as the Head of the British Military Mission which comprised deputies for the CIGS, First Sea Lord, and Chief of the Air Staff in Washington. The actual British principals would only meet the JCS during periodic conferences held between their political chiefs, though the CCS would meet weekly to coordinate staff papers and take decisions as needed, with the British deputies attending and holding the authority to represent their chiefs. These plenipotentiaries were called the British Joint Staff Mission (JSM). All their papers and decisions were coordinated with and approved by the War Cabinet in London before CCS presentation.³⁵

In the papers presented for consideration, Churchill had outlined a plan calling for the securing of the British Isles and the Northwestern Portion of North Africa in 1942, and the invasion of Europe from the west in 1943. These propositions, would by the end of the summer, be agreed to in several further conferences, though somewhat modified during the ongoing campaign in the Western Desert, and also the North African operation. GYMNAST thus eventually was fleshed out, but only after bitter debate after ARCADIA, where it appeared to be an accepted plan. The landings in Europe would depend upon immediate success in North Africa, though the Americans would try to veer from this in the post ARCADIA period of CCS meetings and would propose their own plan.

At ARCADIA, the Combined Staffs accepted a Campaign Plan for the immediate future on 31 December 1941, essentially as laid out in W.W. 1. It formalized the basic ideas set out in ABC-1 in light of the current war situation, and provided a set of fundamentals to guide the Combined planners as a basis for their planning. This period also began an internal rift with the Americans, particularly the Army and Air Force planners, who were leaning heavily toward RAINBOW 5's stricture that the Pacific should only get the minimum forces needed, and would also be influenced by the prospects of winning the war in the Atlantic.³⁶

Given also to the Americans at ARCADIA, was an outline plan, ROUNDUP, then under discussion by the British Joint Planners. It assumed a breakdown or significant weakening in the west permitting a landing in France. Churchill called the name adopted, "presumptuous," and the absent, newly appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Gen. Alan Brooke, thought the plan unworkable but possessing

³³ Steven R. Rearden. *Council of War. A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1991*. Washington: Director of the Joint Staff, 2012, Chapter 1, passim.

³⁴ Rawson, *Organizing Victory, op. cit.*, pp. 9-36, passim; Fergusson, *The Watery Maze, op. cit.*

³⁵ Grand Strategy, Strategy and Command; Andrew Rawson. *Organizing Victory: The War Conferences 1941-1945*. Stroud: The History Press, 2013, pp. 9-36; 36-40. See also Allied Conference Report, Carl Digital Library, USACGSC, Ft. Leavenworth.

³⁶ *Grand Strategy, Volume III, Part 1, op. cit.*, p. 337.

interesting concepts, but currently unusable. Produced by the British Joint Plans Staff, and shelved by the Combined Commanders' staff as impractical at this point in the war, the plan gained new life dominating American and British discussions for the next year. ROUNDUP was conceived not for invasion against a fully ready adversary or the reinforced German army already in France, it was meant for a German opponent already weakened heavily in the east and by a sustained bomber offensive and blockade. These were logical conceptions to the British at this point in the war, but unexpectedly, their Allies generated a different view. The Americans would soon run with the plan, making it their own, and creating an entirely different set of operational assumptions.³⁷

ARCADIA's final report clearly outlined the decisions over strategy, of which the first four were of later discussion almost as a buyer's regret by the Americans. These were:

- (a) *The realization of the victory programme [sic] of armaments, which first and foremost requires the security of the main areas of war industry.*
- (b) *The maintenance of essential communications.*
- (c) *Closing and tightening the ring around Germany.*
- (d) *Wearing down and undermining German resistance by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and propaganda.*³⁸

A clear understanding of the two view points of the President and the Prime Minister is essential, before any discussion of the opinions of the JCS and BCOS are examined. Both heads of State recognized that the war was about the future of the world, and they wanted to align the democracies together, including reuniting with France, and hopefully including Nationalist China and the Soviet Union in the family of nations. While the Prime Minister and BCOS generally espoused identical ideas after the War Cabinet had discussed their views, the same was never true of the President and JCS, among which three distinct views could be heard, that of the President supported by Leahy, his chief of staff who was appointed in July, 1942. The other two voices were that of Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, and that of King, who replaced Stark as Chief of Naval Operations, both of whom favored service connected strategies, the Army for Europe, and the Navy supporting the Pacific. Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces (AAF), who supported having air power everywhere, most wanted a strategic bombing campaign in Europe and was generally understood to be loyal to Marshall's view.

While the JCS later combined over the ROUNDUP/OVERLORD discussion, they frequently differed over the Pacific, the Mediterranean, and the value of strategic bombing versus a ground or naval campaign. King supported "Germany First" in principle, but skimmed on naval commitments to any Army-inspired amphibious operation in the Mediterranean or Europe. He was slow to give priority for escorts to the Atlantic and balanced Pacific and Atlantic wars until forced by both Heads of state to prioritize Atlantic convoy protection and the antisubmarine war.³⁹

Organization for Policy and Decisions

³⁷ Op., pp 568-569; Matloff and Snell, op. cit., pp. 180, 185-186. See also the Bernard Fergusson. *The Watery Maze. The Story of Combined Operations*. New York: Holt, Rhinehardt and Winston, 1961. Pp. 142-155 passim.

³⁸ *Grand Strategy, Volume III/II, Appendix 1, "Washington War Conference, American and British Strategy, Memorandum by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff*, p. 669.

³⁹ See *British Grand Strategy volumes, op. cit., and Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II, op. cit; Stoler, Allies and Adversaries*, is the most complete inside view of JCS regarding Europe.

A series of Post-ARCADIA meetings were held to complete staff coordination and to establish the Combined Chiefs' Staff in Washington. The CCS assigned staff prepared papers, based on original discussions for the CCS to consider, or for completing or modifying their original estimates and recommendations. At this time, the staff organization for the Combined Chiefs grew in its Washington base. Until the JCS formed its own permanent organization to deal with ongoing CCS strategy recommendations, the idea of a post conference set of meetings as "special" was finally dropped for constant coordination and frequent committee meetings for strategy, policy, logistics, and special considerations for Lend Lease. These meetings featured a constant set of estimates and position papers written by the CCS Committees outlining future operations as well as those items requiring immediate decision for allocation of assets. Major decisions requiring political decision were staffed and either presented separately to the President and Prime Minister or held for decision at the next major allied conference. Minor decisions and coordination were made at weekly CCS meetings, or through papers staffed by the CCS committees and staff.⁴⁰

The CCS staff system prevented major surprises in meetings and was designed for the lower levels to solve problems over policies and forces to be decided upon. Roosevelt and Churchill often used papers as the basis for their running conversations based on their correspondence or occasional transatlantic phone calls. While Churchill provided copies of his messages to the War Cabinet on key issues, Roosevelt rarely shared them with his military leaders. Both political leaders used "trial balloons" in both correspondence and discussion, causing the military planners to scurry to identify the real from the fanciful. While the British were finely synced by the War Cabinet system, the American JCS was loosely tethered to industry, mobilization, or long-term policy concerns by their Service Secretaries who may or may not have been included by the President as the President tended to deal with individuals, not a formed cabinet.⁴¹

Roosevelt shook up the Navy Department in early 1942, with a change of the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark) to a new Chief, Admiral Ernest J. King who also took over as Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, putting him directly over all US Naval elements at sea world wide, and giving him ultimate operational control. King sought to go on the offensive in the Pacific as the best way to stave off Japanese advances. MacArthur, whose Philippine garrison was besieged and starving, felt oppressed both by Washington's lassitude in not sending his replacements forward and by the Navy's refusal to break the Japanese blockade of the Philippines with their substantial forces in Hawaii. The American press trumpeted the Pacific Campaign placing great pressure on the White House to fight what Americans considered the real enemy, the Japanese, who had attacked them by surprise. The War Department, however, was adamant in sticking to Germany First.⁴²

⁴⁰ Rearden, *Council of War*, op. cit., Rawson, *Organizing Victory*, op. cit., pp 36-38.

⁴¹ A special device for encrypting or "scrambling" these calls, called SIGSALLY was used. Churchill dealt extensively through memos and papers, preferring precision in details that could be recorded. Roosevelt committed little to paper, often forbade notes from being taken at meetings, and was known to recant or deny decisions that later became contentious. Leahy added efficiency to the President's freewheeling style by ensuring that memos, and a written record be created whenever possible in matters that he was responsible for. Hopkins also kept notes dutifully to assist the staff.

⁴² The primary staff officer assigned to assist the Philippines was Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had served on MacArthur's staff in the Philippines. He confirmed the Germany First principle and that the Philippines was unsavable. See Eisenhower Papers, Volume 1, op. cit., passim. While attempting to aid MacArthur with blockade

The JCS system despite its “Joint Staff,” still had Army-Navy-Air prejudices due to its membership, none of whom had real “Joint” experience, nor who abandoned ideas that were service-centric. Command loomed as the sole way for a service to establish its strategy in an area, and thus command became the true decision factor in the long run. What the committees were required to do, however, was to produce a single recommendation for each problem. Roosevelt’s dealings with Churchill privately by message and phone, however, left the American subordinates often without guidance.

Until Admiral William Leahy became Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff in mid-summer, 1942, no ad hoc chairman existed for the JCS and Leahy refused to act as a formal Chair, though he attended all JCS meetings and most CCS meetings. As Leahy dealt personally with Roosevelt daily, he was able to interpret Roosevelt’s ideas. He also saw the correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt. Until then, the CCS was often treated to an American vs. American argument, that had no solution, while the British always maintained a single policy, previously agreed in War Cabinet meetings. This made them doubly armed at the conference table. They had already devised a course of action, and that course was approved by their Prime Minister and cabinet and supported by detailed analysis by the staff outlining requirements and shortfalls. The BCOS had a chairman, with Admiral Pound serving early in the war, and later was replaced by Gen. Alan Brooke. Both held this position in addition to their duties as First Sea Lord and CIGS.

Marshall and King agreed to give Marshall the voice for European strategy, and King for Pacific operations, a fact that did not prevent King from objecting to almost any British idea. This however, left Arnold to kibitz in both theaters, as well as the Army fighting for shipping with King, who dominated all US shipping construction and allocation, especially those of landing craft. Leahy’s refusal to serve as a true Chairman resolved no deep-felt differences in strategy which often required Presidential decisions, which sometimes were half measures giving both sides something and solving nothing.⁴³

The JCS was not a comfortable system for services accustomed to be independent of each other, and at no time was the JCS as proficient at joint strategy than were their British counterparts who had a Joint Service Chiefs Committee for more than twenty years. Too often, JCS decisions and arguments were driven by service selfishness, and the refusal to accept that Grand Strategy was determined by the governments, and that they were subordinates. The British followed directives once decisions were made by their superiors in Whitehall. British unanimity in policies led to a belief that Roosevelt was being duped by Churchill, and that the Americans until 1944, had no influence in strategy, factors that were never true.

runners, he also “hired” former Secretary of War, Patrick Hurley as a reserve Brig. Gen. to go to Australia and locally procure what aid was possible. Hurley would end up as Presidential Representative to Chiang Kai Shek.
⁴³ For insights into the evolution of how American representation evolved, see General Albert C. Wedemeyer. *Wedemeyer Reports!* New York: Holt, 1958; Henry L. Stimson & McGeorge Bundy. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949. See Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy. London. *I Was There*. William D. Gollantz Ltd, 1950, and Philip Payson O’Brien, *The Second Most Powerful Man in the World*. New York: Dutton, 2019. Leahy was not officially Chairman of the JCS as that position did not exist until 1947. He was however, the accepted spokesman for the President, though Marshall or King often spoke for the Americans depending upon which theater was under discussion, Marshall for Europe and King for the Pacific. This represented more cant than unity. After 1944, the Americans tended to disagree with every British input as if their surging numbers granted them special worth. This added a broad front to Europe, and an irrelevance to the Far East and Mediterranean, and two separate theaters in the Pacific. The Combined Bomber Offensive was never viewed as decisive until the Strategic Bombing Survey justified it. The strategy might be viewed as effective but not efficient. Note the Army Services Forces allocated military supply ships originating from the United States.

The President had simply decided against his chiefs on a number of issues, mostly small, but at least several, of major policy dimensions.⁴⁴

This was a factor as Americans had no harmonized strategy agreed to, even with Rainbow 5. This was especially true concerning the Mediterranean which was already an active war zone before America entered the war, and the Pacific, which the Army thought should be simply a holding action. RAINBOW 5, really became a basis for change, not a blueprint for deployment or operations once the war began. The German front did get the major share of support, but the Pacific was supported with the means needed to move ahead, if not more slowly than the Pacific commanders wished. Once the original building schedule for the two ocean Navy was completed, the Pacific received a greater number of warships, auxiliaries, landing craft, and virtually all the Fleet Carriers and Fleet submarines.⁴⁵

After ARCADIA these systemic organizational inefficiencies caused a number of changes in both organization and practice. The “Marshall Reorganization” of the Army in March, 1942, greatly expedited dealings with the effective British Chiefs of Staff Committee and their practiced War Cabinet System, both of which had dominated the early staff conversations and the Allied ARCADIA conference. Churchill’s government had already developed the habit of both “fighting” in the theaters of war, and fully coordinating their command and staff machinery with the War Cabinet in London.⁴⁶ As Churchill also held the position of Defense Minister, he was at the center of the War Cabinet and personally was involved in matters of war. British staffs were far ahead in both planning and in identifying theater shortfalls, a skill learned over decades of “Imperial” planning with the Empire. The Americans in order to present their own strategies and plans, had reformed their staff system. The Navy, with King both in charge of the staff and bureaus, and operationally, overseeing the fleet, had far less a problem.⁴⁷

The Army reorganization made Marshall the dominant chair against a triumvirate of Commanding Generals of Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, and Army Air Forces, three men who essentially ran all the business of the Continental Army, from training and doctrine, to supply, transportation and air power. While the AAF and ASF had responsibilities overseas in the theaters of war, the overseas theaters were commanded by men responsible to the Combined Chiefs via their own service chief, but nevertheless under Allied strategic direction. Army Ground forces was responsible for individual training

⁴⁴ Kent Roberts Greenfield. *American Strategy in World War II*. Malabar: Krieger Publishing, 1962, 1982. The author was Chief Historian at Office of Chief of Military History and oversaw writing of the War Department series. His objective insights give a deeper understanding into the Americans problems of deciding military factors in Grand Strategy. He also credits Roosevelt’s ability to steer the JCS towards an outcome that he wanted. He is far more objective than Matloff, Snell, or Leighton, who wrote the Grand Strategy volumes and who inevitably depict everything in Marshall’s perspective as being correct.

^M *Matloff and Snell, op. cit., Chapters VI and VII, passim*. Both Global Logistics volumes in this series details support and deployments to all theaters. While it is apparent that the British wanted the CCS to approve the distribution of warships to theaters, King would never countenance this and no one curbed his actions even when they were detrimental to European naval operations.

⁴⁶ Colonel R.D.Q. Henriques. *Planning. The Second World War Series, Army*. London; The War Office, 1954. This in-depth study explains the British planning, War Cabinet, and War Office system focusing on Operational Planning and Strategy. Henriques, was a Combined Operations Planner.

⁴⁷ Mark A. Stoler. *Allies and Adversaries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Strategy in World War II*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. This illuminates the JCS’s opposition to Roosevelt’s ideas, and their attempts to govern Grand Strategy in the name of military reasoning. It should be read in conjunction with the War Department series on Strategy and Logistics to understand the logistical background of the arguments made.

of ground soldiers, their formation into units and unit training, and then their assignment to fill theater demands. It had no direct overseas responsibility. AGF did, however, have responsibility for Army doctrine and the individual tables of organization and equipment (TOE) for every unit in the United States Army, except those of the AAF, which managed both its doctrine and the TOE's authorized.⁴⁸

Marshall used his own "Command Post," the Operations and Planning Division (OPD) both to direct and manage US Army operations. OPD became all powerful as Marshall's own personal staff group. Thus, freed from administrative management, though not responsibility, he directly took up a cudgel against the British. This theme of "us and them" was prevalent throughout the war, and supported by his own actions on virtually every issue. His relations with the Navy were no better, as King was no cooperator and was never personally a friend of Marshall.⁴⁹

The war in Washington in the spring of 1942, did not absorb the anticipatory fear, frustration, or resolve of those fighting the "hold back the enemy war" in the Pacific, save of course the Navy Department which withdrew both carriers and battleships from the Atlantic to send to the Pacific. Moreover, the War Department did not accept the need to launch limited offensives to seize the initiative from the still rampaging Japanese offensive. From February 1942 onwards throughout the year, the War Department planners became increasingly stiff-necked in defining Germany First as providing only the bare minimum to prevent disasters in the Pacific. This was especially true of OPD's first chief, recently promoted Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower.⁵⁰

With heightened belief in their own view being supported with the creation of OPD, many American Army planners saw the tenets of RAINBOW 5 being violated, having already assumed that ABC-1 had been modified or overcome by events permitting more support for the Pacific. The final revision of RAINBOW 5 in November 41, had declared that, "the Broad strategic objective of the Associated Powers will be the defeat of Germany and her Allies." "Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area was considered to be decisive. RAINBOW 5 added Japan as a lesser priority, but no percentages of support had been dictated, a factor that had yet to be worked out to anyone's satisfaction, especially as the American public was eager to destroy the Japanese as the Pacific war dominated the war news.

BOLERO, SICKEL, SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, (CCS) immediately grappled with the American perceptions of ABC-1. The British Chiefs of Staff (BCOS) clearly followed the lead both of the Prime Minister and his War Cabinet, viewing the war in Clausewitz's terms "a continuation of policy by other means." They clearly understood the linkage between Empire survival and the destruction of their enemies, and shaped their campaign plans to those two considerations.

The American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), saw two enemies to be destroyed, Germany and Japan, and ignored Italy and its role in Africa and the Middle East-Atlantic link. The American simplification of this evolved by the middle of spring, 1942, to an immediate invasion of Northwest Europe, and a stop gap

⁴⁸ *Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, op. cit., Chapter 1, passim.

⁴⁹ Ray S. Cline. *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951.

⁵⁰ Matloff and Snell, op. cit., Chapter VII, passim.; Eisenhower Papers, Volume 1, op. cit., contains all the major policy papers handled during Eisenhower's tenure.

Pacific war which when Europe was handled, would become the previous Plan ORANGE war that had always been theorized. American war planners had no concept of a future world order. Post war conditions, were initially never considered by the War Department or the Navy. Roosevelt, however, had made a Declaration of the United Nations on January 1, 1942, and sought consistently to convert this into a future League of Nations, to replace Woodrow Wilson's failed ideal including the devolution of the European colonial-economic system.⁵¹

Before any concept of where to fight the war could be acceptable, the critical question of when, would have to be answered. No argument was ever made against the fact that Northwest Europe would evolve to become the decisive theater, but the question of how and when that could happen had to be addressed. Those questions were inseparably linked. The British simply wanted Germany stretched, weakened by bombing, and pressed from all sides before the main campaign in Western Europe could be mounted. The Americans held the antithesis view; they wanted a major landing and direct battle for Europe as soon as possible, in 1943, with a diversionary landing to begin in 1942. While the AAF wanted a year of bombing to precede an invasion, this was never War Department priority, though they fully supported a massive air buildup to parallel a buildup of forces in the UK. BOLERO, that buildup, was a prime goal of the War Department, and SICKEL, the air buildup, was often considered part of it, and therefore referred to less often.⁵²

Surveying their forces, the Allies had significant strength, but it was badly dispersed to dominate any specific battle space. America's Armed Forces were mainly in the Continental United States, with two thirds of its fleet centered on Pearl Harbor, and the remaining third in the Atlantic. Its Army Air Force was mainly in training, and its strategic bombardment force was scattered, awaiting deployment to overseas assignments. While more than 25 divisions could claim to have "graduated" from their training in the Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941, most of these had been "scalped" to provide cadre for new divisions forming with draftees, and the wave of post Pearl Harbor volunteers. Landing craft were mainly prototypes based on British design, or which had evolved in the US Navy in the past several years. The few amphibious craft that existed, were used to provide training for two regular Army divisions, and two Marine divisions.⁵³

⁵¹ Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell. *Strategic Planning For Coalition Warfare. 1941-1942*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1986, Chapters VII, VIII and X, passim. The British War Cabinet met with the BCOS, and Churchill informed them of his policies for the future and shared his correspondence with Roosevelt. The Americans did not have this policy guidance from Roosevelt, and both Marshall and King resented policy shaping Grand Strategy, which was a British term. They viewed military strategy in terms of fighting the enemy. This attitude never changed in the rest of the Twentieth Century, and has colored "Military Histories."

⁵² Op. cit. BOLERO was a detailed buildup plan, carefully mixing the Troop Distribution Plan for Europe into Divisions, major headquarters, combat service support, and supply and ammunition Stockage. SICKEL was a plan to create the full aerial support for the campaign, initially under Eighth Air Force with an even distribution of air groups, and supporting organizations in groups, with about a 2:1 distribution of heavy bomber groups to fighters. BOLERO took into account shipping which initially supporting moves of elements and then later shifted to support of those units. The SICKEL plus bombing cycle would therefore be approximately 18 months from the beginning of deployment.

⁵³ The US Army official histories concerning *Strategy and Logistics*, and *Coalition Warfare* planning gives deployment numbers, theater statistics, and the actual deployment of divisions by date. The Statistics of the Army Air Forces gives detailed AAF statistics including aircraft losses, casualties, and strengths by type airplane. *US Navy at War*, King's reports, is vague and does not list ship totals by fleet or battle, though it lists all US warships lost.

Britain had forces at home for defense, a Canadian Corps training in England, and divisions scattered in the Middle East, Palestine, Malaya, India, and Burma. Half its forces were Commonwealth Troops, and with Australia and New Zealand now threatened, those governments demanded their forces be sent back from the Middle East to defend their own homeland. Most were returned, requiring a double shipment of troops to and from areas to replace units.

Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command was formed but awaiting its first four-engine bomber, a necessity to give the Command adequate bomb loads to justify the investment in crews and aircraft expected for the long bombing campaign. Britain had hoped the Americans would join them, preferably at night, as daylight bombing had proved prohibitive in cost and with little demonstrated, *op. cit.*, results. American strategic bombing theory demanded daylight strikes to precise targets, not area bombing as practiced by the RAF.

Churchill correctly believed that Europe should be targeted for Allied operations, but not until preparations for a decisive force be made, and that the essential campaigns in the Middle East and Far East be advanced from defeat or a situation in which a strategic shift was not dangerous. Russia must be helped. Roosevelt agreed with this in principle, but both Marshall and King veered to more pronounced views of decisive action in either the Atlantic or Pacific areas.

America drew a line through all three major theaters. Several mantras were heard from the War Department. "Concentrate in Europe," "land in France to help Russia if only by a diversion," and "mount major operations in Northwest Europe in 1943." "Halt the enemy everywhere else." Africa, which was already a planned and ticketed expedition, would be cancelled as indecisive. These thoughts were but an undercurrent at ARCADIA, but grew rapidly after the post-conference discussions, and increasingly underscored American positions.⁵⁴

Though losing badly in the Pacific, the initial War Department reflex was to send bombers to England "to begin slugging at the Germans," while troop transfers could be planned and shipping and landing craft were being produced. No intent to rob Lend Lease of shipping was proposed, but new shipping and landing craft were fast coming down the ways and some headway could be made in these by late in the year, and these fed an unfulfilled optimistic view. Africa, not accepted as a decisive theater, should be scrapped in the American view, leaving the British to be stuck there with the bulk of its forces, which somehow could be shifted to the mainland in Europe. This view predominated by March, 1942 as Eisenhower dominated OPD planning.⁵⁵

This was clearly revealed in the different military interpretations of invading North Africa, but the more political view was taken by the heads of state. Both Churchill and Roosevelt saw great import in returning France to the Allied side, though each had far different subliminal purposes. Churchill wanted to restore France as an allied power in future Europe; Roosevelt wanted to begin divesting France of her colonies through the means of granting them independence. While these war aims were at loggerheads, the means, an invasion of North Africa, linked their choice of operations. The JCS having no tradition of

Ellis, *Statistical Survey of World War II* lists forces and totals by years and campaigns. The *Army Almanac*, 1950 edition, gives excellent data on World War II and comparative World War I data in previous chapters.

⁵⁴ Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.*, Chapters VIII, IX, and X *passim*.

⁵⁵ *The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower. The War Years. Volume 1., op. cit., passim*. This contains bulk of planning statements and planning for 1942 from ROUNDUP to TORCH.

either cooperation or being a political international body, sought only service defined campaigns, not political victories. Africa did not play well to either the US Army or Navy as neither viewed the Mediterranean as linked to Germany's defeat, though the airmen eventually viewed the eastern Mediterranean in 1943, as rich in airfields to hit Southern Germany as well as oil fields in Romania. It took Air Marshal Portal to explain this to Arnold whose planners agreed.⁵⁶

The British believed that the Mediterranean base would expose Hitler's southern flank, and also put bombers in range of deep targets in southern Germany or in the east where industry and oil was out of Bomber Command's reach. No plans existed yet for a campaign there, but Italy had a large modern fleet, and along with the French fleet controlled by Vichy, these ships could dominate the Mediterranean if joined. Keeping them apart, therefore, was a strategic aim for the forces already deployed to Africa as part of the Commonwealth force. While Malta and Gibraltar appeared to cork the Mediterranean basin from right and left, the disputed middle sea was crucial to Britain for supply which was now forced south of the Cape to nourish Egypt or India with supplies. This added the requirement for over 200 additional ships per month, a million tons of shipping, due to the additional sailing time.⁵⁷

Churchill committed to a landing in France in his "Atlantic Paper" delivered at ARCADIA, and also agreed with the ROUNDUP plan presented by Marshall in April, 1942. These of course were "*contingent* on the ongoing situation, not in lieu of the ongoing campaign." He did not commit to a timescale, and with GYMNAST, it was assumed as he explained to Stalin, that Europe could be threatened from its "Soft Underbelly." While this followed in his support of an invasion of Sicily to seal the Mediterranean nearly a year later, he also noted Southern France as an avenue for possible assault.

No British plans existed at this time for any moves eastward in the Mediterranean, and finishing Africa if GYMNAST was accomplished, was first on Britain's list. This made a 1942 landing in Europe, especially one of high risk and no guaranteed result, a costly impossibility. The British Joint Planners continued to plan raids and small operations, but as in ROUNDUP, they believed that neither the assets, nor the forces available could successfully land and remain in Europe for a protracted campaign. Churchill hoped that forces could be freed to commit to France in 1943, but certainly not in early spring which was an American objective, despite its own shipping and mobilization plan which would not finish its planned basic phase, till July, 1943. Noteworthy is that the Victory Program upon this was based, did not account for the continuous attrition being suffered in the Atlantic. Nor did the called for movement of a million

⁵⁶ Air War Plan 4 had predicted that a yet to be procured aircraft, the B29 or B32, would target German industry from North African fields in 1944. Air routes to Karachi, India and then to China or Australia were already of concern to US air planners. See *US Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume 1. Plans and Operations*. Craven and Cate editors. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 311, 315. While the US Army looked to a direct confrontation frontally, the airmen preferred a concentric concentration to hit a wider array of targets while stretching the enemy's air defense all along its periphery. Air war planners had theorized the acceptance of a very long range bomber to bomb German targets from Egypt or Libya in 1942. As a spin off of this, a small raid was launched on the Romanian oil fields in 1942, with most of the planes diverting to Turkey afterwards where the crews were interned.

⁵⁷ Maurice Matloff. *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare. 1943-1944*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, pp. 10-11, 25; see also *Grand Strategy, Volume III, parts 1 and 2, op. cit.* Matloff discusses shipping, *op. cit.*, p. 46 cites the total as two million tons to be saved.

men and aircraft and supplies, account for shipping needed for lend lease, which had to predominate over any invasion plan.⁵⁸

Unstated by Marshall's planners during this period, was the fact that the Germans commenced "DRUMBEAT," their concentration and attack by U-boats of unprotected shipping along the East coast of America, and later also in the vital Gulf of Mexico, from which much shipping came carrying west coast produced goods. This now posed a threat to Lend-Lease and any shipment of troops overseas, which would use the Gulf coast ports for deployment.

DRUMBEAT eventually claimed 397 ships sunk in US Navy protected coastal waters in 1942, causing even Gen. Marshall to write King noting the losses of army-designated supply ships. It took half of the 1942 period to settle defenses among air and naval headquarters, and civilians such as the Civil Air Patrol, until an integrated warning and protection system was evolved. Losses in coastal waters continued to be high throughout 1942, both near the coast and in the far Atlantic. King stood up TENTH Fleet, a symbolic headquarters run out of his office to oversee US Naval operations against submarines including a mirror image decryption capability matching Bletchley Park to feed submarine messages to the fleet. Initially, this was not enough.⁵⁹

The Atlantic war was being lost in 1942. It was the vital war that Lend Lease, and every overseas operation in every theater was affected by. Ships lost in the Atlantic, could not count on shipping taken from the Pacific for replacement as that theater was also critical, so lost shipping had to be replaced by new construction and the training of new crews. Doenitz, the head of German submarine forces thus became the only Axis commander, who "had to be beaten," to permit Allied victory. American production, whose value was undeniable, was being lost as sunk cargo within the holds of more than a thousand ships as losses rose dramatically. This situation gravely affected any operation that Britain could subscribe to for 1942 and 1943.

Shipping produced in 1942 equaled about 7.75 million tons built and in 1943, 19.2 million tons were added. Over 1100 ships totaling about 6.1 million tons were sunk in 1942 and over 1.5 million tons were sunk in the first six months of 1943 after which U-boat sinking dramatically rose and shipping lost fell to 2.1 million tons and 363 ships. In 1942, the Germans were building two submarines for every one lost. This trend did not end till May, 1943, when the Atlantic war suddenly turned.⁶⁰

Churchill and Stalin, both on the receiving end of those convoys, realized that the master card was the seemingly instantly produced Liberty Ship, and what it could carry in cargo and troops, not far-flung campaigns that could not be supplied or transported in unsafe waters. The survival of these ships turned not just on Bletchley created intelligence, but more so on escort ships, long range aircraft, and the still being produced light carriers and escorts that would form the Hunter-Killer Groups that would purge the ocean of U-boats. All the transport of men and material relied upon this, and these factors would not be

⁵⁸ Churchill War Papers, "Ever Widening War." "Atlantic," *op. cit.*

⁵⁹ Michael Gannon. *Operation DRUMBEAT*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1990, pp. 388-389; Ladislav Farago. *The TENTH Fleet*. New York: Ivan Obelensky, 1962. Bletchley Park was the location of the British code breaking operation that was vital to the entire war effort. See E.F. Hinsley. *British Intelligence in the Second World War. Abridged edition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

⁶⁰ Gannon, *op. cit.*, 390-396. *World War II Statistical Analysis, op. cit.*, p. 267. See especially, *The Defeat of the Enemy Attack On Shipping, 1939-1945. Naval Staff History, Volumes 1 and 2*. (Eric Grove, editor) Naval Records Society, Ashgate, Naval Records Society, 1997.

felt until mid-1943, and more rapidly afterwards, as the numbers of antisubmarine ships increased. Contrary to the logic of the Bombing theorists, the real killing of submarines took place at sea, not by bombing the builders' yards.⁶¹

One plan had hung fire from the outset. In late summer, 1941, the Americans had prepared plans for a landing on the West Coast of Africa, both to anchor the South Atlantic at its narrowest point, and to assure that France's Colonial Army and Fleet was not pressured into cooperating with the Germans. Vichy and its overseas possession were then unoccupied and cooperating with Germany under terms of its 1940 "Armistice." An expanded plan was provided by the British Joint Plans Staff, to deal with this matter. Called GYMNAST, the US Army's War Plans Division had this British outline plan to add to their own. Marshall named a commander, Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, and planned to deal with the threat from Dakar that had been discussed by Churchill and Roosevelt in correspondence.⁶²

Both leaders had discussed this upon Churchill's arrival in Washington and both wanted the plan to go forward. Roosevelt favored this plan as essential to securing the South Atlantic Sea lanes and had personally been involved in its creation. Both political leaders had agreed that Western Africa could provide key bases to cover the South Atlantic, and from there, the two heads of state hoped to coerce Vichy France into joining the Allies and employing the French Fleet in the Mediterranean against the Axis. This was a doable goal for America, already short of shipping, and still organizing and training its mobilizing Army and Army Air Force. No one in the Army opposed this plan in 1941, or at ARCADIA. The Victory Program had allocated almost 350,000 troops to Hemisphere Defense and the defense of America's overseas possessions, this force fell within the estimate of overseas Task Forces.⁶³

Britain had 55,000 men to add to GYMNAST, the allied invasion of North Africa, but relied on American help to create the force. Churchill asked for three divisions to help defend the UK and Ireland to release forces for operations, as well as to begin a US buildup of troops in the UK in 1942, especially air units. With 1942 concentrating on ending the war in Africa and the Mediterranean, he expected a landing in France in 1943, following a combined bomber assault that would begin as early as US planes can be deployed to England, to join with Bomber Command's offensive. Whether Vichy resisted or cooperated,

⁶¹ *Statistical Survey*, op. cit., p. 294. The US added more than 70 "escort carriers" and Britain two dozen during the 1943-45 time frame. Almost all of the British carriers and a reasonable percentage of the US escort carriers ended up in the Atlantic for Hunter Killer Groups to hunt submarines, or in near escort of large troop convoys; and pp. 261, 266, about 290 of 785. U boats sunk were lost to aircraft attack. The addition of B-24 bombers to Coastal Command was significant in closing the mid-Atlantic "air gap."

⁶² TORCH Operations MS, in Center of Military History Archive, passim; George F. Howe. *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1957, pp. 3-13.

⁶³ This was a complex idea, somehow relying on France's traditional friendship with America to permit its overseas colonies to be occupied by the Americans. It is difficult to document whether this was Roosevelt's original idea or Churchill's but Churchill seized on it, and Roosevelt had the War Department prepare an outline plan for the operation as part of the Army's Hemispheric Defense Plans under Plan Black. Roosevelt was fixated on the idea of "being invited" by the French; Churchill realized that after the attack on the French Fleet by the British at Mers-el-Kebir, that Vichy would respond to the British as invaders. For troop deployment estimates see, *Victory Program*, op. cit. pp. 111-113. Note that the estimates of troops assigned in plans for Monroe Doctrine defense areas, were never deployed, and slipped from planning when it became apparent that neither Germany nor Italy was prepared to move into the Western Hemisphere. Nor was the original Dakar landing under Plan Black listed in the Victory Plan. These allocated forces in fact, were in the Mediterranean by the end of January, 1943. The expanded plan was named SUPERGYMNAST.

GYMNAST was essential to complete Britain's 1942 campaign, which would free shipping in the Mediterranean route to the Far East, would draw off German divisions to cover the entire coast of Northwest Europe, and would assist the southern Atlantic passage of shipping. This was an optimistic, aggressive policy, not defensive as the War Department planners soon claimed.⁶⁴

As in every major campaign reliant upon an assault landing, landing craft in large numbers were the basic enabler, not merely divisions or aircraft. Thus, landing craft determined the real tempo of beginning new campaigns in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and in Northwest Europe. Moreover, no campaigning could be accomplished in the Pacific, without amphibious craft, and amphibious trained personnel. Early US planning for GYMNAST included the use of a Marine division, to deal with this shortfall.⁶⁵

GYMNAST was not favored by the US Navy. The change in the Navy Department had guaranteed that. Admiral Ernest J. King replaced Harold R. Stark as Chief of Naval Operations, and Stark, the Anglophile, was sent to England to help coordinate naval forces, and King, a Pacific-Firster and reputed Anglophobe, essentially controlled all US Navy operations. His rush to beef up the Pacific Fleet delayed GYMNAST. King used the available troop shipping to reinforce the garrison being formed in Australia from the "Pensacola Convoy," that had been diverted from the Philippines after Japan had attacked. This force was to be reinforced by both ground and air elements originally ticketed for MacArthur's Philippine garrison. King further planned to interdict Japanese moves towards the Solomons by landing a Marine Division there by late summer, 1942. This further drained shipping for Africa. Dakar as an objective, had featured in the Hemispheric Defense plans in order to secure the shortest route to the African continent, but would soon unilaterally be shelved by the War Plans division. Meanwhile new plans would churn as the CCS was being organized.⁶⁶

What emerged from ARCADIA, was that neither the US nor UK would mount sole country operations in the theaters defined by ABC-1 as Joint Interest. This meant that Europe would never see a US only operation, or in the Mediterranean as it initially took precedence, as the German-Italian theater. Thus, later in the war, the US and UK would mount landings in Africa, Sicily, and Italy, and the US and France would mount an invasion of Southern France, though Britain provided both naval and air forces for this landing. Sole country operations would develop in the Far East and Pacific by the interested parties. China would participate through the coordination of a US Chief of Staff provided for Chiang's committed forces, though not without significant difficulties and a strained command relationship based

⁶⁴ These timings were accurate had GYMNAST been executed by spring 1942, Pacific shipping priorities had stalled its execution.

⁶⁵ *Churchill War Papers, op. cit.*, pp. 1633-1637. Note ideas on air campaign aligns what would later be published in AWP-1942. W. F. Craven and J.L. Cate. *Army Air Forces in World War II. Plans and Early Operations. January 1939 to August 1942. Volume 1.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, Chapter 7, passim.

⁶⁶ Glenn Wilford. *Racing the Sunrise. Reinforcing America's Outposts, 1941-1942.* Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 2010; George F. Howe. *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West.* Washington: Center of Military History, 1991, Chapters 1-3, passim; Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild. *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense.* Washington: Center of Military History, 1989, Chapter VII, passim. See also Fleet Admiral King, First Report, in *U.S. Navy At War, op. cit.* Note the landing to Dakar had been on file since August, 1941. Note the Marine Division considered for African landings went to Guadalcanal in late summer, 1942.

on differing long-term objectives and an unrealistic Western understanding of the realities of Asia and the political revolution occurring there. These Chinese forces were also supplied through Lend Lease.⁶⁷

The Victory Program had estimated that the full move to the future main theater would take approximately two years, with both sequencing of air and support units being prioritized by shipping. Wedemeyer estimated that a five-million man force, or two thirds of the projected total Army, would be sent to Europe and would require seven million tons of shipping, or roughly 1000 ships. A ten-million-ton shipping allowance or 1500 ships would be required to maintain it. ⁶⁸ This fit the idea of a “decisive theater,” with minimum support given to the “holding action” in the Pacific.

American planners at this time did not recognize either the attrition factor and its effect on their Allies, or its long-term influence on the war. Nor did they account for war weariness on the part of their allies who had been fighting longer. Planners too often believed that victories could be scheduled by mass moves of divisions as soon as they were trained, and had vague notions of shipping available, the war in the Atlantic, and how long air superiority would be battled for. Reality would eventually show that campaigns were much tougher than the outline plan depicted. Only Roosevelt and Churchill could solve the quandary of forcing their military leaders to cooperate, a matter handled by jointly decreeing that a specific strategy would be followed. Greatly influenced by the type planning and decisions needed, the Army had centered this activity in OPD in March, whose chief was Eisenhower. Actual operational planning devolved to the Theaters.⁶⁹

The British recognized the critical middle period of the war was beginning, and that these battles could not be ignored. They had characterized it as “encircle and enclose,” a term derided by Wedemeyer as “defensive.” In reality, it was the critical stage of reversing Allied fortunes in the maritime and air stages of the war, and an attempt to stretch German reserves while exacting the necessary attrition in battles fought at favorable correlation scales. The British believed a direct force on force campaign in Europe in 1943 would stagnate as it had in 1915, due to the larger size of the German army, German air superiority, and their use of interior lines. The non-combat experienced planners in the War Department scoffed at this idea.

As the US fleet was assumed to be operating offensively to weaken Japan in its November version of RAINBOW 5, the plan at best could be seen as an offensive-defense, with the loss of the Philippines being unavoidable. OPD intended to take over the war, and since Europe had been seen as the "main

⁶⁷ The China-Burma-India theater is covered in 3 US official histories and five British Histories on the War in the Far East, or South East Asia Command. The War Department begrudgingly supported this theater, and the British view of China was far different than Roosevelt’s Machiavellian view which supported Chiang, but sympathized with Mao.

⁶⁸ “Victory Program, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

⁶⁹ The British who had far more experience in both World War I and already about a year and a half in the second war, understood the need for a realistic strategy. They understood that winning the current battles were essential to set the conditions for later victory. The Americans wanted to go to offensive operations disregarding their own lack of trained aircrew, mounting maritime losses, and lack of shipping. Roosevelt understood this from his own experience as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in World War I. See *George C. Marshall Interviews for Forrest C. Pogue*. Lexington: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991.

war," it followed that they wanted to shape this war, and wrest control of its higher direction away from the Navy and the CCS.⁷⁰

Recent British inquiries regarding Burma, which the Americans wanted held to support China, alarmed US planners, as they saw commitments to aid "peripheral campaigns" as a violation of Europe First. Churchill saw the entire war as needing tending, but by immediate priority. Recapturing the Burma Road to supply China, particularly Chennault's American Volunteer Group, was an American priority foisted on the British. The British believed this could be best achieved by several amphibious landings around the southern tip of Burma, not a grinding campaign through jungle and river valleys. But King had no intention to diverting landing craft for the Indian Army to have amphibious craft to bypass hundreds of miles of contested jungle. Despite the ultimate rationale for an amphibious operation, King successfully prevented landing craft from ever going to South East Asia command, demanding the British provide from their small pool, which they then had tied up for raids on France, and hoped to send to the Mediterranean and eventually Europe.⁷¹

If the Americans were surprised by British attitudes, it was because they refused to accept what had already been agreed to in outline both in ABC-1 and W.W. 1, the British concept for future planning agreed to at ARCADIA. Churchill's own mind was open to debate and diversions, but he stuck to the agreed script when decisions were made. Roosevelt understood this as how politics works. The JCS resented everything that was not a "legal agreement." They wanted a direct plan for Europe First, and the JCS consistently underrated both the Atlantic, and the Air War in Europe, as crucial factors, both of which would prioritize BOLERO, the concentration in the UK. Lend Lease was simply a diversion to their war. The idea of long-term campaigns, with multiple variations, and long-term attrition, had not yet taken hold as part of their decision process. Some like Wedemeyer, never learned, and complained ever after that the years 1942-1943 had been wasted by not invading Europe in 1942 and 1943.⁷²

Moreover, the War Department planners greatly underrated the psychological power of imagery and disaster in a democratic society where the populace could topple governments. Churchill could barely swallow Tobruk and Singapore as losses, he could not tolerate the loss of Australia or India. This struck at the very heart of English feelings. Likewise, Roosevelt could tolerate the loss of the Philippines, it was far away, but not Hawaii, which was not. These type losses would terrify the populace, and 1942 was an election year. Moreover, the far left mobilized by the American Communist Party, now demanded a Second Front, to help "Uncle Joe," no longer a bogeyman and warmly embraced by Roosevelt to justify his Lend Lease shipments. The Dieppe raid, offered to the Canadians as a symbolic gesture to appease their own domestic critics, and which failed with high losses, poses a still significant rift with British-

⁷⁰ Matloff and Snell, op. cit., passim. Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post*, 1951, Chapter V, passim.

⁷¹ *Churchill War Papers*, XVII, XVIII, and XIX, op. cit., passim. See also Kirby, *Volume III*.

⁷² Wedemeyer, op. cit., passim. There is no evidence that the Americans were competent or plentiful enough in 1942, to foment anything but a disaster. They were not yet a harmonized decisive force. Early operations in Tunisia showed how inexperienced, and how poor much of the American leadership was. SLEDGEHAMMER also demonstrated how little George Marshall then understood about modern battle conditions. There is little in SLEDGEHAMMER to credit Eisenhower or Marshall as great military thinkers. Eisenhower evolved. Marshall seemed to be carried by the momentum of the staff. His greatness was in character, and in supporting his president, and in guiding the Army. He was both too old, and too narrow to have been Supreme Commander in Europe in 1944. Alan Brooke's assessment of him, while sharp, was easily supportable. See *War Diaries 1939-1945*. Lord Alanbrooke. Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, editors. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2001, passim, and pp. 246-249.

Canadian analysts, proof that unsuccessful operations were both remembered and hurt government policy support.⁷³

Nor was the War Department against arming the British and Russians to fight the main enemy. This was provided for in the Victory Program, and was essential in maximizing the production capabilities of the United States by deploying weapons and goods to whichever Allied force needed them immediately. They did, however, see them as supporting the main American campaign, which from the first, they decided had to be in Europe, not elsewhere. Sending supplies to the Middle East and Russia in their view, was merely to fix enemy divisions in those locations, so the Americans could fight the main army in Europe. This was the natural extension of the “Victory Program.”

Roosevelt favored the US seizing Dakar, “to get American troops in the war across the Atlantic,” as well as to study the possibility of landing in Norway in 1942.⁷⁴ He did, however, succumb to Churchill’s vision of controlling all of North Africa, with a French ally added to the fold. Secretary of War Stimson feared not only British dominance of strategy, but a dispersion of effort away from the main theater to the Northeast, Western Europe.⁷⁵

The American Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, was particularly concerned that the European focus would be dispersed in Africa, instead of being directly focused on Europe in 1942. He did not, however, oppose this in 1941 when the plan was first drafted. Claiming a mass move to the UK by the Army would automatically secure the sea lanes in the North Atlantic, he wanted an expedition in France that year. The Army Air Forces of course, would focus their campaign from UK airfields. This strategy would monopolize shipping except the minimum needed to hold the agreed line of Communications open to Australia. Landing craft would go to Europe to support the expedition. This stirred Marshall and the planners, who promptly organized all planning around the concept.⁷⁶

⁷³ John Grigg. *1943: the Victory that Wasn’t*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1980. See also *Planning for Continental Operations*, *op. cit.*; Mark A. Stoler. *The Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941-1943*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1977. This book condenses a complex argument. American military planners were poor at understanding Grand Strategy, i.e. the politics of war, and if anything, Roosevelt and to a smaller extent Leahy, aptly understood the interplay of the two. Marshall, certainly did not. Roosevelt’s failure to form a war cabinet as Churchill did, left the military as builders to an architect’s plan. For DIEPPE, see Brian Loring Villa. *Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. See also George Bruce. *Second Front Now! The Road to D-Day*. London: McDonald & James, 1979.

⁷⁴ *Grand Strategy, III, part I*, *Op. cit.*, 11-13. The British along with the Free French, had launched an abortive attempt to seize Dakar in August 1940 named MENACE, which failed due to lack of local support. Fear of German control of the eastern coast of Africa probably fueled American plans as part of Hemispheric Defense.

⁷⁵ Stimson, *On Active Service*, *op. cit.*, pp. 413-436. Stimson was a lawyer, and despite his favoring his title as “Colonel,” he understood little of the mechanics of war. He had been embraced by Roosevelt because he was a Republican Interventionist. Roosevelt always listened to advisers, and then decided based on his own reasons.

⁷⁶ Henry Stimson & McGeorge Bundy. *On Service in Peace and War*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947, pp. 413-448. Stimson rivals Marshall for hagiographical biographies. Stimson’s legal mind was not that of a war strategist, His military experience was near nil. While Secretary of State, he disestablished the American codebreaking system saying “Gentlemen do not read other gentlemen’s mail.” He and Marshall saw themselves as protecting the President from himself if his recent unsourced biography is to be believed; see Edward Farley Aldrich. *The Partnership. George Marshall, and Henry Stimson. The Extraordinary Collaboration that Won World War II*. Lanham: Stackpole books, 2022, Chapters 11, 13, *passim*.

This tune was soon trumpeted in OPD by Eisenhower, as well as Colonel Albert C. Wedemeyer, whose father-in-law, Lt. Gen. Stanley Embick, an Anglophobe with a particular hatred of Churchill personally from World War I, was Senior Member of the JCS Strategy Committee. Wedemeyer by instinct or direction, always parroted his father in law's ideas.⁷⁷ While the Victory Program had foreseen "expeditionary forces" sent in 1942, it did not foresee the main battle until the Army reached its peak mobilization, in 1943 and after. It also assumed that divisions would be created at a more rapid rate, a factor that industry could not compete with, nor could the Army efficiently train and raise divisions as quickly as originally foreseen. No one could predict the way the war had started with such massive failure in every theater, and those who felt the early plans should be followed were unable to deal with the reality of a far different type war. This was slow to sink in in the War Department.⁷⁸

Eisenhower and the planners soon turned the original British plan, ROUNDUP, into a 48-division operation, to be launched in 1943. They coupled this with SLEDGEHAMMER, an "emergency landing" designed to draw force from the east if Russia seemed in peril of defeat.⁷⁹

This evolution sprang from the "Eisenhower Studies," regarding the Pacific's requirements vs. those of European operations, and the eventual need for a landing in Northwest Europe. In late March, following comments by Stimson, and Eisenhower's general summing of strategic alternatives, the War Plans staff drafted what became known as "the Marshall Memorandum." This summarized the current buildup plans for the UK (BOLERO) and for air units (SICKEL), and combined three plans into a linked action, BOLERO-SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP. Both SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP had already been studied in the UK, though the War Department replanned each under different assumptions favoring an immediate

⁷⁷ General Albert C. Wedemeyer. Also see comments in *Wedemeyer Reports!*, op. cit., John C. McLaughlin. *General Albert C. Wedemeyer: America's Unsung World War II Strategist*. London: Casemate, 2012. Embick had already been retired for age but was recalled by Marshall who relied on him heavily. Embick was an isolationist, whose belief that anything favoring their Allies, was bad for America. His patriotism was dated to a different century. He also attempted to prevent the Air Corps from developing 4 engine bombers while he was Deputy Chief of Staff. For a British insight into Wedemeyer from one of their most respected planners, see Alex Danchev. *Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance. The Second World War Diaries of Brigadier Vivian Dykes*. London: Brassey's 1990. pp. 205-206. Dykes was the British Secretary of General Staff for Dill and the opposite number of Brig. Gen. Walter B. Smith on CCS Staff. Dykes died in an air crash in early 1943. Smith went to Allied Force Headquarters in London for TORCH and remained with Eisenhower throughout the war. The introduction gives perspective on the forming of CCS. A US participant's view that is absent Wedemeyer's bile is Brig. Gen. Monro MacCloskey. *Planning for Victory World War II. A Behind the Scenes Account*. New York: Richards Rosen Press, Inc, 1970.

⁷⁸ It should be noted that Army organization and equipment scales were changed dramatically by the creation of the smaller triangular divisions in 1941, but which also created more independent armor, antiaircraft, transportation, engineer, and signal units, to serve as "pooled units." Lend Lease also dug more heavily into tanks, trucks, and aircraft as the war proceeded. Overseas transport was greatly affected by huge losses at sea in 1941, 1942, and the first half of 1943. The simultaneous surge in ship production, and the fortuitous turn in the Atlantic war in May, 1943, simultaneously reversed this situation, but that could not be predicted in 1942.

⁷⁹ See Matloff and Snell op cit., Appendix A, pp. 383; Grand Strategy, Volume III, Part II; Appendix III, General Marshall's Plan: Operations in Western Europe, pp, 675-681; Eisenhower Papers, Volume 1, BOLERO and SLEDGEHAMMER sections, passim. Note, the 1944 OVERLORD plan, significantly differed from ROUNDUP for a range of reasons, not possible to consider in 1942. ROUNDUP was an outline plan whose practicability was never solved in detailed planning.

offensive. To do so, they had to minimize enemy opposition and were unduly optimistic about “being offensive.”⁸⁰

SLEDGEHAMMER was to be “an emergency” operation to draw divisions away from Russia if the situation there was critical. It topped at 8 divisions, with 6 being British, as only 2 U.S. divisions were capable of arriving in the UK, and being ready for combat by September, and therefore it had to be executed by that time. The landing plan evolved into a concept for seizing Cherbourg and holding the Cotentin peninsula in Normandy. This would be tied to a spring 1943 ROUNDUP, a landing to ultimately put ashore 48 divisions supported by 5800 planes. The Americans expected Britain to provide half the force, ignoring their ongoing commitments in both the North African Western Desert and the Far East. SLEDGEHAMMER also ignored the ongoing convoy battles in the Atlantic battle, and the Lend Lease supplies sent to Russia, partially out of Britain’s allotments.⁸¹

Marshall, King and Harry Hopkins visited England to sell these plans to the British in late April, 1942. While receiving an agreement in principle from the BCOS, the Americans left believing that Germany First was now anchored solidly in near total commitment to the three plans outlined. This was a major gaffe on the part of the British BCOS, who should have been more strident in their disapproval of SLEDGEHAMMER, ruling it out totally, while agreeing with a ROUNDUP-type operation in 1943 if the Middle East campaign had resolved positively. Lend Lease and the Atlantic, still existed as prime considerations, and those requirements had to be addressed before beginning this major operation which would commit both powers to a prolonged campaign requiring the bulk of allied shipping.⁸²

Predictably, misunderstandings concerning what “an agreement in principle entailed” occurred, but this was not apparent at the first conferences. The Americans not sensing a demur, left with the belief that SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP were approved, “not approved in principle.” Further study by the British Joint Plans committee, and the reversal of fortune in the Middle East due to losing Tobruk, gave the British pause in sending off six divisions for what would obviously be too little, too late for the Russians. Unknown at the time, within two months the British would be decisively losing in Libya and Egypt, and any ideas of putting troops ashore in France at that time, would be impossible. The Americans, of course, held to this as if it were an agreement settled in concrete, despite the World-Wide situation.⁸³

At the time, Brooke had thought Marshall “had not thought the problem through,” especially as he felt that ROUNDUP had no strategic goal for its follow-on operations, though he agreed with the idea of a 1943 landing in France, but not 1942. The British of course, were fighting all three Axis enemies on

⁸⁰ Matloff and Snell, op. cit., Chapter 10. It appears that losing the Middle East, or a continued battle to hold it, was not a consideration in assigning British divisions to the European theater. It is highly doubtful that the British force theorized would have materialized without removing half the forces from the ongoing Egyptian-Libyan campaign. In January 1942, the British appeared to be winning there, but that reversed by late spring and early summer, 1942. This was not reversed until November, 1942.

⁸¹ Matloff and Snell, op. cit., pp. 186-192, passim.

⁸² Robert Sherwood. *Hopkins and Roosevelt. An Intimate History*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948, pp. 602-612; *Grand Strategy, Volume III/ii, Chapter XXIV and appendix III, “General Marshall’s Plan: Operations in Western Europe,” pp. 675-681*. Note shipping, imports, and lend lease were the providence of the War Cabinet Economic, Foreign Office, Home Office, and Production ministers, not the BCOS.

⁸³ Stimson was particularly wooden about this “legal agreement,” and Marshall either followed his lead or was also unimpressed by anything else, other than his plan. Brooke always claimed Marshall was incapable of seeing total strategic issues, which is easy to understand based on his stance on many things early in the war.

the ground, and could not disengage or lose any of those campaigns without severe consequences. The Americans at that time, were only fighting the Japanese on the ground at Bataan, which surrendered in April. The Philippines surrendered in May, ending US Army combat in the Pacific until late fall, when troops were moved into New Guinea and reinforced the Marines on Guadalcanal.⁸⁴

Marshall's real intent in proposing SLEDGEHAMMER, had been to obtain permission for ROUNDUP. This linkage was its fatal flaw. By claiming SLEDGEHAMMER as a Second Front offering for Russia, he had hoped it would not be seen for what it was, a questionably based operation. He did not accept that 1943 would be less favorable if SLEDGEHAMMER proved to be a disaster. Roosevelt's insistence that the US and UK mount a joint operation against Germany in 1942, would be the major consideration for any decision made on the Atlantic-European theater and negated Marshall's later claims, that SLEDGEHAMMER was only considered to be an "emergency operation." Churchill demanded that if a landing was made, the force had to stay put, not withdraw. SLEDGEHAMMER had no purpose other than to draw German divisions. If the British had approved, Roosevelt wanted it launched. Neither Marshall nor Roosevelt had contemplated what the effect on the American public a disaster in SLEDGEHAMMER would be.⁸⁵

Marshall also did not consider other issues that might change basic assumptions for a European landing. A massive build up in England no doubt would have been matched by a similar German buildup in western Europe as a reaction to BOLERO, and without the benefit of a long bombing preparation by both Allied Air Forces, which were still growing in 1943. While the British had seen the extent of German interior lines strategy for four and a half years in World War I, and had watched it materialize against Russia, they were not fooled by the dominant German concentration in the east knowing European rail capability to move divisions from the east to the west rapidly, as well as support both fronts simultaneously. The Germans in fact, by summer had increased their forces in Europe as a reaction to the British raid on St. Nazaire, increasing their forces to 33 divisions in the west by summer, 1942.⁸⁶

Emotionally, Churchill clung to GYMNAST as being more relevant to the immediate problem, the Middle East, and Roosevelt had already leaned towards it for similar reasons, including the grand prize of perhaps bringing France into the war on the Allied side. FDR had yielded to Stimson and Marshall, but perhaps had reservations on what a foothold in France would possibly gain. Possibly Roosevelt's true mind was reflected in Stimson's comment, not to commit the Army until it was ready. Disaster had topped the headlines till this point in the war. He felt America could not bear more.⁸⁷

SLEDGEHAMMER had six major flaws. First, it was provided with few American resources in landing craft, aircraft, or trained forces, making it a large cost to the British who were strapped already. Shipping was its biggest shortfall which would continue to be a commitment as long as the enclave was

⁸⁴ Danchev, *War Diaries*, op. cit.,

⁸⁵ Stimson was overly concerned about domestic political appearances. A SLEDGEHAMMER disaster was something he had not considered, though he had insisted that GYMNAST only be launched when the Army was ready to fight.

⁸⁶ Colonel C.P. Stacey. *Six Years of War. The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific*. Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1957, Chapter XIII, passim.

⁸⁷ Stimson had stressed this point during the early GYMNAST discussions, that the Army's first battles must be successful. Roosevelt, in his written instructions to Marshall and King via Hopkins stated, "In regard to 1942, you will carefully investigate the possibility of executing SLEDGEHAMMER---SLEDGEHAMMER is of such grave importance that every reason calls for accomplishment of it." Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, op. cit., p. 604-608.

maintained. Landing craft were short, minimizing the original assault.⁸⁸ Second, its basic object was contradictory. It would only be launched if Russia was in jeopardy, yet launching it would not constitute a large front that needed to be supplied from the east, so its very purpose was impossible to achieve. Churchill admitted this to Stalin when he proposed cancelling it. Third, it would not really benefit ROUNDUP save for the BOLERO priority. This could be made without launching SLEDGEHAMMER which would be better served by BOLERO-SICKEL in troop distribution. How supporting SLEDGEHAMMER was supposed to support a buildup, denies the need to support and possibly reinforce the SLEDGEHAMMER enclave. This was especially true after Marshall offered a third possible division as an enticement to execute SLEDGEHAMMER. Fourth, SLEDGEHAMMER offered no operational support to ROUNDUP, its enclave was far from the planned ROUNDUP sector, and it offered no good terrain line of departure for a supporting attack.⁸⁹

Fifth, and worst, the operation seemed to hang under the threat of having to launch an operation in 1942, a political, not a military necessity. The British already fighting in the Mediterranean could get some mutual benefit from GYMNAST. SLEDGEHAMMER offered none in that sector, moreover, the British had long calculated that a million tons of shipping was lost by sending convoys the long way around the Cape of Good Hope to the Far East and to *the Near East oilfields. The Persian Gulf offered a way to supply Russia, SLEDGEHAMMER did not.*

A wiser European landing would be in north Norway to provide air and sea coverage for Russian bound convoys. Roosevelt in fact had directed study of this based on Churchill's recommendations.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Gilbert, pp. 112-113 in late May, Admiral Mountbatten noted that the shortage of landing craft at the end of May, would reduce SLEDGEHAMMER's first wave to 4300 men and 160 tanks, with a six division force requiring up to three weeks to land 132,000 men plus guns and supplies. While this could be improved upon by September, the guarantee that an adequate force could seize a bridgehead while having a slower buildup rate than the defense would be a problem. By March of 43, in time for ROUNDUP, the capability to land 100,000 men and 18,000 vehicles on the first day, was achievable if production plans were prioritized. Churchill directed that floating piers and docks be developed to speed offloading. They eventually became the MULBERRIES, used in Normandy in 1944.

⁸⁹ Combined Operations assessed the cost of executing a short-term SLEDGEHAMMER operation as a "tip and run" operation at about 250,000 tons of shipping; a prolonged operation lasting until ROUNDUP was executed would require about 1 million tons of shipping dedicated solely to executing and sustainment. This equates to about six weeks of losses in the ongoing Battle of the Atlantic. The cost of breaking out of the Cotentin in 1944 should be noted also. Bradley's forces suffered over 40,000 casualties in the post Cherbourg operation to gain a good operational line to begin COBRA, the breakout. Cherbourg, according to Air Marshal Portal, would have been destroyed by the Luftwaffe, and significant U-boat bases existed at Lorient and St Nazaire, making an underwater blockade of the port guaranteed. Marshall changed his argument to say the divisions would hold the Cotentin, and hence not be "sacrificed," but the cost of such a siege was too bitter to contemplate for the British.

⁹⁰ Neither the Royal Navy, nor the Joint Planners liked JUPITER, the Norway landing, due to the problem of sealing the Fjords where Germany based the Tirpitz, and pocket battleships. Substantial naval gun power and escorts would be needed to clear the Norwegian coast, and the eventual occupation of the country might have been required. However, from the point of view of leaving six to eight divisions in a pocket in the Cotentin in SLEDGEHAMMER or the liberation and basing of the same size force in Norway, the payoff would have been significantly different. As an air base to block Hitler's Baltic shipping, as well as a port from which Swedish iron ore was shipped, this was a worthwhile strategic aim. Supporting the arctic convoys would have been greatly improved. The story of one of the most costly convoy battles, caused by the fear of a Tirpitz attack which prompted an order to scatter, and thus lose their escort, is covered in David Irving. *The Destruction of Convoy PQ. 17*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968. The ULTRA background of this decision was revealed years later, in E.F. Hinsley. *British Intelligence in the Second World War. Volume II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 205, 215-217.

Churchill had weighed this, and still favored GYMNAST as to a guarantee to ending the Middle East as well as symbolically adding the French to the Allies, a goal of both the United States and Britain in the war. King eventually admitted the gain of clearing the Mediterranean, yet Marshall tenaciously held the area in contempt as irrelevant to later operations.

Sixth, and last, SLEDGEHAMMER was weather dependent. Hitler had cancelled Sea Lion, his invasion of England due to the Luftwaffe's inability to gain air superiority before mid-September, when historically, bad weather would prevent a sustained amphibious operation. This date was true for SLEDGEHAMMER whose sole scheduling requirement was based on the earliest period two US divisions could arrive in the UK and train and deploy for a landing. That was determined to be September, which guaranteed worsening weather. The turn around of shipping and the provision of landing craft simply did not support an earlier date. Following this logic, weather would most probably cancel the operation, though not ROUNDUP which did not satisfy the goal of a 1942 operation. Moreover, if Cherbourg was not seized, an over the beach support of the operation could not proceed in bad weather. Cherbourg was fortified against direct assault from the sea, and its capture would have to be made from its landward side, as it was in 1944.

ROUNDUP was ticketed for the spring of 1943. Russia's immediate peril in 1942, was as much a pretense as a reason. Russia was in peril in the summer of 1942, but worsening weather would grant it a respite as it did in 1941. Russia had the mindset and the capability to mount large winter counteroffensives. Germany frequently withdrew and refit some divisions in the winter months, especially panzers, at this time in the war. The winter months, therefore, favored the Russians at this time. As it developed, the winter of 1942 proved to be disastrous for the Germans, who lost an entire army at Stalingrad.

While the British BCOS and Joint Planners were appalled at SLEDGEHAMMER's sole intent to be a diversion that could waste divisions that they could not spare, they accepted ROUNDUP as both an essential and a winning strategic operation. SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP were not mutually supporting, but SLEDGEHAMMER could, if their drawing of many divisions from the East occurred, actually diminish ROUNDUP's prospects by forcing a landing on a more fortified and heavily reinforced front for ROUNDUP, now manned by the extra divisions from the east. Such contradictory assumptions led the British to question Marshall's judgement, and also that of his prime planner, Maj. Gen. Eisenhower who arrived in the UK proclaiming the sanctity and superiority of SLEDGEHAMMER. Having staked his reputation on this, Eisenhower could not relent, nor could Marshall who had demanded his plan be followed, including bucking the President's overruling of the plan. Marshall was intent on getting SLEDGEHAMMER and thus ROUNDUP in 1943, despite the adverse characteristics that SLEDGEHAMMER posed.⁹¹

In late April, the War Cabinet was enthused with BOLERO and ROUNDUP as was Churchill, but all felt SLEDGEHAMMER was a costly risk, and not capable of drawing the 25 or more divisions from the east that Stalin had stated as essential for the relief of the eastern front. The British understood that that they

⁹¹ *Eisenhower Papers, Volume 1*, op. cit. The actual committee working on SLEDGEHAMMER was the Future Plans Group under Colonel John Hull, later Chief of OPD in 1944. The Combined Commanders also examined a different variant of SLEDGEHAMMER, which was the first plan examined. Hull's group produced the last variant. Variants circulated through the CCS Joint Planners apparently. See also Matloff and Snell, op. cit, pp. 186-187; Cline, Pp. 156-157; Leighton and Coakley, *Global Logistics*, op. cit., pp. 380-387.

had to win in the Mediterranean in 1942, both to release troops and to free shipping for easy passage to the Far East. Importantly, a loss or stalemate in the Middle East could also prevent Britain from providing a force for ROUNDUP, which it intended to do. Thus, future events could tip the scales for any judgement on a European operation.

Both Churchill and the BCOS agreed that ROUNDUP was to be the prime operation launched in 1943, but after the Mediterranean was opened. Both plans were then scrutinized intensely at varying levels after the Americans left London. Thus, the Americans who believed that they had agreement, did not fully understand that “further study” could cause them problems in executing their three linked plans.

⁹²

Both SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP were “outline plans,” with little deep study into the mechanics and logistics of how they would be executed. This is what now had to be examined, and during this time, the Americans believed that they were moving forward with the operations planned and affirmed in the Marshall Memorandum.⁹³ The British in fact, had the organizations to scrutinize these plans in detail.

The British had created a joint headquarters, Combined Operations, whose task was to plan, and test technology and methods for amphibious assault, as well as to execute raids along any enemy coast to stretch enemy defenses. These raids and beach reconnaissance, provided the basis for detailed hydrographic and defense studies of all enemy beaches in Europe. No invasion of Europe could have gone forward without incorporating their data and experience. The Americans were invited to send staff officers to this headquarters, as well as to Norfolk House, where the British Combined Commanders were studying landing and proposed joint plans.⁹⁴ Combined Operations worked hand in hand with the Joint

⁹² There were approximately thirty three divisions in France in mid-1942. The Germans would have easily had troops to shift, especially as after September, the sea state in the Channel would have prevented any landings elsewhere, and that the Allied bridgehead, whether at Cherbourg or Le Havre, both candidates for the landing, could have been easily interdicted by air concentrations in central France, and would have had little direct air protection had Cherbourg been used. The Cotentin has no good terrain to build airfields and most fighter aircraft lacked the range to reach Cherbourg save American P-47 aircraft. After the war, Eisenhower admitted that SLEDGEHAMMER was probably not a good idea. Wedemeyer falsely claimed that Churchill had no intention of ever landing in France, a falsehood easily destroyed by sources in both Cabinet war papers and in Churchill war records. SLEDGEHAMMER, like ROUNDUP, had materialized as British ideas from the Joint Planners, but after ruthless examination by the Combined Commanders who would have had to execute it, it had been shelved as impractical and of very questionable value.

⁹³ The actual operational planning was to be done at Norfolk House, by the experienced planners assigned to the Combined Commanders. It was here that the “problems” of the Outline Plans had to be solved.

⁹⁴ Bernard Fergusson. *The Watery Maze. The Story of Combined Operations*. New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, 1961. Mountbatten’s influence in cancelling SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP in 42 and 43 was significant. His eventual influence on OVERLORD, though significant, has been underrated to accommodate the American version of events. See Forrest C. Pogue. *The Supreme Command*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954. Note Marshall sent representatives but consistently rated sending officers to new mobilized divisions as a higher priority than indoctrinating senior staff officers in combined planning. This would lead to a constant shortage of quality American officers in theater and joint headquarters throughout the war. The fact that the British were able to do both in large measure had to do with the larger body of combat experienced officers from the Great War, who were called back into service and who frequently were used in planning and administrative headquarters.

Plans Staff of the Combined Commanders, at Norfolk House, and from the first, was dedicated to finding both solutions and a workable plan for an invasion of Northwest Europe.⁹⁵

These Headquarters studied SLEDGEHAMMER, ROUNDUP, and a wide variety of outline plans, and did not believe that the Allies were prepared in doctrine, equipment, and preparations to mount these operations on the time line that Eisenhower's planners had created, both due to a shortage of landing craft, but also due to the ignorance shown of port problems, over the beach operations, and air preparations, all that the Americans had so handily glossed over. These techniques had yet to be investigated by the Americans and adopted as doctrine by all her services. 1942 for a landing in Europe was therefore ruled out, but not 1943.⁹⁶

Unknown to the Americans, Combined Operations was then planning and began mounting a division sized raid for DIEPPE, Operation RUTTER. It was intended to draw German divisions and aircraft from the East to deployment in the West. Scheduled for July, it would be delayed until mid-August. In attempting a direct strike on a small port, the British had hoped to establish a model for a larger later landing, as well as to finalize planning and coordination of services that would be needed in a major, permanent landing in France. This plan, however, had no bearing on the ongoing debate over SLEDGEHAMMER, but would yield results to the post SLEDGEHAMMER debate.⁹⁷

Gen. Sir Bernard Paget, Commander of British Home Forces and sitting member of the Combined Commanders at Norfolk House, examined SLEDGEHAMMER in detail after he had already worked on the original ROUNDUP. As the senior Army Commander who would have been involved in executing both plans, he and his counterparts at the Combined Commanders had disapproved of it as being a questionable, dangerous operation with no real strategic gain. Landing craft shortages and inadequacy of types had caused the early plans for ROUNDUP to flounder at the drawing boards, and the planners had concluded that German defenses in the logical area Pas de Calais areas or north of Le Havre in the American version of ROUNDUP, would cause it to fail due to lack of air support, and the inability to land at night which assured a covert approach, but this was problematic. He had concluded the Baie de la Seine in Normandy was the most appealing target area, with the Cotentin Peninsula and its port of Cherbourg were the most logical supporting objectives, after the main landings, though air support would be strained due to short ranged RAF fighters. The Cotentin eventually, became the American choice for SLEDGEHAMMER.⁹⁸

Though the American later choice of Boulogne-Le Havre for ROUNDUP eased air problems somewhat, a host of other problems had to be solved. The British needed to deploy divisions to the Mediterranean to reverse Axis gains there, and balked at the probable waste of at least six infantry divisions for SLEDGEHAMMER as a poor choice as a prelude to the main invasion. Paget approved of

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ *Watery Maze*, Op. cit., pp. 139-156.

⁹⁷ Colonel C.P. Stacey. *Six Years of War*, op. cit., Chapters XI and XII. Raids were launched in the attempt to convince the Germans that a complete defense of the entire Atlantic coast must be deployed. The Germans then had a thin screen with divisions in depth, but ports and obvious landing areas were occupied and defended.

⁹⁸ The British had already studied a seizure of Cherbourg and the Cotentin called WETBOB. Paget and Mountbatten became the real fathers of the D-Day Normandy Landings, not Sir Frederick Morgan who had adopted their plan to a great extent. Normandy featured in the major planning of the Combined Commanders planning in late 1942 and early 1943. The Cotentin was considered a contentious landing area according to the COSSAC planners who succeeded the Combined Commanders as planners for a landing in France.

neither plan as being yet workable due to shipping. He was also concerned about German beach opposition and the rapid build up of German divisions to form a defense.⁹⁹

The difference in national perspective brought an immediate crisis over strategy. SLEDGEHAMMER was a willing sacrifice on the part of Marshall, who thought it to be a favorable payment for keeping Russia in the war. A failure in the East, he said, would cause a massive change in the war plan for creating divisions if the Russian Army were to withdraw from the war.¹⁰⁰

That Marshall believed SLEDGEHAMMER to be necessary was in no doubt, whether the "emergency" were to be called, was a matter of argument. No British senior officer believed that anything less than a full invasion would draw German divisions from Russia, and that very little could be done to halt the German advance from the west in 1942, however much the Heads of State wished it to be so. Thus, two issues remained. Roosevelt who had promised a Second Front according to the news, and became increasingly adamant that Americans would fight Germans on the ground in 1942, and whether Churchill could be put off from the Mediterranean war raging, were other matters. Both leaders viewed "sitting" as politically unrealistic, though both countries were hotly engaged in the Pacific, the Far East, and the British in the Middle East. To the British, landing in France on a limited scale, seemed too much like going back to Dunkirk and wondering how they could escape.¹⁰¹

The British who had fought Germans in two wars, respected the capability and strength of the German Army particularly in the defense, had considered carefully their opponents and their previous war experience, and considered that the correlation of enemy forces had to be weighted first by a general weakening of the enemy's war production by bombardment, as well as the elimination of some of his strength by forcing a dispersion of forces, and elimination of some units in peripheral areas. They placed a high value on diminishing the German pool of reserves that could rapidly build up against a landing. The War Department at the time, seemed to believe all you needed to do to win was show up with masses of men and planes, however trained or equipped. They consistently underrated the advantage granted by the extensive European rail system for the rapid movement of reserves both from Germany and from other fronts.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Fergusson, *Watery Maze, op. cit.*, pp. 142-155.

¹⁰⁰ Marshall Interview 1945, war department historians. It is apparent that Marshall did not mentally "write off" the divisions as certain to be destroyed, only frozen in place in their French enclave which had been decided upon as the Cotentin Peninsula. They would have held these positions until ROUNDUP was executed in the spring. The latest American concept was that the force would "break out" of the Cotentin to link with the ROUNDUP landings on the Calais coast. This took almost 3 plus months in 1944 during OVERLORD, though the situations cannot be said to be congruent. Alanbrooke, who had withdrawn the last of the British troops in France through Cherbourg, thought SLEDGEHAMMER was an absurdity. This permanently colored his views of Eisenhower and Marshall as military planners.

¹⁰¹ Marshall Interviews for Pogue, pp. 579-581, passim. A study of the difficulty that the Army had in 1944 in exiting the Cotentin, demonstrates how poorly thought out, SLEDGEHAMMER was. Cherbourg had been substituted as the final objective for SLEDGEHAMMER to enable the landing force to subsist through Cherbourg, though Air Marshal Portal noted that it would probably have the port destroyed by repetitive German air attack, stranding the force without subsistence during the winter months. See Michael Howard. *Grand Strategy. Volume IV*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972, p. xxii.

¹⁰² Maj. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell. *The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler*. Atlanta: Higgins-McArthur, 1972, Chapter V, "Complete Air Ascendancy," passim. See comments of Maj. Gen. Eisenhower's views on bombing in 1942, in Charles Griffith. *The Quest. Haywood Hansell and American Strategic Bombing in World War II*. Maxwell: Air

Churchill chose to fight the Germans in Africa or in Norway as an immediate aid to Russia, not in France as his forces were overstretched in both the Mediterranean and the Far East, and his Navy was fully committed in the Atlantic. His growing Air Force was beginning its major strategic bombing offensive but would need at least 18 months to reach its goal of 4500 four-engine bombers.¹⁰³ Roosevelt had seen the logic of Churchill's using his military forces' capabilities versus his goals. England already had more than half of its divisions in contact with the enemy and virtually all of its Navy and Air. The Americans certainly were less pressed. The battle on Bataan was fought mostly by Filipino troops, and apart from the Carrier Task Forces and submarines roving the Pacific, the bulk of the American Far East force was in Australia preparing for combat and had not been committed forward. No ground combat troops at this time were committed other than the Philippines.

The American Atlantic Fleet was only slowly being reinforced by new construction and was overwhelmed with its escort role for Atlantic convoys. It could offer no decisive action in addition to training for GYMNAST at the end of the year. The AAF strained to assemble bomb and fighter groups for Europe due to lack of shipping, but it would not bear dramatic results in 1942. The war in the Atlantic thus featured as the real offensive against Germany until later large bombing raids could be seen as part of America's war against Germany.¹⁰⁴

By June 1942, the factor that loomed as consequential to the Allies, was the factor of air power. Despite its inability to pose a second front for the allies in 1942, the political leaders of both American and Britain leaned heavily towards this manner of warfare as most immediate. But this was a capability that could only be developed over time. It did not suffice for a major amphibious operation. Enemy divisions could not be drawn from the east by air power, nor could a decisive amount of war production and goods sent to the Russian front be interdicted by a strategic air offensive at this time. Two years hence, by 1944, the bulk of the Luftwaffe had been drawn off the Eastern Front to defend Germany and her industrial vassals, from the daylight bombing raids launched by the two American Strategic Air Forces, the Eighth Air Force in England, and later the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy. But no one at this time could predict this with any assurance, though Arnold and his air planners saw this clearly. They also recognized that this capability would take up to two years to mount and employ.¹⁰⁵

The American and British airmen believed that bombing would be strategically decisive, but as late as mid-1942, bombing had been proven to be disappointing, not only due to factors of accuracy, and bomber capacities, but in sheer numbers of bombers available. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur "Bomber Harris" managed a "Thousand Plane Raid" on Cologne in April, 1942, by mixing every possible type of bomber available and drafting them into the raid, including training crews and instructors from non-operational groups. The "thousand plane raid" effect was psychological. The actual damage done was neither decisive nor able to be replicated in subsequent missions as aircraft and aircrew were not available

University Press, 1999, pp. 91-92. Eisenhower never viewed bombing as anything but part of the theater plan, and not an independent campaign. He was forced to accept Arnold's green ticket from Marshall for much of the war, but demanded operational control of bombers during Normandy though he did little to oppose the airmen's control of targeting. *Grand Strategy, Volume III/II, Chapter XXIV passim.*

¹⁰³ Heavy bomber losses kept the eventual force to about 2000, four engine bombers.

¹⁰⁴ It is logical that given the slowness of the air buildup, that Marshall believed that the heavy bombers would directly support ROUNDUP, and not conduct a full bombing campaign deep into Germany against enemy production.

¹⁰⁵ Craven and Cate, *AAF in World War II*, op. cit., Volumes II and III, passim.

to sustain a series of maximum effort raids. Harris had embraced “area bombing,” as the most effective method of night bombing tactically possible at the time. Entire industrial areas and the associated housing for workers, thus were targeted. The technology of the time could not sustain any other method for night bombing.¹⁰⁶

At the time of Harris’ “Thousand Bomber Raid,” America launched the Doolittle Raid, of 16 bombers launched from the carrier Hornet to bomb Tokyo. It was a stunt designed to increase morale, but such imagery lent itself to sufficing for large operations.¹⁰⁷ The daily news of bomber raids to Germany had to suffice for those demanding a Second Front, though the imagery was wearing thin as no real results were being gained. Counterintuitively, it was the necessary shipping for deploying a large ground organization as well as the tonnage of fuel, bombs, and parts necessary, that slowed the Army Air Forces’ deployment. Thus, the Atlantic convoy issue, again overwhelmed other options.

The Americans had only four Bomb Groups in England till late fall of 42, and these performed short penetration missions both to train air crews and to develop methods for longer raids. Without long range fighters, the airmen believed that only large formations of self-defending bombers could sustain tolerable losses in percentages, not just numbers, that could cripple just a few groups if similar losses were suffered over time. Over time, they developed their own theory of numbers which had not been part of bomber theory. There was a huge difference in losing 20 bombers out of 100, as opposed to 20 out of 300. This reality defined in percentages, kept the Eighth Air Force on a short leash until more bombers could arrive, as well as more fighters, which could escort the bombers part of the way to targets. Larger formations also increased the bomb damage in target areas, adding to increased probabilities of target destruction. But these larger numbers were not available to the Americans for deep penetrations until mid-1943.¹⁰⁸

Despite the War Department’s support of the Air War Plan created by Arnold’s staff, this support did not translate into a substitute for the invasion of Northwest Europe that Stimson championed and which Marshall, Eisenhower, and Wedemeyer touted as essential to save Russia, as well as fix priorities away from the Pacific battles. Nor did they see marshalling the air units first, as a strategic priority, but settled on a more even distribution of air, support, and combat troop units. To the planners, more divisions meant everything. SICKEL, the air buildup, was only a component of BOLERO, which assuming a 1943 invasion, planned for a balanced deployment of air, supply and support, and ground combat units, all tailored for a 30-division initial campaign force for the Americans. It is probable, that due to shipping

¹⁰⁶ Sir Arthur Harris, *Despatch On Operations, April 1942-May 1945*. London: Frank Cass, 1998; and *The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945. The Official Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit*. London: Frank Cass, 1998. See also Sir Arthur Harris. *Bomber Offensive*. London: Collins, 1947. Note advanced radio beam and radar aids made night bombing, by 1944, very accurate.

¹⁰⁷ This raid led by Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle did little damage, but the subsequent retribution against Chinese peasants in the province in which most of the Raiders crash landed, was said to have cost up to 250,000 Chinese lives. Doolittle subsequently commanded the 12th and later 15th Air Forces in Africa and the Mediterranean, and the Eighth Air Force in the UK in 1944-45. He was redeploying the B-29 equipped Eighth Air Force to Okinawa when the war ended.

¹⁰⁸ Carl Digital Library. *Eighth Air Force Statistical Summary of Operations*. Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, 1945. This shows a clear trend in numbers of aircraft available on operations. See also, W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate. *The Army Air Forces in World War II. Volume II. Europe-TORCH to POINTBLANK*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949, passim. Massive losses against Regensburg and Schweinfurt in mid and late 1943, delayed deep penetrations until the arrival of long range fighters in early 1944.

losses, that ROUNDUP would not have the 30 divisions required for mounting the operation in place by spring, and the operation would either have to have been launched with fewer divisions immediately on hand, or delayed.¹⁰⁹

Marshall told the Air Staff, that their plan had merit, he did not believe that the airmen could replace ground forces. He wanted a big air show, but the airmen would have to support the invasion of Europe which both Stimson and his OPD planners now insisted should be invaded in 1942, even before the first major stage of mobilization foreseen in the Victory Program could be completed. Moreover, if the Marshall Memorandum's plans were executed without SLEDGEHAMMER, ROUNDUP would be the first combat test of equipment, doctrine, and peacetime selected commanders in combat leadership roles.

¹¹⁰

OPD, therefore attempted to ramp up mobilization of more divisions as a follow on to a ROUNDUP landing. This plan was halted by the irreconcilability of the war production board, those who controlled materials, especially steel, and the ammunition suppliers who could barely ship what they produced. Army Service Forces, the new sole arbiter of world-wide shipping, and distribution and transportation of goods to theaters, could barely find "bottoms" [ships] to deploy the air elements to the UK under SICKEL. Landing craft were all being whisked to the Pacific by King for his Solomons Island plan that found favor with Roosevelt and the Army in the Pacific in July and August, 1942. This allocation of tonnage was to prove decisive in deciding where and when an operation could be mounted in the Atlantic theater.¹¹¹

The underlying issue for Grand Strategy was that 1942, was that the Americans were only at the beginning of the massive expansion, and could not yield the numbers of ships, weapons, and trained elements promised in the Victory Program, which had been promised for mid-1943, as the first decisive year for major operations. Future plans drawn were not short-term answers.¹¹²

The correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill presented a continuing theme. The result of the military situation in 1942 was that Theater commanders needed to finish the business of defense, shifting to a limited offensive to negate future threats in 1943. They could not simply hold, stop operations in the Pacific, and hope that the enemy would not continue to advance.¹¹³

SLEDGEHAMMER implied that the Pacific would be starved, and that the Atlantic war would somehow not affect European operations. GYMNAST offered some respite in the Atlantic by securing its narrow point for air and shipping bases, and that possibly the French could be added into the United Nations, not simply with troops, but with the moral support it could give to those in occupied France. Moreover, much of the approach routes for the fleet coming from the United States ports could avoid the worst areas of U-boat operations, and be covered by air for longer periods of time from bases in the

¹⁰⁹ Ruppenthal. *Logistical Support of the Army, Volume 1. Logistics and Global Strategy volume 1, Troop Distribution in ETO Chart*. Note British ports could not handle a shipment of troops into the UK and an invasion outbound simultaneously. An outbound invasion would also shut down most of the inbound Lend Lease supplies.

¹¹⁰ Royal Navy planners on the Norfolk House were not the only ones concerned with weather, as the RAF planners noted weather would hamper if not prevent daylight air operations through much of the winter.

¹¹¹ Matloff and Snell, op. cit., pp. 357-360; and Morton, *Command the First Two Years, op. cit., Chapters XIII, XIV, and XV, passim*.

¹¹² Leighton and Coakley, *Global Strategy 1940-1943, op. cit., Chapters XIV and XVI*.

¹¹³ Roosevelt Correspondence with Churchill, passim, April to June 1942, Volume 1, op. cit.

Caribbean. GYMNAST in the British planners' eyes, had not gone away, despite the War Department's lack of interest in keeping the plan alive. Nor was GYMNAST far from Roosevelt's personal interest.¹¹⁴

Both Roosevelt and Churchill had caught the Second Front bug, and both had made pronouncements supporting it. But losing over a half million tons of shipping as well as the goods aboard the lost ships, got Lend Lease goods to no one, either the British or the Russians. And this directly impinged on beginning a Second Front. The U.S. Navy's miserable record with protecting coastal convoys on the east coast threatened overseas deployments. Marshall's planners moved full speed ahead with the idea that Europe would be attacked first, by a diversionary attack, which may or may not remain ashore, and then would land as half of the Allied main effort, ROUNDUP in the spring of 1943. This was a reasonable goal for the spring of 1943, but not a temporary landing in France in the fall of that year. The ability to stage forces and mount an operation was being lessened by the shipping being lost. That which remained could barely supply the powers already in daily contact with the enemy, both in the Eastern front, and those supported from England. Two US Army divisions, the 1st and the 3d, began amphibious training on both coasts of the US, along with two Marine Divisions scheduled for the South Pacific, that also trained for future operations. Landing and assault craft were desperately short, even for training.

Striking at Germany was both a political imperative, as well as a prelude to decisive operations that would win the war. It had to begin somewhere, if not in Europe, the Mediterranean. But Roosevelt saw the need to begin destroying German military might everywhere, in the air, on the ground, and at sea. He recognized therefore that bombardment, and the destruction of the U-boats were inseparably linked to major ground operations, far more than his Chief of Staff appeared to understand. This was also a way to force Germany to face west and thus aid the Russians, if the Germans were forced to commit reserves to a different front.

Germany was stronger than the Allies everywhere except in the Mediterranean in 1942. The British thus saw it as a lever. The Americans wanted to focus on attacking enemy strength "in the decisive theater." Roosevelt could not afford defeat or stalemates in 1942 an election year, nor could he compromise the great success he had hoped for in 1944, another election year during which he hoped to be elected to an unprecedented fourth term as President. Thus, Europe's priority had to be gauged carefully so as to prevent some enemy gain in the Pacific as well as to keep China in the war. He saw a military balance world-wide as essential, not merely the stopping of the enemy in some parts of the world to permit a major operation in one theater.

Churchill returned to Washington to visit Roosevelt in mid-June 1942, bringing Brooke with him who had yet to meet Roosevelt. Churchill's feelings with the war moving at breakneck speed, as so many plans being proposed, he had to keep "Roosevelt on the rails." Several things had to be addressed. Convoys were foremost. Atlantic sinkings had increased and the attrition against Russian convoys had caused delays in sailings in the hopes that ice would clear by summer to permit a more northern route out of distance of Norway-based German bombers. US east coast sinkings had increased due to lack of convoys close to shore. The war in Libya had turned, with Rommel's army recovering all the ground that the Axis had yielded in the past eighteen months. Crucially, during Churchill's first day at Hyde Park, word

¹¹⁴ This operation is a recurrent theme in the Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence throughout 1942. The British enhanced landing was renamed SUPER-GYMNAST.

was received that Tobruk had fallen along with 33,000 men. Following a loss of 85,000 in Singapore and Malaya, British losses in 1942 already proved to be Britain's most costly year of the war.¹¹⁵

In June and July, Britain fought more battles in Egypt, but Britain had lost the initiative, and Churchill considered changing generals again to get more positive results. He could no longer afford bleeding by constant counterattacks and back and forth offensives in the Western Desert. If he were to commit ground troops from the home reserve, they had to have a positive effect on the Egyptian campaign, not on the French coast.¹¹⁶

Tobruk's fall prompted immediate action by the Americans. Roosevelt offered heavy and medium bombers diverted from India to Cairo, and Marshall offered a fast shipment of 300 Sherman tanks and 100 Self-propelled guns to reinforce Eighth Army with tanks superior to those they were replacing, and which would compete favorably with any Rommel possessed. These would not be in place until September, but both Churchill and Brooke were forever grateful for this aid, and the gesture of immediately trying to assist in their hour of need. These tanks and guns would help turn the tide in Egypt, but they did not solve the major question of what major operation should be launched in 1942.¹¹⁷

Roosevelt had assured Molotov that a Second Front would be established in 1942. Churchill registered his idea that this could not be in France, as SLEDGEHAMMER could only go forward if Germany were failing, and not the other way around. The potential for loss against Germany's 33 divisions in France, could not justify the attempt, which offered no real respite for Russia. Rather, he proposed a landing in North Norway, JUPITER, to establish both airfields for patrol bombers, and a base for fueling escorts, despite the risks that this would entail. JUPITER would help Russia, and would anchor a 1943 Cross Channel landing.¹¹⁸

JUPITER, Churchill felt, was a bigger help to Russia than SLEDGEHAMMER. It would eliminate Luftwaffe operations that were taking a toll on ships, and put the Allies within aerial reach of their Russian allies. It would also close "the air gap" over the Atlantic, where convoys did not enjoy air cover.¹¹⁹ This was seen by the PM as a justifiable replacement for SLEDGEHAMMER, and would preserve Marshall's sacred BOLERO priority for Europe only operations while maintaining a constant flow of troops to the UK. Yet planners on both sides of the Atlantic emphasized its risks, which were not the same of the longer list of perils posed by SLEDGEHAMMER or an ill prepared ROUNDUP.¹²⁰

While meeting with the CCS in Washington, Brooke mentioned that possibilities other than SLEDGEHAMMER were being considered. This caused much internal consternation until the later session

¹¹⁵ By August, 1942, Britain had suffered over 80,000 casualties for no gain, the reason Sir Claude Auchinleck was replaced in August, 1942, and new commanders were brought in. Auchinleck had suffered most of these during his term in command.

¹¹⁶ Gen. Sir Claude Auchinleck was replaced in August by Gen. Sir Harold Alexander as C-in-C Mediterranean and Auchinleck sent to command India Command, a substantial training and administrative command overseeing the training and mobilization of over 1 million volunteer Indian Army soldiers.

¹¹⁷ *Alanbrooke War Diaries, op. cit., p. 269, and pp. 266-272.*

¹¹⁸ This idea was opposed by both the British Joint Planners and the Americans as not be supportable at this time.

¹¹⁹ *Op. cit.; p. 100-101; Grand Strategy, Volume III/ii, op. cit.,*

¹²⁰ The principal negative seemed to be it failed once, due to bad preparation and planning. This lesson should have been applied to SLEDGEHAMMER which had no finalized objective until August, a month before its scheduled execution.

that he indicated that no halting of BOLERO was desired. The Americans had not fully understood that the British separated BOLERO from SLEDGEHAMMER, while Marshall's staff considered them linked.¹²¹

While the British considered ROUNDUP both ongoing in planning and expected its launch when the situation was optimum, the Americans now viewed their entire strategy for the German war as being under attack. They linked SLEDGEHAMMER as the glue to a Cross Channel operation, whereas BOLERO, the buildup was the key to any landing. Moreover, the Americans viewed 1943 as the year for this, not viewing the winning in the Atlantic or Mideast as enablers for a full Allied offensive. The British were about to launch a massive raid across the Channel as an offering to fixing German forces in the west, and did not accept SLEDGEHAMMER as somehow offering succor to the Russian front.¹²²

So, Churchill's second visit to the United States in June, 1942 revived differences in opinion, but also underscored that Churchill constantly revisited decisions, not to be difficult, but to assess if the conditions that plans were based on, were still relevant in terms of ongoing events. This was a politician's view of always assessing the field, whereas Marshall and OPD had the view that victories could be scheduled and programmed, a view that they never abandoned throughout the war, though the reality of campaigns was such that operations were always being modified, rescheduled, and frequently reshaped. The difference is clear. Both Churchill and Roosevelt viewed Grand Strategy as a Process, while Marshall and his planners viewed it as a Plan. At this point early in the war, the Americans reacted to change more emotionally than the British. By midsummer 1942, Churchill wanted to review the reality of war with Roosevelt, who understood that the war was going poorly everywhere. Neither man could see that the CCS quibbling was pushing the war ahead.¹²³

While Churchill was in Washington, Roosevelt criticized Britain's post war self-government plan for India, telling Churchill that an immediate government should be established. It became apparent, that Roosevelt was going to use the weight of aid to push his own international agenda at the UK's expense. To Churchill, who had problems in the Middle East and was attempting to establish a sound defense in India against Japan, as well as use some of her troops in the Middle East, this was both unwelcome and badly timed. It was also a portent of Roosevelt's aim to reshape the world in his vision, not to merely fight to reestablish the status quo.¹²⁴

Churchill had embraced the idea of the two nations "going forward together" but despite Marshall's plea that the other fronts should not leave Europe-the Main Effort— ...a residuary legatee" to places like the Middle East, Australia, and other points which would get a designated force and no more, neither the President or Prime Minister were as rigid. To Churchill, it was clear that Marshall had intended the entire war to be decided in France and that all of the American program should be tailored to that end. Within a day, Churchill was asking for more bombers and fighters for India and the Middle East, a

¹²¹ Danchev, *Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance*, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-159.

¹²² In the event, both the St. Nazaire Raid and Dieppe caused the removal of several high grade Panzer Divisions and some divisions from the central reserve or the east. See, Stacey, *op. cit.*, pp. 352-357; 387-393. The British considered the losses in Dieppe as proof that SLEDGEHAMMER would have been a waste of a larger force and at greater cost.

¹²³ The fact that Churchill always called for a fresh "appreciation" before any major operation went forward convinced the Americans he was waffling on decisions; the reality that a careful estimate to see if the conditions planned still existed was sound military thinking. Roosevelt never expressed dismay at this practice.

¹²⁴ Martin Gilbert. *Winston S. Churchill. Road to Victory 1941-1945*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986, pp. 88-89.

clear indication that Churchill did not accept Marshall's assessment that those places could hold with what has been sent. Britain had been at war for 32 months, America less than five, and it was apparent to Churchill that the US Chiefs' focus on one problem was strategically unrealistic for a coalition, and that the war could not be won by the exclusion of other operations vital to regaining the initiative.¹²⁵

Churchill was most concerned about the war at sea. Upon his arrival in Washington, the Prime Minister immediately brought up the Atlantic War of the Convoys. Upon these shipments, all the operations in Europe would have to depend. King had yet to show results in the Western Atlantic and admitted that more escort ships should be built. Maintaining a steady stream of supplies to the United Kingdom and Russia would require major fleet operations, not merely a handful of destroyers. At this time, Germany still retained a major capital ship and a number of cruisers, mostly in Norway, all within reach of Russia bound convoys. These convoys required a battleship escort for each large convoy. Convoys in fact, had to be delayed to permit the use of a far northern route outside of German bomber range.¹²⁶

Britain could ill afford the losses in ships and crews in the Atlantic, but more so, she could not afford the losses in materials delivered, to include its own production being lost on its way to the Far East or Russia. Thus, the million tons of shipping used annually bypassing the Mediterranean route to its own battlefields or in transporting goods and men two ways from the Far East could only be addressed by ending the North African fighting favorably.

Atlantic losses at sea reached an all-time high, with nearly 300 ships lost in May and June of 1942, averaging more than a half million tons per month. Nor had a similar killing been made against the U-boats; their losses were sustainable and being made up with a building rate adding to the total submarines available. The great slaughter of ships on the East Coast of the United States was at its height. More than 1.3 million tons were sunk in those two months alone, and more than 3.6 million tons up to that point in 1942.¹²⁷

No decisions had been made in this Second Washington conference, but the pattern for change had been clear. On their return to London, Churchill and Brooke carefully relooked SLEDGEHAMMER and virtually every review of the plan was taken up in the War Cabinet and by the BCOS. The significance the American War Department placed on this sacred trinity, BOLERO-SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP was both fully understood along with their own agreement with BOLERO and ROUNDUP as key to the total war effort. Their discussion was circular, finding no value in SLEDGEHAMMER as a viable option. For a time, this drumfire questioning of how to help the Russians, which was the sole purpose for the plan, went on. But the situation begged a decision.

No British Chief of Service, nor the Director of Combined Operations, or the Norfolk House planners disagreed with BOLERO or ROUNDUP. SLEDGEHAMMER was considered a bad plan, and a costly a diversion from the campaigns already being waged. This had to be stated with finality.

¹²⁵ Op. cit., pp. 89-91.

¹²⁶ *Churchill War Papers, Volume 17*, op. cit., *Secret Speech to Parliament, 22 April 42*, pp. 576-577, PQ 17 lost 130,000 tons of goods sunk with their bearing ships.

¹²⁷ Captain S.W. Roskill, RN. *The War at Sea. Volume II. The Period of Balance. History of the Second World War Series*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956, Chapters II-VII, passim. Table: Allied and Neutral Ships Sunk by U-boats in all Theaters, p. 104.

On July 6, the BCOS unanimously disapproved of SLEDGEHAMMER saying, "that Operation 'Sledgehammer' offered no hope of success and would merely ruin prospects of "Round-Up in 1943." This was far from denying any interest in landing in France, as Marshall and others claimed. Churchill's minute, however, added a sharp edge on their combined judgement.¹²⁸ Dill was signaled the preparatory line for use with the CCS in Washington, that the BCOS "...considered that conditions which would make Sledgehammer a practicable operation in 1942 were most unlikely to occur."¹²⁹

Churchill disapproved the SLEDGEHAMMER plan during the next days, after study by the Combined Commanders, but more importantly after the Tobruk disaster had threatened the survival of the British position in the Middle East. SLEDGEHAMMER in 1942, was ruled out.¹³⁰ The Prime Minister withdrew any consideration of SLEDGEHAMMER on 8 July 42 with a pungent message enraging Wedemeyer and the planners at OPD. "*No responsible British General, Admiral or Air Marshal is prepared to recommend 'Sledgehammer' as a practicable operation in 1942.*" Churchill also cited Combined Operations as noting that SLEDGEHAMMER would delay the training and buildup of amphibious assault teams for ROUNDUP in 1943. Churchill outlined the costs and problems of maintaining a surrounded force in France, and recommended GYMNAST as probably giving Russia more indirect help in 1942 than a sacrifice in France. He again noted a possible landing in Norway to support the convoys to Russia.¹³¹

Insensitive to British losses or needs, the JCS considered Churchill's verdict on SLEDGEHAMMER, nothing less than a betrayal of America's "graciousness" in proclaiming Europe First as a strategy, a strategy which the US Navy now wanted to avoid, and which would permit them to concentrate on the ORANGE war in the Pacific that they had always planned for and one that they would wage in revenge for Pearl Harbor.

Marshall reacted immediately to the SLEDGEHAMMER message. Marshall laid out the American position first for the JCS after reading out Churchill's message, and then announcing his own reactions. "Gymnast," Churchill's recommended action in 1942, would be "expensive and ineffectual. Noting that SLEDGEHAMMER could only go forward with British support (they indeed were to supply most of the troops and the bulk of air and ships), he said that the US must "turn to the Pacific for decisive action against Japan." His repetitive bugaboo, "dispersion," thereby would be eliminated by being able to "concentrate rather than to scatter U.S. forces..." King of course agreed. They claimed concentrating on one of their enemies therefore would aid the Russians, as equally illogical as a 6 against 33 division ratio in a SLEDGEHAMMER landing.¹³²

¹²⁸ Gilbert, *Road to Victory*, op. cit., p. 143.

¹²⁹ *Marshall Papers, Volume 3, op. cit., p. 269.*

¹³⁰ Grand Strategy and 8 July 1942 Memo, *Churchill War Papers, Volume 17,*

¹³¹ *Churchill War Papers, Volume 17, pp. 933-934; Wedemeyer Reports!, op. cit., Chapter X, passim; Global Logistics, 1940-1943, pp. 383-385; Grand Strategy, Vol 3, part 2, Chapter XXVII, passim.* Mountbatten briefed Roosevelt in June during a visit, noting the shortage of landing craft available as well as training time for amphibious teams for a SLEDGEHAMMER sized operation. As RUTTER, soon renamed to JUBILEE had not yet occurred, it is also possible he expected that operational losses from this raid would further complicate operations but it is unknown exactly what he had said to Roosevelt. Army planners were suspicious that he had been Churchill's advance man to kill SLEDGEHAMMER and replace it with GYMNAST.

¹³² Op, cit., pp. 269-270. Note the essence of the British refusal to do SLEDGEHAMMER was that it would be "expensive and ineffectual." Japan and Russia were not at war. Attacking Japan would not, therefore aid Russia.

Marshall felt that the Pacific should be reinforced rather than launching GYMNAST. This overturned the entire ABC-1/RAINBOW concept that Germany was both the most dangerous and crucial enemy to defeat. Reinforcing the Pacific would have abandoned the Middle East and Russia and gained very little. It would have left the Atlantic battle and the air war to be fought from the UK. Roosevelt saw this as the worst possible alternative, which would lengthen the war. He had just read in the Victory Program, less than six months before saying “...*Joint Board is convinced that the first major objective of the United States and its Associates ought to be the complete military defeat of Germany. If Germany were defeated the entire European system would collapse, and it is probable that Japan could be forced to give up much of her territorial gains...*” This was endorsed by Marshall.¹³³ Yet now he appeared to change his mind.

Marshall now threatened to shift on Germany First as a strategy. He and King combined against the President to get Europe First or take their ball somewhere else. Such childishness was beneath the man, but certainly typical of King who saw the Pacific as the Navy’s crusade for revenge. Marshall claimed this was a bluff, but Marshall was very much swayed by certain of his staff, and it smacks of a possibility, though after deeper thought, it would have been hard to believe that Germany would have been defeated had the Allies focused on the Pacific war first. Yet Marshall had the Army staff study the effect of a turn to the Pacific. It found that due to distances and turn around rates for steaming ships, a force increasing by 40,000 men per month could be sustained in a Pacific move, whereas a force of 100,000 men added monthly, could be supported if transports went to Europe or Africa.

When SLEDGEHAMMER initially came under fire and threat of cancellation in late May and early June 1942, the War Department response was predictable. Just as Marshall believed SLEDGEHAMMER would anchor ROUNDUP, he counted on threatening to reverse JCS support of Europe First, and that would somehow change things. Roosevelt refused, Hopkins’ notes on his meeting with Roosevelt outlined the President’s ideas succinctly. Several points underscore FDR’s strategy. Roosevelt’s analysis was a telling assessment of his Chief of Staff’s judgement:

“I cannot agree that if it is impossible to develop BOLERO in 1942 that we could turn away from Germany and towards Japan.” He asked for a confidential report to see if the men in the UK agreed with the Cabinet position. *“Even though we must reluctantly agree to no SLEDGEHAMMER in 1942, I still think we should press forward vigorously for the 1943 enterprise.”* My main point is that I do not believe we can wait until 1943 to strike at Germany.¹³⁴

Marshall wrote to Roosevelt, “This proposal [GYMNAST] means no BOLERO in 1942 and an inadequate and probably ineffective BOLERO, if any, in ”1943.” He further stated, “British attitude as to BOLERO must be accepted, it is our opinion that we should turn to the Pacific, and, using all existing and available dispositions and installations, strike decisively at Japan.”¹³⁵ Marshall’s written reaction to the British message sent to Roosevelt, was curtly simple. His fury at British whom he felt had agreed to his BOLERO-SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP plan caused him to state that if the British could not be threatened into acceptance of the full BOLERO plan, that he and King were willing to turn fully to a quick win in the

¹³³ *Victory Program, op. cit., pp. 103-104.*

¹³⁴ *Sherwood, op. cit., p. 602.*

¹³⁵ *Op. cit., p. 271*

Pacific, “with forces strong for a decision against Japan.”¹³⁶ It is significant that Marshall noted that the problem with the British decision was “their attitude,” and that Wedemeyer would later accuse the British of substituting “Stratagems in Lieu of Strategy.”¹³⁷

A turn to the Pacific, not only would slow the war, it would still leave Germany to be fought which could fight Russia with less diversion from Allies committed against its flanks. Pride, not calculations, therefore supported Marshall’s claim for a Pacific move. Obviously 1942, was besides being a year of defense, it was one of taking achievable decisions.¹³⁸ Given his record with intransigent service chiefs, Roosevelt simply would have fired Marshall, had he not relented, the gap in their judgement would have then been too far to accept.¹³⁹

Roosevelt sent Marshall, King, and Hopkins to London almost immediately to restate their views of 1942 actions but would issue them written instructions concerning the options to present and what would be an agreeable for a decision. Hopkins drafted the instructions though Roosevelt’s draft notes included an option that he himself negated in the final paper. His written notes included as a second option, one of the components for a 1942 strategy being, “...to send the majority of planes being sent to UK to Middle East, and to speed up divisions sent to BOLERO (UK) as well as 5 divisions to the Middle East, while planning on ROUNDUP in April 43. Russia aid would go through Basra.”¹⁴⁰ Neither of these were favored by Marshall and King and apparently never presented.

The CCS in Washington had already weighed changes before Marshall left for the UK, though not in sync with Churchill or Roosevelt. The final statement following the CCS Washington conference in July, 1942 stated:

That if the situation on the Russian front by 15th September indicates that such a collapse or weakening of Russian resistance as to make ‘ROUND-UP’ appear impractical of successful execution, the decision should be taken to launch a combined operation against the North and North-West coast of Africa

¹³⁶ Global Logistics, 1940-1943, passim, Chapters XIII and XIV. The ability of ports to handle the discharge and movement of goods and troops was continually underrated by American planners despite numerous backups and sailing delays during the war. Army Service Forces planners and naval planners clashed frequently. This bulge in the pipeline, was inevitably blamed on the Service of Supply echelon dedicated to delivering the goods, never the central planning staff who valued statistics of tonnage sent. That certain “strategists” failed to study or understand multi-theater logistics has colored the depiction of what actually happened in the war.

¹³⁷ Ibid and *Wedemeyer Reports!*, op. cit., Chapter X, passim.

¹³⁸ *Global Logistics, 1940-1943, op. cit., pp. 385-387.*

¹³⁹ Roosevelt was more shrewd and informed, than the Army staff liked to believe. The Navy, who had dealt with him for years, never dared oppose him. He essentially fired both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief of the US Fleet in 1941. He was not afraid to change horses for the long race. Marshall’s “bluff” convinced Alan Brooke that Marshall was not a deep thinker, and had no inkling of the maritime interconnectedness of the theaters of war, which both Roosevelt and Churchill were intensely concerned with. Tellingly, Marshall had Somervell speak for the army at conferences where logistics was discussed, whereas all the other service chiefs of both countries, handled the topic by themselves reinforced by their own staff’s preparations. Whether this was gamesmanship or indicative of Marshall’s lack of assurance in detailed argument can only be speculated. See Edward Farley Aldrich. *The Partnership: George Marshall, Henry Stimson, and the Extraordinary Collaboration that Won World War II*. Lanham: Stackpole, 2022. This is the most ardent description of Marshall’s attempt to change policy, pp. 298-311.

¹⁴⁰ Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 275, copy of Roosevelt handwritten notes given to Marshall on 15 July, but later replaced by typed final copy on 16 July.

at the earliest possible date before December 1942.¹⁴¹ This essentially made the aid to the Russians as the main Grand Strategy for the Allies in 1942, not action against the Germans.

Roosevelt received a nightly summary from Hopkins of the meetings with the BCOS. Hopkins final note reported the impasse and clearly opted for Churchill's recommendation. When SLEDGEHAMMER appeared impossible, GYMNAST fell out as the least problematic to the Americans. Marshall attempted to hold the British to a September 15th decision date in an attempt to run out the clock, but Roosevelt directed the Chiefs to plan TORCH, its new name, and on Hopkins advice, to specify that it was to be executed by 30 October. He wanted this done immediately.¹⁴²

In the event, Eisenhower, who inherited the operation from his position at ETOUSA, rescheduled it for 7 November to accommodate the complicated naval coordination of task forces sailing from both the United States and the UK. Roosevelt who appeared to want American troops in combat before election day on November 3d, refused to intervene to move the date up, possibly to avoid being accused of staging the landings for domestic political reasons.¹⁴³

Churchill referred to the decision for a North African operation in 1942, as one of "Strategic Natural Selection." This decision certainly fit the pattern of ending the North African war, and offered positive military and political possibilities, but it was not an immediately decisive operation. It would, however, force the Germans to react to the Mediterranean front on a larger scale, thus drawing Germany's reserve away from the Eastern front.¹⁴⁴

Churchill recognized the long-term nature of war; Marshall insisted only one campaign would solve all problems. This was what his planners told him. Yet, even the assumption that Japan could not survive Germany's defeat, had less substance if Japan had not been whittled down in the interim, which meant a larger Pacific commitment. Anything else, was faulty reasoning.

Throughout 1942, Japan was still within a very strong position, having the Dutch East Indies, all the Mandated Islands, Malaya, Indo-China, and the Chinese coast, all within its perimeter. Its merchant fleet and battle line were strong, only in military and naval aviation had it fallen in quality, but not significantly in numbers of pilots. Japan had counted on America not being able to endure a prolonged

¹⁴¹ 24th July, 1942, *Combined Chiefs of Staff Operations 1942-1943: Memorandum by Combined Chiefs of Staff, ' in Grand Strategy, Volume III/11. P. 684.* This is referred to as CCS 94.

¹⁴² Howe, *Seizing the Initiative*, *ibid.* Note, if SLEDGEHAMMER was approved in September, there was not enough to mount the operation before bad weather, thus making ROUNDUP its obvious replacement in the spring, if no other operation was then being mounted. "The Decision to Invade North Africa." Leo J. Meyer. *In Command Decisions, op. cit., pp. 173-198.*

¹⁴³ Sherwood, *Hopkins, op. cit.,* and Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.,* and *George C. Marshall Interviews, op. cit. pp. 579-581, et al., passim.* Eisenhower had been promoted to Lt. Gen. and named Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations, US Army (ETOUSA) and was to oversee BOLERO and be the US senior representative to the Combined Commanders, planning ROUNDUP. He was not designated to command to ROUNDUP. His being named as Allied Commander-in-Chief for TORCH, had not immediately been foreseen. King recommended he could do both TORCH and plan ROUNDUP, an impossible task even for a seasoned senior officer. Eisenhower was neither. He had been a general for a little more than a year. No commander since George McClellan had been advanced as rapidly, and neither had combat experience or much accumulated time with troops. Unlike McClellan, Eisenhower's attitudes and decisions were constantly shaped by his boss' attitudes, and the input of the Chief's OPD planners. McClellan operated in the vacuum that was the 1862 War Department system.

¹⁴⁴ Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate, op. cit., Chapter XX passim.*

penetration of Japan's outer defense ring captured in its 1942 operations. America had to weaken these defenses, before they could be reinforced and hardened. MacArthur, Nimitz, and King recognized this, but were opposed by the War Department planners who clung to Europe First, as not being a relative term, but as a restriction for support.

Deciding on GYMNAST (later TORCH) did not preclude a European landing, it delayed it. Nor were the British ever against such a landing. The Combined Commanders' Staff at Norfolk House, examined the ROUNDUP operation as outlined by the War Department, and reported favorably on it as well as conducting a detailed appreciation of requirements and tasks that would support the operation. If there was disagreement, it was in the assumption that ROUNDUP was a must run operation in 1943. The British leaned heavily towards weakening the Germans first by bombing, blockade, and finishing the Mediterranean operation, though they did say the operation should be executed as early in 1943 as possible if other conditions were favorable. The current strengths of the Allied versus German forces only, would justify the date for its execution. When launched, the operation had to have a good chance of obtaining an operational decision and this was solely reliant on a correlation of forces of the assault versus the defense and its immediate buildup.¹⁴⁵

The major difference between the Allies was that Americans viewed ROUNDUP as the only possible operation against Germany, while the British always considered an array of operations that would place them at a military advantage, and not necessarily in another western front situation where strength was pitted against strength. They heavily relied upon bombing to weaken German capacity and morale. As in World War I, they also viewed blockade as essential. The Army War Department did not embrace either as necessary requirements before ROUNDUP could be launched.¹⁴⁶

The newly renamed Africa operation, TORCH, benefited from being on the cusp of new construction joining the fleet, as well as a short turn around time for many ships. TORCH also benefited from not tying up British ports by masses of ships loading out and leaving for a continental invasion thus delaying supplies coming in in the competition for quays. Planners estimated that mounting a large invasion, would essentially shut down the UK's major ports for up to two months as ships loading at quays and forming up, would block any arrivals from unloading. This meant that no lend lease supplies could be taken in for British use or transshipped to Russia.

¹⁴⁵ The Norfolk House planners had been working full out on invasion possibilities starting right after ARCADIA. This cancels Wedemeyer's claim that the British never had an intention of invading Europe. The creation of Combined Operations in 1940, was for that intent, to develop methods and equipment. The British always studied politically generated OUTLINE plans to ascertain their actual tactical viability. Churchill had certainly learned this lesson from the Dardanelles in 1915. The War Department sent plans to lower headquarters but their view was always if they decided it, the theaters should get on with the job, regardless of local knowledge. SLEDGEHAMMER was deemed possible due to shipping and division availability by September, its tactical details were potentially disastrous and never finalized. Neither Eisenhower nor Wedemeyer, had combat experience, and viewed their broad brush creation as a sound operation, without ever doing a detailed tactical, logistical, and correlation of forces analysis. Neither also, had ever experienced the cultural, doctrinal, and personality impasse that happens in Combined Operations.

¹⁴⁶ This changed in 1943, with POINTBLANK, the Combined Bomber Offensive whose prerequisite for success was weakening German production, air supremacy, and capabilities in order to make OVERLORD possible. A starvation blockade against Germany worked in World War I, but did not in the Second World War due to the massive transfer of Russian wheat and food to Germany, thus deliberately starving millions of Ukrainians and other Russians. The German army planned this rape of the food supply as part of their campaign plan for the East.

Marshall told Roosevelt that TORCH would delay ROUNDUP until 1944, but Roosevelt was adamant and saw the fact that driving into the Mediterranean would both clear the southern flank of Europe, open the Mediterranean and permit bombing to still be conducted against Germany from the UK, a very important priority to both he and the Prime Minister. The unspoken fact, that until the Atlantic convoys could be protected, that shipping losses would continue to hamstring the Allies into mounting but a single, major campaign per year against Germany. No victory at sea was then in sight, even with the flow of new ships being produced. It was obvious that Roosevelt did not view the strategy of an opening of a western front either decisive or timely, until the Allies basic lines of communications were freed, both of which would show results in the Atlantic and Mediterranean if GYMNAST was adopted.¹⁴⁷

Marshall viewed ROUNDUP as the only operation he favored against the Germans and the best option to keep Russia in the war. It was also the only European plan he had. Losing SLEDGEHAMMER, he felt, negated BOLERO and ROUNDUP, neither of which was true, they were in fact postponed. Roosevelt had not accepted that 1943 was to be the decisive year, and therefore could never be convinced that an immediate invasion was essential.¹⁴⁸

Was a 1943 ROUNDUP called for? Was it possible?

The fact that America could not do both BOLERO and GYMNAST/TORCH simultaneously showed that the Atlantic convoys were crucial and that the loss of shipping prevented multiple front actions. Germany produced tanks, artillery, airplanes, ammunition and submarines; the largest production items produced by America was thousands of ships of all sizes, and tens of thousands of airplanes, and hundreds of thousands of trucks and tanks, and artillery. Germany relied on rail to move and support its armies; America used the sea in virtually all of its campaigns simply to enter the theaters of war and supply them, as well as to dedicate no less than 20 percent of its production to Lend Lease. Shipping was the ruling factor in America's war¹⁴⁹

Being a continental power permitted the Germans to field and supply a large Army for most of the war, one whose divisions outnumbered any but the Russians, but whose manpower and eventually fuel, ran out during the final year of the war. America's central position between the Atlantic-European theaters and the Pacific, made it possible to supply both, but to different scales. In 1942-1943, the crisis was not in supplies or divisions or air units, but in shipping.

Divisions and air units were available, but the US Navy's problems in the protection of East coast operations cost hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping lost, all at a time when ships, and their cargoes, were essential for the Allies in regaining the initiative. Yet, in King's defense, his convoy areas were

¹⁴⁷ *Papers of George C. Marshall. Volume 3, July 10, 1942 memo.* Marshall was blind to the maritime issues, and particularly the problem of feeding England while fighting a war. Roosevelt had obviously absorbed the lessons of 1917 maritime deployment, Marshall had not.

¹⁴⁸ Cline, *OPD, op. cit., Chapters VIII and XI.* The British actually had a Joint Plans staff for the Cabinet, as well as the planners for Combined Commanders at Norfolk House which could lean on the major commands of the services for up to date information on operations. This was the benefit of London being actually within the fighting theater. Combined Operations focused on amphibious operations as its sole specialty. ROUNDUP was replaced by OVERLORD (NEPTUNE).

¹⁴⁹ *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, and Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945, passim.* Somervell, the Chief of ASF directed ship moves for the army and understood far better than Marshall, that 1942 and 1943 were foundational campaigns, Marshall, Eisenhower, and Wedemeyer certainly did not in 1942.

virtually doubled by Doenitz's campaign to send U-boats offshore, and he chose to protect those at sea, not ships sailing singly inshore of the coast. Most importantly, Roosevelt was waging a war with self-created political pressure. He decided that any operation in 1942 that committed troops against Germany was desirable, even to the detriment of the crucial SICKEL buildup of air elements in the UK, and to the building of thousands of landing craft needed for ROUNDUP to be a viable operation in 1943. His priority on assuring the American people that they had stemmed the Japanese advance, and that they were now engaging Germany on the ground, was vital and an understandable goal for a democratic leader.¹⁵⁰

The preparations for TORCH did not slow the more visible war to America, the war in the Pacific. The loss of the Philippines hit a still shocked America, reeling from Pearl Harbor, and Roosevelt felt it imperative to stave off Japanese advances into New Guinea and the Solomons to protect Australia and reverse Japanese initiative. He realized that America could not suffer "another Bataan." While essential, Roosevelt refused to name a single Supreme Commander for the Pacific thus having two theaters competing for resources that were not in a common pool under a single commander. By default, the real supreme command of the Pacific therefore devolved to the JCS, which approved all plans and gave directives to the two major commanders.¹⁵¹

Britain had defaulted on the defense of Australia, her Far East fleet sunk or driven to the Indian ocean and now under siege in defending India. Her tenuous position in the Middle East prevented the release of forces, including the Australian and New Zealand divisions due to both the situation there, and the lack of shipping to transfer divisions to their home countries. Military logic demanded that 1942 would require the stabilization of the situation in every theater. The idea of a Second Front in Europe, highly dependent on English Channel weather, was thus unsupportable in the face of many enemy decisive attacks everywhere.¹⁵²

ABC-1 had stressed the clearance of major sea lines of communication. Neither ABC-1 nor the Europe First in 1942 contradicted this and these operations had to be prosecuted first, before any other operations could go forward. This was the obvious strategy for operations early in the war. The forces necessary were too great, and shipping did not exist to deploy and sustain a major theater on the European Continent, and would only be available in mid-1943 at earliest, even given the generous statistics claimed for production in both plans. The logic of the situation required a focus on shipping and air power, not the movement of large bodies of fighting troops in 1942 to stage for an operation in 1943.

¹⁵⁰ Landing Craft were conspicuously the "long pole" in every campaign tent until the last major operations in the Pacific in 1945. A tabulation of landing craft production is offered in Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton. *Global Logistics and Grand Strategy, 1943-1945*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1967, pp. 826-829, and Chapters X and XXIV, passim. See also Samuel Eliot Morison. *History of US Naval Operations In World War II. Volume 11. The Invasion of France and Germany*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953, Chapter 1, and pp. 55-56.

¹⁵¹ Louis Morton. *The War in the Pacific: Strategy and Command, The First Two Years*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961. In many cases, both MacArthur and Nimitz proposed their plans and draft directives and the JCS then altered them in priorities.

¹⁵² Under ABC-1, Britain was supposed to defend Australia and New Zealand. This assumed a transfer of the fleet to the Far East. The maintenance of capital ships in the Home Fleet was necessary both to guard against German use of Tirpitz and her smaller sisters, against the Arctic convoys. This limited Britain to sending only two capital to Hong Kong. They were sunk en route within days of Pearl Harbor, leaving the Far East open to the Japanese mobile fleet.

While both Roosevelt and Churchill paid far more attention to production statistics than Marshall, both leaders strained the system to gain the appearance in 1943 of success everywhere, a political appearance that created additional operations to maintain what the initiative already gained. Production could not meet losses or support raising new forces. The idea of a heavily weighted main effort to strike a decisive blow would not be possible until 1944, by which time Russia would have inflicted heavy losses on Germany and virtually made possible the invasion launched. Russia, left to fight the largest battles against the Germans in both 1942 and 1943, would forever feel betrayed by their allies, despite the Lend Lease goods supplied. [JUPITER was probably the only operation that would have immediately benefited Russia in 1942, both by securing ships enroute to Murmansk, but it making an aerial bridge of supplies possible from North Norway airfields.]

The Joint Staff had input, not control over production, and had progressively filled requests from foreign theaters of war diminishing the pool of trained units and equipment. King's handling of all fleets was not transparent to the Joint Staff or to the Combined Chiefs. The bulk of warships and landing craft, were sent to the Pacific. Neither Admiral Leahy nor the President did much to reign him in. For OPD, BOLERO-SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP represented total control of Grand Strategy and the bulk of American production, a reality that none of the British or American planners enjoyed until after late 1944, when only the defeat of Japan lay on the far horizon and the main European-Atlantic issues had been decided by the political leadership.¹⁵³

In Marshall's event horizon, too limited to see the progressive victory being started, he rebelled at the loss of a non-decisive landing in France in 1942 and its possible guarantee of a landing in Europe in 1943. What would not have been possible, was total air superiority by the summer of 1943 over Europe, regardless of what had been done. Long range fighters were not available in 1943, and the bombing of oil targets would have been impossible without airfields in Italy, not gained until late 1943 in the Mediterranean campaign that Marshall wanted to prevent. Both were necessary to guarantee success for a 1943 operation.

Despite the large training programs for air crew, and increased production of planes, less than half the air force was deployed by the end of 1943. The Combined Bomber Offensive yet to be maximized, would by mid-1944 have destroyed German air superiority and within several more months, decisively crippled German oil production making the German war machine increasingly weaker, not by production of weapons lost, but by fuel shortages which by early 1945, were decisive in preventing battlefield mobility.¹⁵⁴ Thus, by 1944, the situation would change rapidly in the first six months after finally achieving the sized forces OPD had planned for in the 1943 time frame.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate. *The Army Air Forces in World War II. Volume 1: Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, pp. 557-565.

¹⁵⁴ *Oil Report.* British Ministry of Economic Warfare. See also *Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Europe.*; *Strategic Bombing Survey. The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Logistics.* Washington: 1947, Chapters 2, 3, and 8, passim.

¹⁵⁵ Marshall should have remembered that the rapid shipping of an unready AEF in 1918, produced a horrific casualty intensive event in the Meuse-Argonne region. The creation of divisions from cadre, "scalped" from previously activated divisions is not a good way to grow an army. The rush to produce many divisions did not permit adequate training and introduction into the theaters. While acting primarily as a member of the JCS, Marshall had delegated the preparation and training of the Army to Lt. Gen. McNair at Army Ground Forces. His understanding of the problems of the fighting arms was limited by his lack of exposure to the problems identified

In 1943, Germany still had the resources to fight a successful defense on both fronts along with the additional 30 divisions later spent to hold the rim of the Mediterranean. Germany would have had more divisions available for a western defense in 1943 than in June, 1944.¹⁵⁶ It is possible that both Churchill and Roosevelt, as maritime strategists, would have recognized the overstretch on German resources and troops from the 1918 blockade, and saw a parallel economic strain and collapse that the OPD continental planners had not seen.

A 1943 ROUNDUP may have matched the slow-motion killing fest in the east, with the Wehrmacht equally divided to defend on both fronts with interior lines and industries and oil protected due to airfields in France and the Low Countries. The 1943 correlation of forces favored the defense. 1943 then would have paralleled 1917 in military stance. Moreover, the vital changes in equipment, training, and doctrine that occurred in the Tunisian and Italian campaigns, would not have been available as lessons in a first deployment to ROUNDUP. The campaign also would have required more divisions to be mobilized than those eventually authorized to face a stronger Wehrmacht, a decision Roosevelt was intent on avoiding. Marshall wanted a bigger army. Roosevelt and industry said enough and held the Army to a troop basis of 7.7 million men active at one time.¹⁵⁷

Roosevelt never fought against a Mediterranean exploitation at least as far as Italy, only Marshall and King did, and both of their views related to their own service's preferred main front, Continental Europe for the Army, and the Central and Western Pacific for the Navy. While Churchill wanted to support guerrillas in the Balkans, his actual interest was in tempting Turkey to enter the war, not to invade Greece or the Balkans. The British supported irregular warfare extensively in all the occupied countries with SOE, Special Operations Executive, a group that trained and led irregulars. This caused the Germans to deploy many divisions for counterinsurgency operations throughout the Balkans to secure their southern flank.¹⁵⁸

With his own recommended man, Admiral Leahy, now sitting in the center chair at JCS meetings, Marshall was fairly isolated from speaking his mind to the President, and had the President's thoughts interpreted for him by an Admiral, who backed King in increasing priorities for the Pacific. Marshall's lack of understanding of air strategy, also saw him failing to back SICKEL, the air buildup in Europe, as the major portion of BOLERO, a force which would immediately engage the Germans and begin to have a greater effect than troops sitting in England, awaiting an invasion in the future. Apparently, he understood little that bombing is a progressive attrition campaign, and that its success could not necessarily meet a time

in the theaters and their solutions in the training base. This was a function of time, not competence. He could not actively train the army and be fully involved in JCS and CCS decisions.

¹⁵⁶ OPD had planned up to 150 more divisions to be mobilized in such a situation, which would have caused economic deterioration by requiring several million more men from the industrial base. There is no evidence that infers a landing in France in 1943, guaranteed an earlier end to the war. The Wehrmacht still had ten million men under arms on all fronts as late as September, 1944 even after massive losses in the east and the Mediterranean. These numbered 327 divisions, many at half strength, and 31 Panzer Divisions. Still after Normandy, the Germans were able to form 25 new divisions. See Hugh M. Cole. *The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, p. 7; See also *World War II: A Statistical Analysis*.

¹⁵⁷ Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast. *The Procurement of Ground Combat Troops*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1948. There was also a significant improvement in technology and weapons in 1944 not available in 1943. This included tanks, antitank guns, and aircraft. Actual strength topped 8.1 million including those invalided or recuperating in hospitals. For those wishing a positive argument in favor of ROUNDUP in 1943, see John Grigg. *1943: The Victory That Never Was*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1980.

¹⁵⁸ Winston S. Churchill War Papers, 1943, passim.

schedule based on a number of factors. Both Churchill and Roosevelt understood the criticality of wearing down German air strength as a prelude to invasion. While Marshall accepted this, he nevertheless pressed for the deployment of divisions and their support as an equal share of the early deployments. He virtually lost control of the strategic bombardment air forces to the CCS general direction, after the Casablanca conference in 1943.¹⁵⁹

When TORCH was announced, Marshall did little to prevent the slowdown in SICKEL when the CCS declared then that 15 aviation groups would be extraneous to BOLERO's requirements. Nor did Marshall persist in demanding increases in landing craft consistently in meetings throughout 1942 and 1943, making landing craft a shortage item in every non-Pacific operation of the war. Beyond a landing in Europe, Marshall was always at loss to describe a strategic end-state possible, and relied heavily on plans made by others. In one sense, Marshall's influence was diminished. OVERLORD, the centerpiece and replacement for ROUNDUP, was the product of a British dominated staff, the Combined Commanders, and was produced even before the famous COSSAC plan that became OVERLORD, which relied heavily on the Combined Commanders' general outline.¹⁶⁰

Without a year of bombing, it is possible that Roosevelt believed that opening a front in Europe would parallel the stalemate in the West in World War I, leaving a long, ground campaign of indeterminate length. A year's bombing plus the additional losses in the East, did have a large effect. As late as 1943, Marshall still believed that two or three hundred divisions might be necessary to win the war, if Russia succumbed, as the War Department held throughout the summer of 1942. His own G-3, put the number at 350 divisions. The sole driving force for this was the existence of the USSR, and its continuation of fixing the bulk of the Wehrmacht. If Russia fell, America would bear the bulk of the responsibility for fielding a large army, England simply lacked the manpower to carry a larger share.¹⁶¹

TORCH did commit the American army against Germany, and besides the destruction of more than 250,000 enemy troops in Africa, it put American airpower in range of Rome, and the oil targets in Romania. The latter was decisive. It also provided valuable amphibious experience with 4 separate invasions launched between November 1942 and January 1944. Each was a learning experience both in

¹⁵⁹ Marshall disbelieved that the B-29 fire missions would obviate a need for a Japan-invasion. Lemay interview in *Strategic Air Warfare*. (edited by Richard A. Cohn and Joseph P Harahan). Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1988, pp. 63-65. Army planners counted on heavy bombers to fly in general support of the 1943 ROUNDUP, and would have prevented what became known as the POINTBLANK Combined (Strategic) Bombing Offensive. See also Rawson, *Organizing Victory*, "Symbol Conference," op. cit., pp. 40-73.

¹⁶⁰ Matloff and Snell. Alanbrooke commented that Marshall had a briefcase full of papers he pulled from. He These are the executive summary papers on virtually every topic found in his travel documents and in support of CCS meetings. See RG 218, papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, World War II. Marshall's papers and his recorded interviews with his biographer offer very little beyond these briefing books, as he both compresses time in his answers, and possibly mis-remembers events. See Papers of Geroge C. Marshall, volumes 2-5, and Interviews for Forest Pogue, op. cit. See R. W. Thompson. *The Price of Victory*. London: Constable, 1960. OPD lacked both the local knowledge, and the experienced amphibious and air planners to produce more than a rough outline plan. Norfolk House was a plans factory, which could staff every phase of a plan through a mill of experts armed with the latest high grade intelligence. Importantly, the Combined Commanders were the men who would be tasked to execute the plans, not merely a plans staff.

¹⁶¹ See various papers on BOLERO, SLEDGEHAMMER, ROUNDUP and TORCH produced in *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. The War Years. Volume 1*. Alfred E. Chandler et al. editors. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, see Chapters 2, 3, 4.

the principles and conduct of Combined Operations, but also in gauging the type resistance that would be met during a major landing in Northwest Europe. Great attrition was suffered by the Axis, with the fall of Axis Italy. Its Armistice in September, 1943, was a major symbol coveted by both Churchill and Roosevelt. Germany was now under attack from three sides with a large part of its assets extending to hold the perimeter, and not simply to fight Russia or to hold the French coast.

But all of these achievements were gained by Combined Allied operations, with new tactics and techniques learned for gaining operational decisions in modern war. These were not available in 1942, but had to be gained in the hard school of war. Going to France in 1942 was possible, but how would it have resulted? Most of the senior commanders of the Army, Air Forces and Navy who would mastermind and then lead the main assault of Festung Europa, had mastered their trade in TORCH and the Mediterranean campaigns. By 1944, almost none of the senior commanders of three stars were neophytes to the war, and all of the commanders-in-chief of service were British veterans. This was an essential advantage. The Americans had no veteran commanders at this stage in the war in 1942. Those employed in 1944, were proven in the 1943 Mediterranean campaigns.¹⁶²

Importantly, after TORCH and the Mediterranean, some 60 divisions were left to America for employment on the main front. Twelve French divisions were added to the Allied Army in Northwest Europe, and Britain and Canada would add 20 plus divisions to the invasion mounted from the United Kingdom. An air armada more than twice that envisioned for ROUNDUP would exist by mid-1944, though the goal of 7000 landing craft would fall short by some 2000 plus ships.¹⁶³

The slowness to commit air units to the UK under BOLERO reflects the fire-brigade mentality that had developed early in the war concerning the use of air units. This developed from the days prior to Pearl Harbor. Then, newly acquired B-17 bombers were hastily attached to a bomb group and flown directly from the United States, to Hawaii and on to the Philippines, while shorter ranged fighters were shipped by sea. The build-up of air units in Hawaii and Australia far exceeded the planned air deployment to the United Kingdom under ABC-1. While Air War Plan-1 was represented in the Victory Program and RAINBOW 5, the fall of the Philippines caused both the Army and Navy to plead for the immediate shipment of fighters, bombers, and transports to support the defense of Hawaii, Midway, and Australia. MacArthur viewed the arrival of the Fifth Air Force under a new commander, Maj. Gen. George Kenney, as a major plus in creating an offensive capability for his campaign in New Guinea and eventually in CARTWHEEL. Fifth Air Force proved to be a decisive partner in every campaign in the Southwest Pacific, and Kenney and MacArthur enjoyed a smooth relationship and great mutual confidence in each other.¹⁶⁴

During the ABC-1 conversations agreement was made to send 32 squadrons to the UK in 1941 (if war came), but the revised figures under the RAINBOW 5 provision authorized five bomber groups, and three fighter groups that were in the initial allocation, an increase in capability. The British were concerned over interruption in their air allotment of new aircraft under Lend Lease. The Air Corps then had a 115 air group goal under mobilization, which eked out a third level priority following Australia and the South

¹⁶² These included Clark, Patton, Bradley, Truscott, Spaatz, Doolittle, and Devers. Collins, Corlett, and Patch came from the Pacific. Hodges served as Bradley's deputy in Normandy before taking command of First Army.

¹⁶³ Memorandum for Information, No. 24, the Admiralty, June 1944 cited in Thompson, Price of Victory, p. 259-260, fn. 5. See also Morrison, Volume 11, for an exact breakdown of craft, *ibid*, pp. 55-56.

¹⁶⁴ CARTWHEEL: Reduction of Rabaul. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, *passim*. See General George Kenney. *Kenney Reports!*.

Pacific. MAGNET, the original code for UK deployment, bore further deletions due to campaigns as far afield as the Netherlands East Indies, and the need to replace and augment the American Volunteer Group in China via India. Additionally, units were assigned to the still extant GYMNAST task force. Thus, the Air Force intended for England, saw itself diminished at the outset of the war. Training combat groups, not individual training, created most of the shortfall in AAF numbers in 1942. The first combat groups deployed, had no group and squadron training, and as a result, trained in the UK before being deployed across the Channel in operations.

Roosevelt had told Churchill that 15 bomber groups would be available by January 43, the reality proved to be a third of that, even considering the offset by TORCH, the lack of shipping for ground elements slowed group deployments. Shipping effected every part of the war. Lost to most analysts is that convoys to the United Kingdom also carried food and civilian goods like clothes needed to sustain an economy whose production had been geared totally to war, and whose manpower was in war factories or under arms. The daily living of more than 40 millions had to be supported while they supported the war effort. Much of this physical support, arrived on ships.¹⁶⁵

While the Eighth Air Force assigned to the UK staged a symbolic raid across the Channel on July 4th, 1942, what was not lost on senior commanders was that the aircraft used were medium bombers, not heavies, and that those had been borrowed from the British who had acquired them under Lend Lease. In August, 1942, the first American heavy bomber raid was against a target in France, and comprised a mere 12 B-17E heavy bombers. The first US raid against a target on German soil did not occur until January, 1943.¹⁶⁶

Marshall wielded an un-tempered sword in his first year's conferences. Despite the boon of Selective Service and the Louisiana Maneuvers, trained and ready forces were already an issue in 1942. While having thirty plus divisions in the force when the war began, the Victory Program had aimed for 215 divisions based on the world wide inventory of enemy divisions, and the factor of Russia failing to endure or to be able to fix the majority of Germany divisions in the east, and therefore away from the Western Front. MacArthur's front, likewise, would need sufficient divisions to move north of the Solomons towards Rabaul, and eventually to liberate the Philippines. The increased activation of divisions meant that men were repeatedly drawn from trained units to be cadre for other divisions, making a fully trained division an endless endeavor due to replacements filling files opened by transfers to new units. The units deployed in 1942 did not suffer from this, but units for the next two years would be affected by this rolling switch of new men into units already fully trained and then reduced to provide trained cadre for new formations.¹⁶⁷

TORCH becomes the Main Allied Response Against Germany and Italy in 1942.

¹⁶⁵ This is detailed in a number of Official "Civil Series" in the UK Second World War Series. See especially, H. Duncan Hall, *North American Supply*. London: HMSO, 1955; H. Duncan Hall and C.C. Wrigley. *Studies in Overseas Supply*. London: HMSO, 1956, and Behrens. *Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War*, op. cit.

¹⁶⁶ Craven and Cate, op. cit., Volume II Chapter 7, passim.

¹⁶⁷ The most egregious example of this was the 106th Division which deployed in late 1944, after losing over 5000 men, most of its infantry complement to replacements sent to Europe. New, basic trainee graduates replaced them. It arrived in untrained condition, to be destroyed within several days of its first combat on the Schnee Eifel in the Ardennes offensive. See Hugh M. Cole. *The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge*. Washington: Chief of Military History, 1964.

Lt. Gen. Eisenhower, recently promoted again, was appointed as Allied Commander-in-Chief for TORCH in August. In June, he had been named the Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations, US Army (ETOUSA) to oversee the execution of BOLERO in the UK, and to provide a senior member on the British Combined Commanders board, planning ROUNDUP. On Alan Brooke's advice, Marshall revised the American boundaries of the American European Theater to include North Africa leaving him with overall American responsibility for both "Europe and Africa," and overall planning responsibility for TORCH and ROUNDUP, leaving the decision authority to the commander responsible for both who could more judiciously balance requirements."¹⁶⁸

From the beginning, OPD contested every part of the TORCH plan, from a variety of threats (unsourced) to the flank of operations from Spain via capture of Gibraltar, to Spain "inviting German forces" into Spanish Morocco.¹⁶⁹ While Eisenhower struggled with creating Headquarters, Allied Forces, TORCH inevitably was blamed for siphoning aircraft, personnel, and shipping from BOLERO, and therefore, ROUNDUP. Eighth Bomber Command in the UK, was told to provide units to create Twelfth Air Force, which would be deployed to Northwest Africa.

Given the bad blood occasioned by British attacks on the French Fleet¹⁷⁰ which had refused to either demobilize itself in friendly ports or to sail to England or a non-Vichy port, TORCH attempted to neutralize Vichy French defenses either by secret agreement or force by American flagged units. Then, British forces would be landed at the eastern end of the operation, for immediate move towards Tunisia, to prevent the expected arrival of either German or Italian troops. As intelligence had warned that this German reinforcement threat was real, and that a seizure of North Africa had been expected by both Hitler and Mussolini, the capture of Tunisia's main ports, Tunis and Bizerte, and her airfields was crucial before the Axis could strike. These ports lay almost a thousand miles from the main invasion areas in the west, and nearly 600 miles from Algiers, the eastern most landing. ¹⁷¹

While the British argued for a landing near Bone near to Tunis or airborne drops of the main Tunisian airfields, Eisenhower followed the final directive agreed by the CCS, after being watered down by the American planners in Washington. They believed that stretching landings far to the east were not possible if the main landing at Algiers was to be secured. In the event, the inability to protect the eastern ports from enemy air attack proved to be fortuitous that they were not early objectives. Both Eisenhower's most optimistic plan to possess the Tunisian entry points by D+14, and the later, less risky

¹⁶⁸ *Operation TORCH, MS*, US Forces, European Theater History Section, 1945. Note King recommended that Eisenhower be appointed as he was already in UK, and Brooke, forever afterward though admiring Eisenhower's political skills, had reservations about his military talent or at least his failure to show it in Africa and the Mediterranean. This was the failure to link operations with strategy and focus and time major operations of his subordinates.

¹⁶⁹ Hinsley, *British Intelligence, Volume II, Chapters XIII, XIV, various appendices*.

¹⁷⁰ Hitler's accession to the French keeping their own fleet under the Armistice, posed a threat to England. Believing that the Fleet could eventually be forced to serve Germany if extreme measures were threatened in the occupied France, British safety demanded that either the fleet be scuttled, or go to British or American ports. Their refusal caused Churchill to take measures against it, first by threat and then attack of its main ships in harbor. The French never forgave this action which was taken out of desperation by UK. See discussion in Roger Parkinson. *Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat. From Dunkirk to Alamein—the Inside Story, Based on the Hitherto Secret British Cabinet Papers*. New York: David McKay, Inc, 1973, pp. 56-67.

¹⁷¹ E.F. Hinsley. *British Intelligence in the Second World War*. Volume II. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, Chapter 24, passim.

course to hold the ports by D+46, proved gross underestimations. Eisenhower's plan was far afield of the early GYMNAST plan which was enhanced by the British as SUPERGYMNAST. This added Tunisian objectives, a necessity to clear the entire African coast in the Mediterranean. The CCS final directive for TORCH read:

OBJECT

*To secure FRENCH MOROCCO and ALGERIA with a view to the earliest possible occupation of TUNISIA, and the establishment in FRENCH MOROCCO of a striking force which can insure control of the Straits of GIBRALTAR by moving, if necessary, into SPANISH MOROCCO.*¹⁷²

The final outline plan allowed for landings on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, and inside the Mediterranean on both sides of Oran and Algiers. The landings in Morocco were totally American as were those at Oran, but the Algiers landing had British troops assigned to go ashore after the Americans secured the beach and port, so as to permit the idea that the operation was American. Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark travelled by submarine to Morocco in October and secretly met at great personal risk with French General Mast, who guaranteed that the French would not oppose the landings. Mast, however, was overruled later by the presence of French Admiral Darlan, the Commander-in-Chief of Vichy forces, who unluckily was present due to the critical illness of his son serving in Africa.¹⁷³

TORCH came ashore in Morocco, and Algeria, on 8 November, 1942. Comprised of a mix of American and British troops, the Allied Force was commanded by Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, through a combined headquarters, designated AFHQ (Allied Force Headquarters). It was in reality, the first major Combined Operation mounted by the Allies in World War II. The plan was controversial from the start.¹⁷⁴

Failing to receive an "invitation" to land by high level Vichy officials, the Allies counted on American command to ease problems with Vichy, which harbored hatred for the British for firing on their fleet at Mers-el-Kebir, to prevent their ships from falling into German hands after the 1940 Armistice. While the French fought long enough to uphold their honor, and in an attempt to show the Germans that France had upheld its Armistice agreements, the Germans immediately moved into unoccupied France and held all of Vichy in its defense perimeter. Darlan would eventually surrender to the Allies, and would be assassinated by a member of the French resistance while working for the Allies.¹⁷⁵

TORCH solved the problem of a Combined operation against Germany, but its conduct left much to be desired. The landing was conceived for safety's sake, and had overemphasized a possible Spanish or German move against Gibraltar and the straits, thus cutting off the Eastern Task Force. While Allied landings were far from its key objectives, the ports of Bizerte, Tunis, and Cape Bon, the Germans airlifted troops into Vichy Controlled airfields, taking over much of Tunisia from the French. Despite the French

¹⁷² "Operation TORCH, Outline Plan, 8 October 1942, US War Plans, op. cit., p. 162

¹⁷³ George F. Howe. *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative*. Washington: Center for Military History, 1956, Chapters II and III, passim and Major-General I.S.O. Playfair. *The Mediterranean and Middle East: Volume IV. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966, p. 125, Chapter V passim, and Michael Howard. Grand Strategy. Volume IV. August 1942-September 1943. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972, Chapters VII-IX, passim.*

¹⁷⁴ According to their joint biographer, both Marshall and Stimson attempted to derail the operations by claiming it was risky, with a 50% chance of total disaster. If true, this reflects poorly on both, not only for spreading defeatism in the staff, but in their attempts to circumvent their orders. See Aldridge, *The Partnership, op. cit.*

¹⁷⁵ *Northwest Africa, op. cit.* This official history covers all the operations in detail, though is less complete on planning issues.

defense to honor their Armistice agreements, the Germans marched into Unoccupied France. All of Vichy territory remained in German hands, making a virtual police state run by Vichy but occupied by the German Army. Moreover, Luftwaffe attacks on Algiers harbors and on advancing allied troops showed that the Allies had lost the race to shift airplanes to North Africa, despite ferrying Army fighters by carrier, and flying heavy bombers into airfields in Morocco and Algeria. The Germans quickly sent Stuka dive bombers, and fighters to the airfields near Tunis, and flew bomber shuttle missions from Sicily. For a time, the Allies did not have air superiority over their own ports, and rarely over their forward troops.¹⁷⁶

France's Colonial Army shifted to Allied Command, and its poorly equipped, but nevertheless trained troops, fought in the rough mountain country south and west of Tunis. After five months, half of that time, trampled by mud and rain, Tunis fell and the linkage of the entire Mediterranean littoral had been completed. British General Sir Kenneth Anderson summed the problem correctly, "the race {to Tunis} was lost." Anderson who commanded the Eastern Task Force, later to become British First Army, noted, "when in the planning stage it was decided that no assault landing should be made east of Algiers, then, in my opinion, my chance disappeared of reaching Tunis before the Germans, unless the French put up a stout resistance to Axis entry into Tunisia."¹⁷⁷

As the year 1942 turned on all fronts, the Allies had gained the initiative on all fronts. Most importantly, the Russians had trapped the Sixth Army on the Volga at Stalingrad, and the fear that Russia would collapse was rapidly turning to optimism that the Eastern Front was both strengthened and that Germany could not succeed against the Allies weakest link. Alamein had reversed German fortunes in the Western Desert and the Eighth Army was moving towards Tunisia to link the Torch forces that were stopped by mud and rains outside of Tunis. As convoys arrived fortnightly to strengthen the Allies in North Africa, Churchill's wish for the Allies to dominate all of North Africa from Dakar to Suez was within reach, and thus the opening of the Mediterranean.

Immediately following the TORCH landing, Churchill countered his BCOS recommendation that 1943 operations be limited to a landing in Sicily or Sardinia. Churchill reminded them of his concurrence for landings or attacks be directed against Italy directly or "better still, Southern France."¹⁷⁸ Churchill was certain that Africa could be cleared up in a month, and that time to shift shipping existed both for landings in Sicily and on the continent from the Mediterranean were possible with the shipping already used for TORCH. He also favored the return to BOLERO, presumably for a 1944 landing, after Italy or Southern France had developed in later 1943, though this had sunk in after much deliberation. He had queried Ismay on the possibility mentioning both to him and Roosevelt in separate memoranda, "that Torch is not a substitute for 'Round-Up.' Getting an adequate build-up of troops in the United Kingdom, not simply transferring assault shipping, proved too difficult while maintaining the slow moving Tunisian campaign, as well as staging for a landing in Sicily."¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ Lieut. Gen. K.A. N. Anderson, Despatch on Operations in North West Africa, from 8th November 1942 to 13th May 1943. Supplement to the London Gazette of Tuesday, the 5th of November, 1946, pp. 5449-5450;

¹⁷⁸ "Memorandum COS Committee via Gen Ismay, " 9 November 1942 in Churchill War Papers, 1942, Volume 17, *op. cit.*, pp. 1372-1373.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.* He originally held that ROUNDUP could be executed in 1943, until the planners proved that shipping could not exploit to Sicily to open the Mediterranean in July and then land troops in Europe by September, 1943. Shipping again was the long pole in the tent. See Churchill War Papers, Volume 17, *op. cit.*, Memorandum to Gen

In the last months of 1942, it was apparent that America was growing stronger in numbers overseas, and therefore became more strident on casting the decisive votes in Allied councils. Marshall would have these numbers tallied, and send them to the President and would use them in discussion.

The British Chiefs would continue to weigh their plans with the bare logic of availability of resources already in the Mediterranean Theater, the importance of removing Italy from the war rapidly, and the exploitation of a cleared Mediterranean that would follow Tunisia, still months off, and the necessity to maintain pressure on the enemy.¹⁸⁰ BOLERO-ROUNDUP was favored for a buildup for a 1944 operation, and despite the Anglophobic distrust of certain of Marshall's staff, it was apparent that Britain did not want to build up a large force in the UK for anything but use in Europe. The naval planners and air planners continued to stress the importance of preparing for the long term campaign by staging craft, training, bombing German industry, and destroying the Luftwaffe.¹⁸¹

The US Army was preoccupied with invading, but had neither a plan nor a long term strategic concept for Europe to present. For this, they would rely heavily on Brooke's planners who were head deep in the problem and had with surprisingly little American help for all their invasion ardor, with significant studies and a general concept reliant on increasing German capabilities. The Americans weighted their work with Grand Strategic Deployment plans and Lend Lease logistics; the British did detailed landing plans and campaign planning to support decisions for actual continental operations. This reflected not only America's role as "arsenal of democracy," but also the American army's lack of experience in conducting large scale military operations, which were the sine qua non, of grand strategy.¹⁸²

The Casablanca Conference and the Shift in Strategy

In late January, Roosevelt met Churchill in Casablanca at the SYMBOL conference. Here several decisions were made. First, ROUNDUP was deferred until 1944, as neither the shipping nor troops were available for it, nor was the key perquisites of air superiority and control of the Atlantic achieved at the beginning of 1943. Marshall, establishing his toe hold on securing an invasion of France, asked for a new plan to be put on the books, a mix of SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP to seize a potential opportunity if Germany suddenly met massive defeat, or if likewise happened to the Russians. Called ROUNDHAMMER, it was another paper place holder, without a real outline plan and no serious planning, that would have taken the original location and objectives of ROUNDUP and used it as the basis for a detailed plan. Alan Brooke, had, however, already ordered plans for a France landing to be updated by the Norfolk House

Isma", 18 November 1942, pp. 1419-1421; "Message No. 211 to Franklin D. Roosevelt," 24 November 1942, pp. 1432-1433.

¹⁸⁰ This was in following with W.W.1, the strategy accepted at ARCADIA.

¹⁸¹ Howard, *Grand Strategy, IV, op. cit., Chapters XI and XII, passim.*

¹⁸² NARA, RG 331, Minutes of Combined Commanders Meetings. See also British National Archives, CAB 106/1027 Combined Commanders 1-11; CAB 106/1125 Combined Operations part In Europe; CAB 106.4243 History of Planning for Combined Operations, 1943-1944. Eisenhower's three senior war planners were in fact British, a factor effected by Marshall's assignment priorities and the fact that senior experienced officers were still short in early 1944.

planners that had never ceased work on investigating a European landing. They had in fact by the time of SYMBOL, produced a plan, as a “requirements” study. It evolved to become OVERLORD.¹⁸³

OUTLINE OVERLORD was the result of the CCS decision to commission the planners to produce a new plan. This was the new successor to ROUNDUP, whose checkered history and the need for security demanded a new code-name. Brooke had ordered these. The British had continued to work towards a better version of ROUNDUP since 1942, and by August, 1943, presented the plan that became the basis for the D-Day plan. That this was modified was due only to the CCS’s skimping on forces for planning purposes, but the final product NEPTUNE, was modified after the named Commanders-in-Chief agreed to a larger plan. In a remarkable turnaround, the Americans had already agreed to huge Pacific transfers of shipping and troops, and despite a reinvigorated BOLERO, assault shipping and landing craft were shortlisted for Europe.¹⁸⁴

Despite British guarantees for a landing in 1944, Marshall and his planners continued to believe that none would happen unless an approved plan and schedule were agreed to. Still smarting from TORCH, Casablanca saw approval to continue the conquest of Tunisia, thus clearing the North African shore, and the invasion of Italy, to seal Italy’s fate. HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily was agreed to, with Marshall’s concurrence as the shipping and troops were already in the Mediterranean, and unable to shift to execute ROUNDUP, as he had predicted. As the Atlantic war still raged unfavorably, the question of a priority shift to BOLERO and SICKEL seemed in question as long as Mediterranean deliveries of aircraft and supplies continued. King finally admitted that the Atlantic war should be given priority, this after 1170 ships of more than 6, 150,000 tons had been lost in the Atlantic with an additional 492 ships and 1, 638, 000 additional tons lost world wide in 1942.¹⁸⁵

Brooke stated that the CCS should count on a 1944 operation to invade France. Marshall, who wanted a limited operation of the SLEDGEHAMMER-type still, to be executed in 1943 to “anchor Allied operations” in Northwest Europe, led his planners in their disappointment that Mediterranean was proceeding ahead. He had held out for “total overriding priority” for Northwest Europe but had to relent as forces and shipping already in the Mediterranean, would not be used for active campaigning for most of 1943. In this spirit of maintaining the Mediterranean initiative, he agreed to a landing in Sicily. He never

¹⁸³ Rawson. *Allied Conferences, SYMBOL*, pp. 40-73, *passim*. The “requirements” study intended to establish the proper size for a realistic assault. In the event, it proved accurate to what was executed, but COSSAC was allotted fewer forces for its OUTLINE OVERLORD. They were overruled by the actual commanders unanimously.

¹⁸⁴ Thompson, *The Price of Victory*, *op. cit.*, *US Force European Theater, History of COSSAC*, *passim*. OUTLINE OVERLORD evolved to satisfy the smaller force initially authorized by the CCS. The last British division was activated in 1942, and at least three of them used in OVERLORD had returned from combat in the Mediterranean. Four US divisions were returned from the Mediterranean, though most of the air and ground commanders for both the US and UK were battle experienced in Africa and the Mediterranean. See Morison, *ibid*, for a comparison on shipping.

¹⁸⁵ Ellis, *World War II Survey*, p. 267. Marshall had recommended a landing in Italy as possibly necessary to occupy the peninsula. Churchill had argued against leaving a “surrendered” Italy out of the hands of the Germans, should they intend to sue for peace. This would be more finely developed in the TRIDENT conference that followed in May. Field Marshal Dill had forearmed the British planners with Marshall’s desires, particularly an immediate shift to a Cross Channel attack at the expense of shutting down Mediterranean operations. See “13 Jan. 1943, War Cabinet Meeting No. 1, 1943,” in *The Churchill Documents, Volume 18*. (Martin Gilbert and Larry P. Arn, editors). *One Continent Redeemed January-August 1943*. Hillsdale: Hillsdale College Press, 2015, pp. 118-121.

admitted nor recognized the value of the Mediterranean becoming a massive holding attack to disperse German air and ground forces away for the Channel front.¹⁸⁶

Casablanca also witnessed a turnaround of Marshall and his planners concerning Pacific Operations. While the US Joint Chiefs had prime responsibility for the Pacific operations continued, King sought to advance the Navy and not allied aims. Marshall supported his claim that the Pacific received only 15% of the war effort and demanded that it be doubled. Marshall smarting over the Mediterranean campaign decided upon by both Roosevelt and Churchill, supported King and the BCOS relented. This ended the War Department's constant uproar over failing to support Germany First. Suddenly more troops and planes were available, though the Atlantic convoy war still made shipping problematic.¹⁸⁷

Put shortly, the American vision was a priority for a European landing, free reign for the Americans in the Pacific with a larger priority, and having the British press farther into Burma with the intent of keeping China in the war by supplies via the Burma Road. An open Mediterranean would support Far East operations, and directly China.

Thus, the CCS took up the strategy for the Pacific recognizing that the goal was to end the war at the earliest possible opportunity. This included maintaining pressure on the enemy to prevent the Japanese from regaining the initiative. In Burma, the Americans pressed for operations towards regaining control of the Burma Road. A force of 1,250,000 tons of shipping was authorized to maintain operations out of India and in North Burma, and the direction of planning towards an amphibious operation with craft to lift for 4 brigade groups was directed. This shipping would be taken from new construction recognizing that the Atlantic maintained a priority over operations in the Far East. Eventually, a force of 250,000 US troops would be assigned to maintain the lines of communication in India and forward, and the 10th and soon to be established 14th Air Forces were activated in the CBI. No ground combat troops would be sent by America at this stage in the war.¹⁸⁸

At Casablanca, Churchill finally wrung from the airmen, a concept for a Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) which not only harmonized the targets hit by the RAF Bomber Command and Eighth Air Force in the UK, but solidified the belief that bombing would not only weaken the enemy, that this weakening would be a necessary preparation for an invasion of Europe. The new plan, directed by the CCS was named POINTBLANK. This also made strategic bombing a directed campaign from CCS level, and supporting the airmen's view that the Theater commander would not command or control strategic bombers, except with CCS authorization on a case basis.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁶ Matloff, *Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, op. cit.; Chapter 1, passim.*

¹⁸⁷ Matloff, *Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, op. cit., Rawson, war Conferences, op. cit., CARL DIGITAL LIBRARY; JCS War Conferences, SYMBOL. Passim; Leighton, Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics, pp. 43-45.* This in fact opened the floodgates on support for the Pacific war, and as US shipyards began producing the fruits of the early Two Ocean War Navy act, carriers, battleships and a host of warships soon moved westward. The Marine Corps shipped its new divisions, and these were matched and exceeded in numbers in 1944 by more Army divisions to MacArthur

¹⁸⁸ *Carl Digital Library. Report on the Casablanca Conference, 1943, pp. 1-10.* Eventually, a sole regimental sized unit, "Merrill's Marauders," served in Burma. It evolved into the 475th Infantry Regiment (separate).

¹⁸⁹ Craven and Cate and Bomber Offensive. The Americans by 1944 created United States Strategic Air Forces, Europe, placing the UK based Eighth Air Force and the Italy based Fifteenth Air Force under Lt. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, who coordinated their strikes into a coherent plan. Bomber Command under Harris, received its directives from Portal, the senior airman on the CCS who also sent directives to Spaatz via Arnold. This fit the tenets of AWPD-1/4.

Roosevelt announced his “Unconditional Surrender” Policy which was agreed to by Churchill, which guaranteed that no combatant could mediate their own withdrawal from the war with separate opponents, and which placed Germany and Japan into a condition where a concerted fight to the end was predictable. That Italy would eventually switch sides did not guarantee its escape as Italy was rapidly occupied by the Germans and the Italian peninsula became a battlefield from the toe of the peninsula to the top of the “boot.”¹⁹⁰

Eisenhower was named Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean both to add the British Eighth Army upon its movement into Tunisia, but also the full weight of the British Mediterranean Fleet and British theater airpower. Air Chief Marshall Tedder was named Commander in Chief, Allied Air Forces Mediterranean.¹⁹¹

While SYMBOL was the scene of great decisions, the American planners rated it a distinct failure, from the fact that ROUNDUP was not approved for 1943, an operational impossibility, and to the fact that the Mediterranean war was posited as being extended to a landing at Sicily. Wedemeyer recorded the disappointment of the planners in not gaining their way in concrete results, ignoring that the British had both agreed to a landing in 1944, and had confirmed an American Supreme Commander for the war.¹⁹²

The British were more adept at stating what was possible as opposed to what was desirable, a fact that men like Wedemeyer who as a Major, committed America to a large war program. While the War Department had much talent, few of the leaders save Somervell, could be considered to be intellectual giants. Marshall’s strengths were character and persistence, not strategic insight, and he served himself poorly by deferring to Stimson, who was not in the strategic command chain. Stimson the lawyer, viewed things as “cases” in black and white, and his own inflexibility, along with Cordell Hull’s intent to change Japanese plans, helped guide Roosevelt into prying the Japanese into war at a time the US was not ready.¹⁹³

From ROUNDUP to OVERLORD: evolution of the Plan and its supporting staff

By January when Roosevelt and Churchill met in Casablanca for the SYMBOL Conference, the Norfolk House planners working for the Combined Commanders had produced SKYSCRAPER, which was initially to establish the size and type forces needed for a successful operation. Both Brooke and Marshall distanced themselves from it, saying its conclusion, a 10-division assault, could not be produced. This caused a re-bluing of the Norfolk Planners into a new planning Headquarters, COSSAC, Chief of Staff to

¹⁹⁰ Italian ground, air and naval elements did serve in small numbers on the allied side after their “armistice” in September, 1943. Mussolini was deposed but reinstated by Hitler in a rump government.

¹⁹¹ Rawson, *Allied Conferences, SYMBOL*, pp. 40-73, *passim*

¹⁹² *Ibid.* This in fact opened the floodgates on support for the Pacific war, and as US shipyards began producing the fruits of the early Two Ocean War Navy act, carriers, battleships and a host of warships soon moved westward. The Marine Corps shipped its new divisions, and these were matched and exceeded in numbers in 1944 by more Army divisions to MacArthur.

¹⁹³ Wedemeyer, *op. cit.*, Chapters XII and XIII. Roosevelt, Hull and Stimson bore the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster, and Stimson championed the idea of a witch hunt (Pearl Harbor investigations) to saddle the local commanders with blame despite the failure of Washington to confide with them on Japanese diplomatic intelligence. See also Eisenhower’s assessment and post facto retractions of his ideas on SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP in Dwight D. Eisenhower. *Crusade in Europe*. New York: Doubleday, Chapters 2 and 3, pp. 70-71.

the Supreme Allied Commander, (Designate). Their spawn, became the new Supreme Headquarters for the invasion, but initially their task was to create OUTLINE OVERLORD.

OPD's alarmists neither trusted the British, nor believed that "closing the ring" was a prelude to the American fixation on an immediate Cross Channel Attack launched against Northwest Europe. The approval of ROUNDUP and then its postponement for TORCH still rankled, and critics like Wedemeyer continually brought it up to Marshall. Brooke had assured them that both a new plan tasking, and definite headway had been made in Norfolk House. Indeed Marshall had been briefed on the results of SKYSCRAPER and had approved the appointment of Lt. Gen. Frederick Morgan to guide the plans effort. By renaming the Combined Commanders staff COSSAC, the Americans believed that they had created a permanent ROUNDUP type plans staff, which in fact, already existed with more talent at the top than the junior Lt. Gen. Morgan provided. Yet, as the Americans recorded, that American "leaders had discounted British pledges for loyalty towards" a landing, and believed that they were going to avoid it by whatever excuse possible. This despite the fact that one of Marshall's men, Maj. Gen. Ray W. Barker was Deputy COSSAC, and kept Marshall and OPD apprised through messages constantly.¹⁹⁴

The Americans, however, did not consider a staff producing a plan as a guarantee of future intent, nor did they accept the Combined Commanders as the heirs apparent to command the landing. ROUNDUP had been a plan, as well as SLEDGEHAMMER. They continued to act as if the British would renege on their original agreement to do ROUNDUP when it was beneficial. BOLERO therefore was updated and briefed at SYMBOL, claiming a full million men could be in the UK by the end of 1943.¹⁹⁵

This deployment gave COSSAC a force upon which to plan, though British forces would continue to rely on the outlook from the ongoing Mediterranean campaigns. The British did not have 60 divisions sitting in various stages of mobilization or training as America had by the end of 1943. America produced a division in 12 months, from the time a flag and a general were on the ground, and cadre was formed. In a year everything from basic training to unit and division maneuvers were conducted. Britain had no manpower pool left save annual replacement drafts. Its full army was already formed and its only reserves lay in what could come from the Commonwealth. Moreover, from late 1943 onward, the British Army cannibalized units, deactivating formations to provide replacement fillers for units in combat. Even the Royal Air Force lost men to provide fillers in both the Navy and Army plus annual drafts were heavily taxed for men and women for priority industries.¹⁹⁶

The Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate) or COSSAC, was the temporary fix to the problem of having no one to Command ROUNDUP or its successor, OVERLORD. Churchill had proposed Marshall to command ROUNDUP in July of 1942 during the height of the American rebellion at British directed strategy.¹⁹⁷ Roosevelt refused, not wishing to relinquish his Chief of Staff at such a vital war juncture, nor did Marshall press to go. Moreover, Roosevelt wanted Marshall to continue to drive for American dominance of Grand Strategy, and the President knew no one better to keep in the chair at this time. While, Lt. Gen. Frederick Morgan proved to be a good choice, he lacked the real authority of a named

¹⁹⁴ Frederick Morgan. *OVERTURE to OVERLORD*. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1950; *Command Decisions*, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-286

¹⁹⁵ SYMBOL conference notes.

¹⁹⁶ See Manpower and Grand Strategy volumes. Women were conscripted both for the services and noncombat industries including the "land army" which created tillable land from woods and wild spaces.

¹⁹⁷ *Churchill War Papers, Volume 18, 1943, passim.*

commander and also lacked battle experience to give his views more than academic authority. Late in the year, in his first allied conference, Stalin had underlined this in his talks with Roosevelt and Churchill, along with supporting a simultaneous landing from the Mediterranean, a massive compression envelopment of western Europe!

The leaders conferred again in May, for TRIDENT. This put a fine point on issues raised during the end of the Tunisian Campaign, which included prisoners taken to include an entire Italian Army and the remnants of the German Afrika Korps and the Fifth Panzer Army. Italy's resolve was seen to be tottering, and the Royal Navy felt that in order to complete the opening of the Mediterranean, Sicily must be seized. Churchill and Roosevelt accepting that ROUNDUP could not be accomplished by a shift of forces from the Mediterranean immediately, sought to investigate how 1943 could be enhanced by using troops in theater, while BOLERO-SICKEL ramped up for a 1944 landing.¹⁹⁸

Characteristically, Churchill arrived in Washington with over 100 key staff members, mainly from the Joint Plans Staff, already fortified with prepared papers, agreed policy initiatives, and current intelligence assessments for every theater. Both heads of State met six times with their military chiefs at the White House, and the bloom of recent victories in North Africa, the Pacific, and sudden large kill of U-boats in the Atlantic, led to optimism, the first combined conference where the Allies saw they were moving ahead. With the air and naval aspects moving forward from the Casablanca decisions, the Mediterranean was the prime concern.¹⁹⁹

How would Italy be defeated, by air attack, by seeding more agents into the Balkans to draw more Germans off the Eastern Front? Churchill emphasized his priority to land in Europe, but ROUNDUP was not possible to deploy and mount in such a short time, and a small landing would accomplish little other than to beach itself on an enclave. With 25 divisions in the Mediterranean, Roosevelt asked the cost of landing in Italy, to seize an area in the hopes of forcing Italy out of the war, while the BOLERO was taking place with other forces. Marshall preferred this to landings in Sardinia or Corsica after Sicily.

China's situation loomed as contestable. Stilwell and Chennault were in attendance, and both had different solutions to keep China fighting. Stilwell said Japan must be fought on the Asian mainland with Chinese troops. Taking Rangoon and opening supplies to China were imperative. Chennault wanted an increase in air shipped tonnage for a larger force of planes. British Mediterranean shipping particularly escort carriers and amphibious craft could not be shifted for a naval bypass of the Burma front, and the Americans would neither send nor create more shipping for Burma.

The long slog into Burma, therefore continued slowly, as the Indian Army was trained and deployed in limited operations, which mainly stagnated due to inhospitable terrain and poor lines of communication. While Roosevelt and Marshall pressed for larger air shipments to Chennault and a more spirited ground war, the British balked as they had to overcome local terrain conditions in what they experienced to be a counterproductive, slow advance. Eisenhower was given the go ahead for HUSKY, whose plans were to be finalized for July.

¹⁹⁸ Howe, *op cit.*, and Anderson *Despatch*, *op. cit.* See also Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander. *Despatch on "the AFRICAN Campaign from El Alamein to Tunis, From 10 August 1942 to 13th May 1943.* London Gazette, 3 February 1948.

¹⁹⁹ Rawson, *War Conferences*, *op. cit.* pp. 73-122 ; CARL DIGITAL LIBRARY, JCS Conferences, "TRIDENT."

The draft general strategy paper for the CCS touched serious points of concern. The Mediterranean was to be exploited. China would be supported, though the ground campaign would proceed with no amphibious help. Europe would be the major target in 1944, and BOLERO, SICKEL and the Combined Bomber Offensive would be stepped up while a landing plan was drawn for approval at the next conference.

Most importantly, a target for landing was authorized for the Cross Channel attack. Five assault divisions, two in follow up, 2 airborne divisions, and a 20 division force deployed to the UK for immediate reinforcement for the bridgehead through continental ports. Further American divisions would then be sent from the United States directly to these ports.²⁰⁰

Both Post HUSKY operations were to be studied, and the AAF was directed to plan for the bombing of the Romanian oil fields, both significant operational considerations. The Ploesti raid which eventuated, would “borrow” four bomber groups (B-24s) from Eighth Air Force in the UK, to train and mount the operation, in addition to one Mediterranean based group, and then be returned for POINTBLANK operations. This was the first CCS directed bomber operation apart from its general targeting of German economy, submarine, and air industry targets, which were given wide latitude in execution for the commanders of Bomber Command and Eighth Air Force.²⁰¹

Churchill addressed the Congress, the first war time allied leader ever to speak in the American legislature and while thoroughly pleased with the resulting strategy, the Americans ramped up their solidification of a Cross Channel attack, which both Marshall and OPD, felt were somehow at risk to British stratagems. The Americans agreed to provide division “sets” of complete equipment for 12 French divisions, to be raised from the rump of the French colonial army, and the Free French forces that had moved into the UK after Dunkirk. They would be deployed initially in the Mediterranean as a national force, and were then to be used in metropolitan France for its liberation.²⁰²

With the JCS announcement that they intended to invade and seize the Caroline and Marshall Islands in 1944, and designate both troops and shipping to this major objective, the accommodation of Pacific operations while maintaining the “Germany First” priority, was both formalized and accepted without argument. The dispute over which Pacific axis, the Southwest Pacific or Central Pacific, continued to be an American only discussion, with priorities allocated by the Navy dominated Strategic Requirements branch of the JCS. CARTWHEEL, already in progress, would continue.²⁰³ This decision

²⁰⁰ Rawson, op. cit., p. 103. While nearly half the size of ROUNDUP’s mounting force, the air portion would be double that allocated in the 1942 concept. The follow on wave would be larger and 7 combat experienced divisions would be deployed from the Mediterranean for use. While some at the time resented the fact that OVERLORD had a 29-30 division commitment and not the 48 promised by ROUNDUP, this was untrue as these forces were only “staged” in the UK with a follow on wave of more than 40 divisions deploying from the states. The US deployed 61 divisions total, larger than originally foreseen in ROUNDUP. It also added an additional tactical air force, the 9th.

²⁰¹ Details of the operations are covered in both official histories and the Strategic Bombing Survey and British Bombing Unit Report, op. cit.

²⁰² Marcel Vigneras. *Rearming the French*. Washington: Office of Chief of Military History, 1957. Note that these divisions would be tasked as part of a second deployment to avoid the problem that emerged in TORCH that the French would demand command of the invading force. See map and chart of World War II French Military Operations, 1941-1945. Eleven divisions were armed due to manpower shortages.

²⁰³ Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*, op. cit., Chapters XXII to XXV.

essentially reinvigorated the ORANGE Plan of pre World War II design, and its annexes for both the capture of the Pacific Mandate Islands, as well as the Philippines, would be combined in 1944.

QUADRANT and the Approval of the Cross Channel Attack (OVERLORD).

Marshall began to enhance BOLERO, with a modest deployment of troops beginning early in 1943, with the intent of having a full million troops in the United Kingdom by the end of the year, with sufficient cargo, to launch a full-sized ROUNDUP type landing in the spring of 1944 in Northwest Europe. The fact that the Atlantic conundrum appear solved by the end of May, making the increasing availability of shipping added by production, made this staging possible. It was not, however, supported by adequate landing craft, combat loaders, and assault craft, to match the needs of the landing based upon the expected defense and enemy buildup, which in fact was greater than that planned for under the original OVERLORD OUTLINE plan. Eventually more gun power had to be removed from the Pacific to provide support for the added beach designated by NEPTUNE, the revised OVERLORD plan.²⁰⁴

Thus, as Allied fortunes changed, their strategy became more balanced. For the Americans, British dominance of strategy was to be opposed, and for the American Navy, parity between the Central Pacific theater and the Army dominated Southwest Pacific was to be opposed as unnecessary. Roosevelt who often fought the Army's propensity to have one war in Europe, and limited operations in the Pacific, had long settled on the belief that the Pacific war was a domestic issue in politics as newspapers hyped the war in the Pacific against the Japanese. This led to the pronounced belief that the Pacific operations would help bring the war to a more rapid close, rather than waiting to defeat Japan separately. What must not be lost is that the 1943 campaigns were destined to be attritional in all theaters. America committed large numbers of ground troops and air groups into the battle in 1943, and valuable experience was gained for improving equipment and tactics. Despite Marshall and the War Department theorists, the Army fought a world war, not one big war with orphaned theaters fighting wars in minimally supported theaters, which was designed into the Victory Program.²⁰⁵

While the Mediterranean was opened and new air bases were secured for a widening air campaign, the War Department, still believed that the British were avoiding the "decisive theater," a belief that did not factor in the still critical Atlantic campaign, and the beginning of the American bomber offensive against Germany. What should not be ignored is the fact that since early 1942, the British Combined Commanders' staff had studied the invasion problem, had already decided on the essentials needed for its success, and had drafted two major plans beyond the original ROUNDUP concept. The latest was presented for decision as OVERLORD, by the COSSAC staff, which had evolved from the Combined Commanders established in early 1942 for the purpose of studying the invasion problem, and producing a plan.²⁰⁶

This does not match the usual American narrative that the British were attempting to avoid a landing in Europe; rather that they were both computing odds of what was best likely to succeed and when. Moreover, the British and even American planners, recognized that the current air superiority over

²⁰⁴ See *ETO Troop Flow and Cargo*. See also E.F. Hinsley, *Volume III, part ii, Appendix*

²⁰⁵ *Victory Program, op. cit.*

²⁰⁶ Thompson, *The Price of Victory*, op. cit. Both Brooke and Marshall wanted a finalized plan, and both had balked as the finding that a ten division landing force on D-Day would be necessary. NEPTUNE had a five division assault, two plus divisions in follow up, and 3 airborne divisions, landing on D-Day, approximating the ten divisions.

Europe favored the Germans, and that a major effort would have to be made to change that. Eighth Air Force which would eventually create those conditions, was only then possible of launching air attacks in large numbers, and no fighters had yet been able to fly to fight deeply in German air space in 1943. This was changing, and would be possible in 1944. The conditions so carefully outlined for an invasion success, would not be available until then.²⁰⁷

The Americans thus arrived in Quebec in August, intent to get a binding decision on what, when and how the invasion of Northwest Europe would precede. Moreover, OPD had conferred in detail with Eisenhower on post HUSKY operations, and despite the adherence of American planners to see an Italian landing as hurting OVERLORD, Marshall believed a direct assault on Naples would solve the problem of using non transferable troops from the Mediterranean, as well as ending Italian participation in the war. This did not support a full Italian campaign, only a placeholder for airfields and a staging base for operations against Southern France. Eisenhower coupled this with a crossing of the Messina straits into the toe, a militarily unsensible operation that would tie down more allied divisions than possible Axis forces. It also ignored the two biggest advantages of southern Italy, the port of Taranto and Bari, as well as the airfield rich terrain of the Foggia plain. Later, his logisticians would takeover his ground campaign, moving in a heavy strategic air force, the 15th, to the detriment of the advancing troops moving to break the Winter Line. Churchill, would argue successfully, that a seizure of Rome, the first enemy capital to fall, was both a political and military necessity to maximize the pull of German forces away from the main 1944 operation. Roosevelt agreed with this assessment. Eisenhower would hold that Rome could be taken by the end of 1943.²⁰⁸

QUADRANT, however, focused on what the Americans called “aggressive, definitive offensive action”, reemphasizing their scorn and insistence that TORCH, and the Mediterranean had diverted the Allies for no gain, from ROUNDUP. One of their adherents, Lt. Gen. John Hull of OPD, had even advocated pressing to the full, the strategic and operational advantages of a forward moving campaign in the Mediterranean, accepting temporarily, that Churchill’s concept of the “Underbelly of Europe” could be followed until the major campaign in Europe could be mounted in Northwest Europe in 1944. This recognized that more than three dozen German divisions were fixed in the Mediterranean and Balkans, and could not afford to abandon their foothold. To a limited degree, Marshall had accepted this by advocating AVALANCHE, a landing that eventuated at Salerno, south of Naples. Wedemeyer fought this, and Marshall accepted the “Mediterranean alternative,” as an operational, not a strategic move to use the forces at hand.

The key to this was the fact that shipping did not exist to transfer 20 divisions from the Mediterranean, as the US Army’s home based divisions had to deploy before billeting and training space could be made for the next wave of mobilizing units. Most camps therefore saw three or four divisions in succession pass through during their one year stint at creation from basic to advanced unit training. The same was true for Air Training Command’s hundred or so fields operated by the continental 2d and 3rd Air Forces which trained pilots, air crew, and eventually full sized air groups of bombers, fighters, and

²⁰⁷ Craven and Cate, Volume III, op. cit. passim.

²⁰⁸ Matloff, *Coalition War, 1943-1944, Chapters VI and VII. See Craven and Cate, AAFWWII, volume 2, Chapters 15-17. Note Churchill was correct in that Italy drew between 22 and 25 German divisions away from the west. See Ellis, World War II Survey, op. cit., pp. 161-165. Additional forces were pinned in Greece and Yugoslavia, where SOE trained and supplied partisans.*

transports. Individual aircrew linked as crews and were provided to the theaters as ready made replacement crews or units.²⁰⁹

QUADRANT began with self congratulation on the turn in the Atlantic and a reordering of antisubmarine actions including using the Azores for air patrols to further smother the area formerly known as the “air gap.” This literally drove the U-boats out of the North Atlantic, forcing them to ply their trade in the South Atlantic and Caribbean in the hopes of picking off single ships or small unescorted groupings of ships. Submarines remained high on the bombing priorities despite the fact that both intelligence and common sense had shown that it was more profitable and probable to catch US boats on the surface than in disrupting the construction of boats in their yards.

Both Roosevelt and Churchill had private briefings on OVERLORD, as well as a full scale examination by the Combined Chiefs who approved the plan, though Brooke and Churchill both said the landing was at least 25 percent too small. Despite this general acknowledgement, no further action was deemed required. Essential from the British point of view was the basic assumptions concerning enemy strength and defense posture, that this was stipulated as part of the approval process. That the Americans viewed this a trap laid to avoid the landing, it was, however, a sensible approach to the viability of a plan for an operation ten months in the future.²¹⁰

Churchill declared his belief in OVERLORD, but demanded two caveats. First, he accepted Morgan’s basic assumption that the German defense must not be increased, nor the number of German divisions in northern France exceed twelve divisions, which would overwhelm the Allied buildup. If such contingency eventuated, or another unforeseen reason for cancellation had to be invoked, then Churchill wanted JUPITER, the Norway landings substituted. Lacking also “the over riding priority” demanded by Marshall, the Americans accepted the legal deal, believing that the mere impulsion of the operation would carry it through, with Roosevelt’s unwavering need to have the liberation of Western Europe to begin in 1944.²¹¹

In the interim, others respond to the “smallness” of OVERLORD, whose assault is virtually half in the first wave, of the HUSKY landing would be examined, critiqued, and eventually reinforced both in assault craft and air transport. Italy was attacked as a secondary, supporting offensive to pin the Germans in the Mediterranean, and to threaten the Balkans which would demand more German deployments, and which would provide needed airfields for the expanding bombing forces, as well as offer both advantages in weather and direction for a continual air offensive against German industry, oil, and transportation. With additional shipping and trained units, the Mediterranean would soon gain more than twenty bomb groups in a new organization to be activated as the Fifteenth Air Force as Eighth Air Force nears its peak of 40 bomb groups.²¹²

The subsequent expansion of OVERLORD to its full 5 assault, and 3 parachute divisions was at the cost of no Pacific landing craft, but a delay to await more landing craft to be built. The inability to shift production or the willingness to redefine priorities was a bitter fight as every theater was involved. Considering that the invasion of Northwest Europe had been the War Department’s top priority since

²⁰⁹ Matloff, op. cit., pp. 164-167. Hull replaced Maj. Gen. Thomas Handy as Chief of OPD in 1944.

²¹⁰ CARL Digital library. QUADRANT. JCS allied Conference report.

²¹¹ Matloff, op. cit., and Churchill,

²¹² Matloff, *ibid*, Harrison, Craven and Cate. AAF WWII, volume III, Section 1: Bombing and Section III, Italy and

March 1942, the lack of assault shipping for it demonstrates the complexity of the Coalition's priorities, and the lack of support given to it by Admiral King who dominated amphibious craft production and allocation.²¹³

Yet the Pacific demanded amphibious forces, and Burma which also needed them, was conveniently sideslipped China was to receive more aircraft in support, transports to fly the Himalaya "Hump," but not LST's and other transports needed to move a corps sized force to Rangoon or down the coast to envelop the Japanese in Burma. Eventually, a more limited "airborne invasion" spearheaded by gliders and transports would fly in a smaller force to chip away at Japanese north Burma defenses. It would dramatize the west's interest in China, but its fruits would open the Burma Road, now the Stilwell Road, in 1945, not 1944.

At fault, was the constant compromise at Grand Strategic levels to appease every faction, fighting an enlarged war in the Pacific, maintaining China, and exploiting the Mediterranean victory over Italy. Though the die had been cast in principle at Casablanca, six months before, no brake had been put on plans or advances anywhere else. The Prime Minister had declared that Rome was a necessary objective to complete the Mediterranean victory. Roosevelt never offered so much as a demur, and saw the value in the imagery in 1943, understanding that the Cross Channel attack would be the center piece of 1944.²¹⁴ The President essentially authorized both a Central Pacific drive and not surprisingly an advance towards the Philippines to begin her liberation before the Presidential election of 1944. The domestic political power of having begun the liberation of Europe and the reclaiming of the American possession the Philippines in 1944, would signal the beginning of the end of the war to Americans, as well as to the beleaguered British population.

Coalitions demand "cake" and an "eating" for every major member. This never sates any one member, but does move action forward, and strategy becomes an "economy of force" driven action, with enough to maintain direction, but not to solve a single problem. "Overriding priority" which the Americans always demanded, was neither realistic nor obtainable, and also would have lengthened the war if only one enemy were effectively fought, leaving the others to be fought in tandem.

The European War had never been supported by any game or theoretical campaign played to its finish as the ORANGE plan had been. Closest to this was the plan but not game of the Air War Plan had theorized a campaign based on specific targets, the major campaign had no analytical model to call for a certain number of divisions from the Allies. Prewar plans had not accommodated this, in large measure due to the way that America gradually produced policies to participate in the war, and only began detailed planning after the ABC-Conversations.

SEXTANT, and EUREKA

²¹³ Ibid. Note, some bombardment ships were pulled from Pacific duty to support the American beaches. See Morison, *Invasion of France*, *op. cit.*

²¹⁴ Mark Clark upon being awarded a well-earned Distinguished Service Cross by Roosevelt, was alleged to have been told by his Commander-in-Chief to assure that his American Fifth Army be first into Rome. See Mark W. Clark. *Calculated Risk*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950, and "Decision to take Rome. Sydney Matthews in *Command Decisions. General Clark's Decision to Drive On Rome*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1987, pp. 351-364.

OVERLORD needed to be bolstered by having a named commander, an adjustment of forces, and a supporting strategy to limit the Mediterranean which OPD feared would become an equal part of the a two pronged thrust.²¹⁵

The Allies met in Washington in May, (TRIDENT), in Quebec in August, (QUADRANT), in Cairo in November, (SEXTANT), in Teheran with Stalin in November (EUREKA), and returned to Cairo for (SEXTANT PART II). These conferences balanced the force requirements world wide and would name Eisenhower as Supreme Commander in Europe, thus giving Marshall the final say in the main theater, Northwest Europe, in December, 1943.²¹⁶

During the year's final conferences, SEXTANT, in late November in Cairo, was attended by Chiang Kai Shek and Lord Louis Mountbatten, the new Allied Supreme Commander for Southeast Asia. This saw British naval strength transferred to the Indian Ocean due to the surrender of the Italian Fleet and additional emphasis being placed on Burma, which gained aerial assets for a limited "airborne invasion." Roosevelt and Churchill thereafter travelled to Tehran, Iran for EUREKA, a three power meeting with Stalin. OVERLORD was confirmed by the three heads of state, and upon Stalin's enthusiasm for a simultaneous landing in Southern France, ANVIL was confirmed. Fulfilling this became problematic as a "temporary" loan of LST's was made in January, 1944 for Anzio, the SHINGLE landing. This stagnated, freezing assets in the Mediterranean previously ticketed for NEPTUNE, the newly named Normandy landing.²¹⁷

Stalin questioned the intent of the allies who had failed to name a Supreme Commander for OVERLORD; Roosevelt, whose choice it was, picked Eisenhower to command saying he could not spare Marshall from his crucial duties on the Combined Chiefs. Stalin also questioned if OVERLORD would go forward if 13, or a greater number of German divisions were located in theater, thus negating the assumptions made by COSSAC. In the event, these assumptions were investigated deeply during the RUNUP to NEPTUNE's actual landing.²¹⁸

The JCS, not wanting to change their own Pacific plans, forced a one month delay to get adequate landing craft for OVERLORD, and a two month delay for ANVIL the supporting invasion of Southern France demanded by Marshall. This shortage should be put at the feet of King and his compliant partner Marshall, who decided the "centerpiece" that they had argued over for two years, now didn't have to have

²¹⁵ This would have temporarily been true if the Seven division payback had been simultaneous with the last stages of BOLERO's prelanding reinforcement of the UK base. But this cross leveling would have rapidly been adjusted with a 3:1 favor to Northwest Europe. Marshall, always fearful of Churchill, wanted total control of the flow of divisions, including a landing in France to write down the Mediterranean theater except the air forces. Both he and Stimson were of the same mind, with Stimson more emphatically Anglophobic whenever strategy was discussed. Once Rome fell, Roosevelt bore no interest in the Mediterranean and became cold to any further appeals to Turkey. He also refused assist Britain in putting down a communist takeover in Greece, and forbid US troops from supporting that operation.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Rawson, *War Conferences, SEXTANT*, pp. 147-155; 201-216 (*SEXTANT II*). *This conference reconvened in Cairo to name a Supreme Commander, to discuss turkey, and the Combined Bomber Offensive.*

²¹⁸ Rawson, *War Conferences EUREKA*, pp. 157-201; F.H. Hinsley et al. *British Intelligence in the Second World War. Volume 3 Part 2*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1988, *Appendix 10, Intelligence on German Divisions before D-Day*. See following appendices for additional Normandy intelligence.

overriding priority as they had decided to ramp up Central Pacific operations in late 1943 and throughout 1944.²¹⁹

These conferences solidified Roosevelt's control of Grand Strategy advancing the planned invasion of France for the late spring of 1944, the limitation of the advance in Italy and prevented any eastern movement to the Dodencanese or attempts to gain Turkey in the war. Additionally, the conferences furthered the development of Burma and the CBI, and the eventual launching of main offensives in the Central Pacific and Southwest Pacific that included the liberation of the Philippines.²²⁰

Roosevelt had wrested dominance over Grand Strategy by mid-1943. While American Army planners initially lamented the Grand Strategic decision to pursue the exploitation of the Allied African gains which led to Italy's surrender, US planners demanded and obtained a 1944 invasion of western Europe, a reality that had been implicit since the Casablanca Conference, after which the British CIGS, had ordered the Norfolk Group to produce an outline plan for an invasion. This had been a foregone conclusion since 1942 when SLEDGEHAMMER had been decided against in favor of TORCH, though the British had accepted a European invasion in 1943, a factor temporarily sidestepped to complete the victory in the Mediterranean. While Marshall and King often hinted at removing European priorities in favor of the Pacific if they did not get their way, this was a fete of childishness that would never have supported, Roosevelt had already cautioned against this pose, which they ignored. At Casablanca, they essentially decided the issue, by camouflaging King's siphoning of assault shipping and landing craft to the Pacific, a fact that is counter to Marshall's stated belief in a "ROUNDUP-sized landing in Europe to deploy two thirds of the US Army had to be supported to the hilt."²²¹

Called ANVIL, this new operation appealed to Marshall who wanted the Mediterranean theater shut down except the rapid buildup of bomber elements recommended by Air Chief Marshal Portal and gripped enthusiastically by Arnold who of course created another strategic air force, the 15th, which Arnold intended to pair with the 8th In the UK under a single operational air commander, Lt. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz. While this drama unfolded, the Mediterranean Allied Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, was told to plan ANVIL and submit an outline to the CCS.²²²

OVERLORD became intertwined with ANVIL, another War Department scheme to reduce the Mediterranean. The complexity of mounting both simultaneously proved too difficult, and the shipping released from the Mediterranean as well as taken from Pacific future building was used for both, but the plan was not mounted simultaneously as Marshall had promised Stalin.²²³

²¹⁹ Rawon, *Ibid.*

²²⁰ *Op. cit.*, *passim.*

²²¹ Forest Pogue. *Marshall: Interviews for Forest C. Pogue.* See also *The Alanbrooke Diaries.* R.W. Thompson. *The Price of Victor*, *passim.*

²²² Coalition Strategic Planning, 1943-1944.

²²³ Coakley and Leighton, *Logistics 1943-1945*, *op. cit.*, Chapters VII, X, XIII, and XIV, *passim*; Matloff, *Strategic Planning 43-44*, *op. cit.*, Chapters XVI-XVIII, *passim.* Again, Marshall and the War Department planners were caught short on landing craft. Their response was to change authorizations of vehicles to be lifted, thus creating more free space for fewer landing craft. Invariably, OPD, felt the theaters executing plans were too conservative in their estimates of capabilities and thus inflated their "needs." In reality, this numbers game shorted those fighting the battles. They would do the same with personnel authorizations for replacements, and overall truck allocations for the theaters.

The Victory Program based its force requirements first on available manpower, then a forced allocation of formations to provide a match of divisions to the estimated number of enemy divisions in existence. As the war progressed, the manpower ceiling was maintained by the United States though the correlation of divisions changed dramatically due to the logistics of a World wide war, as well as the fact that enemy capabilities had diminished even though the number of enemy “organized” divisions had been increased. The war was thus accommodated by relative combat power, not numbers of divisions which had been the original War Department basis for force design.²²⁴

By the last year of the war, most German divisions were shells of their authorized size, and though “manned,” most German divisions were scraps of replacements from broken up Luftwaffe or Naval elements, youngsters, old men, and low quality unhealthy men including a large variety of “foreign volunteers” from the east, or some western nations such as France or Holland. America sent all of its nondeployed divisions (61) to Northwest Europe, the Commonwealth sent 21 divisions which had to be scaled back due to lack of replacements. France created 11 divisions from its colonial divisions and volunteers after the invasion of Southern France and these served in the Allied force. This mixed force was impressively supported by tanks and artillery and three Allied Tactical Air Forces, one per Army Group.²²⁵

The integration of political decisions within the capacity to produce and project forces was simultaneously both limiting and empowering. Decisions made in the Great Allied conferences, focused this potential overshadowing single tactical plans or single service strategies. In every case, the enemy collapsed under the weight of attrition and the constant regenerating power of the allied capabilities to go forward. Allied forces grew increasingly stronger in every theater except the Mediterranean until the end of the war, though the Commonwealth Nations had reached their peak capacities by 1944, but the American and Russian forces grew larger, and were better equipped as the war went on.²²⁶

This final offensive began in Central Pacific at the end of 1943 and the Southwest Pacific in 1944. The main offensive in Europe began with the massive air offensive to destroy the Luftwaffe, Operation AGUMENT, and then was continued with OVERLORD and DRAGOON, the invasions of Normandy and Southern France. Airpower and ground maneuver thus were linked on a Grand Strategic scale. All were power drives based on mass and mobility to destroy the enemy capability to resist. In the Pacific, the twin theater offensives were complimented by the B-29 offensive to eliminate Japanese production centers

²²⁴ *Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops; Organization of Ground Combat Troops, “Ninety-Division Gamble,”* op. cit. Any correlation of forces for the allies must include their virtual superiority in tactical air forces, as well as the ability to rapidly replace destroyed or inoperative tanks, trucks, and material. While the British, Canadian, and French divisions faced manpower shortages and often the cannibalization of units, the Americans maintained their relative strengths within the divisions and increased in size at a rate exceeding four divisions per month in Northwest Europe, until March, 1945. It must be noted that Italy permanently fixed a force approximating 25 divisions during its entire operations up to late April, 1945, keeping them away from both the Eastern and Western Fronts.

²²⁵ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe, passim.*

²²⁶ Ellis, *Statistical Survey, op. cit.* This volume lists organizations, mobilization and production statistics for all the major combatants.

launched in March of 1945. In both horror and efficiency, these raids actually eclipsed the larger and more continuous bombing of Europe.²²⁷

The Air War as an Essential Component of the War

Overhead, the Allied Air Campaign had its roots in prewar plans both in the Air Ministry, and the conversion of the US Army Air Corps Tactical School doctrine into a requirements plan, APWD-1. This developed into a dominant force of more than 4000 allied bombers, which was supported heavily by both the President and Prime Minister as having the potential to bring the war closer to an end with fewer casualties. It cannot be overlooked that logistics had to provide for all these things, and the power of a functional mobilization plan for both industry and manpower had made these campaigns possible by providing the necessary infrastructure to support Lend Lease, and the maritime capacity to deploy the Allied forces throughout all the theaters of war. The air power slice of supply in fuel, bombs, and parts was proportionately higher than comparable sized ground forces.

Neither Air Marshal Portal nor Gen. H.H. Arnold had to push for the bomber offensive, as both Churchill and Roosevelt keenly desired limiting the enemy capability to resist, and agreed to the concept of destroying the enemy's morale by bombing, though the US Army Air Force preferred to look at bombing as the precision destruction of factories, not people. At no time was there a political limitation placed on the level of destruction wreaked on the infrastructure of not only enemies, but the "liberated" countries while they were occupied by the enemy. This assured that cities, bridges, road, and water systems would have to be rebuilt after the war. While previous wars were full of examples of the destruction of property and crimes against civilians, air power lent a feature of total destruction never before seen by modern civilized nations. That this was the result of viewing the enemy economy and the will of the people as linked, it also posited the idea that bombing of civilians, was justified. This had first been seen in the bombings by Germans from both dirigibles and heavy aircraft in World War I. World War II would feature the mass destruction of tens of thousands of towns and villages and hundreds of large cities. The mass production of weapons, and the requirements for oil based fuels and lubricants meant that without bombing, total military manpower losses would have been astronomical.²²⁸

The air campaign was also aided by the Victory Program which looked after more than Army ground forces. Not only was the US Army's implicit goal a direct assault on the mainland and the reduction of forces used to "close the ring on the enemy" as had been posited in ABC-1, but a full strategic bombing campaign using over 2000 heavy bombers based in either the UK or Italy that permitted bombing of all major targets in Western, East Central, and Southern Europe including the primary oil sources for Germany that were located in Romania. By 1943, the American air offensive in Europe was functioning as the daylight portion of the "round the clock" Combined Bomber Offensive patterned on Air War Plan 4. Beginning in February, 1944, the US Strategic Air Forces were centrally directed by Lt. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz

²²⁷ *The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys. Europe and Pacific War.* Maxwell: Air University Press, 1987. This volume reproduces the overall reports for both Europe and Pacific. See also CARL DIGITAL LIBRARY, 20th Air Force, Command and Staff Review, 1 August 1945. This provided detailed information on planning and execution of all XXI Bomber Command Missions over Japan until 1 August.

²²⁸ This theme is apparent in the US Strategic Bombing Survey, and also reflected somewhat differently by the British Survey of Bombing.

who commanded all US air forces in the European and Mediterranean theaters, and directed American heavy bomber operations from both theaters against European targets.²²⁹

Preconceptions of War and their translation into Reality

In both the Atlantic and Pacific, the submarine was a decisive weapon. No prewar American plan except the belief that submarines would have to conduct unrestricted warfare, and an implicit British understanding that the Submarine would be a decisive enabler of enemy victory, shaped responses to the underwater threat. The convoy system of World War I reinforced with technical achievements swayed the convoy battles to the Allies. Sonar, advanced radars, forward firing anti-submarine weapons, and aided in large measure by signals intelligence, coupled with the ability of long range bombers and close ranged antisubmarine aircraft to both deny the surface maneuverability to the U-boat, and which hunted them when they were located, reversed the tide in the Atlantic by mid-1943. The use of Hunter-Killer groups along with light escort carriers spelt the doom of the German Wolfpack tactic, and later individual U-boats themselves. The mass production of US Fleet Submarines and their use of similar signals intelligence to intercept and destroy vital Japanese merchant convoys from the East Indies, and throughout the Pacific, was decisive in crippling Japanese fleet operations due to lack of oil.²³⁰

Yet neither the Atlantic convoy war, nor the Pacific submarine offensive were anything but annexes or implied tasks in any prewar US or British war plan. Shipping, the great enabler, had been assumed to be in existence. The British applied little thought to antisubmarine warfare in the interwar, and the Americans far less. This occurred despite an early concentration on building a robust submarine arm by the German Kriegsmarine which was no secret. No nation was fully prepared for the antishipping war conducted by submarines. Doenitz, himself, had hoped for a much larger force at the war's onset.

British naval foresight led to designing a wide array of landing craft, and an easily produced merchant ship, known later as the liberty ship. Their interwar designs combined with overwhelming American industrial capability to provide the central factor needed to conduct a World-wide war, adequate shipping. Neither Lend Lease, or the air campaign could be waged without massive shipping to bring fuel, food, and raw materials to home countries, nor could the air forces or armies self deploy their own supplies. Russia, England, and China survived due to Lend Lease, a financial ploy devised to offset the US neutrality laws. Of all the prewar plans, this proved to be the most essential and it was developed not through years of thought but was an improvisation.²³¹

²²⁹ Spaatz's Headquarters, USSTAF, United States Strategic Air Forces, Europe was created in February 1944, was comprised of the 8th and 15th Air Forces. It later moved to the Pacific, taking control of 20th Air Force from Henry H. Arnold, and the newly redeployed 8th Air Force, and having administrative (logistical) control over FEAFF, the Far East Air Forces, that controlled the 5th, 7th, and 13th Air Forces for the invasion of Japan. For Army Air Forces Commands and Command structure, see *Army Almanac*, op. cit., pp. 228-229; Mauer Mauer. *Air Force Combat Units of World War II*. Washington: Air Force History Center, 1961; AAF. *The Official Guide to the Army Air Forces*. Army Air Forces Aid Society. New York: Pocket Books, 1944.

²³⁰ *The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping. Volumes 1 and 2 (revised)*. Edited by Eric Grove. Ashgate: Naval Records Society, 1997. See especially, W. J. R. Gardner. *Decoding History. The Battle of the Atlantic and ULTRA*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999.

²³¹ See Merchant Shipping Requirements. Frederick C. Lane. *Ships For Victory. A History of Shipbuilding Under the U.S. Maritime Commission in World War II*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951, p. 28; 577-579. More than 2700 Liberty Ships were build, and over 400 additional ships based on a larger pattern, called the Victory Ship.

Lend Lease provided the early expansion of American industry, saving over a year in industrial mobilization and permitting America to enter the war with a vast head start in ship production and yard expansion as well as the provision to rapidly increase aircraft production. Selective service and early service expansion meant that aircraft and training crews, and soldiers both equipped and training were already in existence prior to Pearl Harbor. This was exactly the opposite the condition of April 1917 when America's mobilized army was a paper authorization whose greatest boon came from the call up of the National Guard to man the Mexican border in 1916, thus providing unit training and an investment in upgrades in equipment that could be issued. The 1940 draft had similar problems as most equipment was World War I equipment, with the Army finally purchasing and issuing the modern M-1 rifle which had been designed in 1936, but deferred for production due to the massive stockage of rifles surplus from the Great War. Modernization of weapons had already begun prior to Pearl Harbor. Both of these processes had been conceived, but barely started by the Victory Program when war struck.

America, however, was far better prepared than it had been when it entered the first war, but its forces already in a mobilization state and its industry rapidly ramping up not only to support the American war effort, but fully engaged in supplying its allies under Lend Lease, a program that would keep Britain, China, France and Russia in the war, along with other Allies to a lesser extent, and would thus share in the benefits of their manpower, armies, air forces and fleets. This benefit came from over two years of increasing preparation, thus having its army and air force almost a third formed in total strength, and its navy growing at a rapid rate with keels already laid for battleships and carriers from the earlier Two Ocean Navy program. This combination of manpower, industry and weapons acquisition had already been planned and begun, its final achievements were more a factor of energetic application than the creation of a plan and assignment of major responsibilities. Two types of ships had been skimmed on fatally, destroyers and amphibious craft. Both would bear a large part of the reason that operations were slowed from the planned campaign in 1943, to the eventual D-Day in Northwest Europe, in mid-1944.

The massive forces created by selective service, the basic victory program, and a burgeoning Lend Lease program combined to form a completely different strategy than had been practiced in World War I, when America joined the war as an "Associated Power." In World War II, America's massive aid to her allies pitted US production against the enemy in lieu of a larger force distribution.

Prewar planning had been decisive in drafting flexible plans for mobilization, the employment of air power, and the creation of a forces capable of deploying and fighting in every theater and under a variety of conditions. These plans influenced the nature and shape of operational plans as they set the conditions for the type of forces, the basic type of weapons to be used, and the capability of the Armed Forces to deploy. Without knowing it, they also created both forces and conditions that would make the United States Armed Forces a world wide force for peace, with bases throughout the free world. American isolationism ended with World War II. The nature and type forces mobilized, made American a world power for the years after the war and into the Twentieth First Century, where that position is still maintained.

Turning Point in Plans and Direction of the War: 1943 and Pre-War Planning in Retrospect

Casablanca concluded over a year of war for the United States, but it also marked a turning away from pre-war plans and conceptions. American planners and leaders had visualized a war against the Axis powers, but had not envisioned the losses that would cripple the American fleet, nor had they fully grasped the danger of the Atlantic convoy war, particularly after silently engaging in operations against

the Germans from late summer 1941, but not in experiencing a concerted attack on shipping immediately off the coast. While air power featured greatly in pre-war planning, the problem of air superiority which had to be gained by long-range, not the current fighters, had not been predicted. The survivability of the self-defending bomber proved fatally wrong. This totally reshaped all air estimates on their bombing program, while heavily relying on prewar designs for the B-17 and B-24 bombers that were used not only in Europe but in every theater save China.²³²

The period of planning from 1939 to 1941, had turned over the basic questions and aimed at both a strategy and a basic estimate of the forces and weapons required. This gave the allies a rough map of the “road ahead,” and though it often required change or refinement, it eventually overperformed in its provision for weapons and forces. American military and naval planners resented being harnessed to coalition requirements. Their British allies had already had over four years of being a junior partner in the Great War had adapted both their BCOS system and War Cabinet to the process of a war where allies were essential and had to be both supported or cooperated with, thus gaining a head start on the Americans in both Grand Strategic planning, and the mechanics of theater level warfare. War forced the Americans to develop a Joint Chiefs of Staff system, and eventually, a unified Department of Defense afterwards to administer and support the armed forces totally, not simply individual services.

1942 had been a year of emotional adjustment, particularly to American leaders and planners whose preparation fit a preconceived method of war making, mainly as sole services and with little or no Coalition flavor to how the war was to be fought. Having met with over a half year of running defeats, America recoiled from Pearl Harbor to being able to stabilize the Pacific war by year’s end. While the War Department drew a straight line to Europe as being the most decisive area, it had to accustom itself both to the survival of allies, and to the application of force based on a common plan that would suit multiple strategic goals.

1942 also showed that the Allies would fight in supporting theaters such as Africa, the Mediterranean and Burma, and not the main theater of Europe as preparation for the final offensive. This manner of thinking by use of the Combined Chiefs and frequent political conferences, went far beyond the American experience in World War I with the Allied Council, during which it was assigned a frontage backed by secure deep water ports and a relatively free passage of ships through U-boat infested waters. Victory in World War II would come, not on one front or from a plan, but from many changes in many plans some of which were inconceivable before the war because the actual situation of entry into the war had not been accurately foreseen. Pre-war plans and assessments had to be adjusted to reality.

Of the foundational documents, ABC-1, Rainbow 5, and the Victory Program, it can be said that the major thrust of each had laid a solid foundation. But as always, the war envisioned was not in detail, the war found, and which had to be fought. However, the changes while significant, would have been decisively worse, had not a vision of the war been planned for, and industry mobilized, and materials allocated to the future war effort.²³³

²³² One group of B-24s was deployed to China, but no B-17s.

²³³ Changes in weapons and organizations were profound. The Army was revamping its divisional organization, and the Air Force modified its bomber philosophy based on the introduction of long range fighters. The Aircraft carrier replaced the battle ship as the key to the fleet, and the use of large amphibious operations far outpaced any early thinking in the ORANGE Plan.

ABC-1 proved to be remarkable in its vision of critical areas, lines of communications, and most importantly, its delineation of theaters and a recommended Combined command structure. The creation of Supreme Allied Commanders affecting a total unity of command, ranging all the way to the Combined Chiefs of Staff which maintained overall strategic direction of the war, was inspired. It was based on lessons learned in the Great War, and though Marshall's admirers credit him with demanding Unity of Command, this lesson had been both practiced and learned in World War I, with an active Supreme Commander, Marshal Ferdinand Foch.²³⁴

World War II permitted the active participation in Allied task forces, and the creation of Joint and Combined Staffs, that were not however the custom in the first war. ABC-1 also gave gross estimates in forces needed, that were essential upon which to base not only mobilization plans, but also production of weapons and their necessary logistical support. The prioritization of basic materials and fuel became essential to any production plan.

ABC-1 also permitted a more robust planning of Lend Lease. These were combined in the Victory Program that had allocated manpower, sized the armed forces by major components, and became the basis for Selective Service beyond the original Protective Mobilization plan. This permitted an effective use of manpower by both industry whose essential workers were protected from conscription, and the armed forces which could phase personnel acquisition to the capabilities of the service to absorb and equip new drafts. Food production was considered an essential industry. Critical to the war effort, was Roosevelt's decision that the armed forces would not eclipse the need for production for his "Arsenal of Democracy," a fact that kept the allies fighting by providing them goods in lieu of more divisions.

Rainbow 5 had permitted the original deployment of forces and stated that all plans would be subordinated to the early defeat of Germany and her allies. While the strategic planners in OPD had the most difficult adjustment to supporting secondary theaters, the twin Heads of State, the President and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, provided a consistent and clear path, with priorities agreed and adjusted to meet the needs of both nations and the coalition in an ever changing war situation. The Combined Chiefs therefore provided the military plans to accomplish the overall design which was created based on the policy logic of the Big Three, and not simply the military plans of the major military leaders.

While Rainbow 5 did not provide a clear path to Grand Strategic Design to permit strategic and operational guidance for Theaters, the basic outline of the Victory Program should be examined for its insight into forces and manpower. It also required that detailed planning with allies were to be required. ABC-1, the Victory Program and RAINBOW 5 actually blended into a single overarching concept.

Manpower had been accurately estimated. While service planners by 1944 experienced a manpower limit, this was caused by economic and political considerations, not the lack of adequate manpower. That the Army did not have a blank check on people had always been understood, and the war was fought with roughly the manpower estimated in 1941 by the services and compiled in the "Victory Program."

²³⁴ Sir Frederick Maurice. *Lessons of Allied Cooperation. Naval, Military and Air. 1914-1918*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942. Note, the prevailing view of how the war would be fought until 1942, was that "GHQ" would form and deploy the forces with the Chief of Staff in command, and with a stand in in Washington to support him. See Watson, Chief of Staff, Prewar Plans, Chapters 1-3. The creation of OPD, gave Marshall a world wide Command Post and left him in Washington as member of the CCS, as well a functional Chief of Staff, Army.

The Victory Program was compiled from the war plans sections of each service. Heavily relied upon were papers written by the Army/Navy Joint Board. Wedemeyer had begun with a number of assumptions listed more as a strategic assessment, rather than a specific methodology. The Program thus states, *“It is out of the question to expect the United States and its Associates to undertake in the near future a sustained and successful land offensive against the center of German power.”*

Wedemeyer continued saying that defensive measures would not win, but

*“...that effective offensive methods other than an early land offensive in Europe must be employed. These methods can be found in a continuation of the economic blockade; the prosecution of land offensives in distant regions where German troops can exert only a fraction of their total strength.”*²³⁵

Effectively this describes GYMNAST/TORCH, which had been firmly opposed by OPD and loudly lamented by Wedemeyer, who had compiled the original document.

He further develops the idea of a European theater and its establishment, requiring thousands of ships.

*“To transport five million men with their modern air and mechanized equipment to European ports over a period of approximately one year would require about seven million tons of shipping or about 1,000 ships. To maintain such a force in the theater of operations would require about ten million tons of shipping or 1500 ships”.*²³⁶

Wedemeyer did not discount multiple theaters, noting that about 215 divisions would be required, an estimate based on the numbers of enemy divisions available versus those of Britain and the Commonwealth and Russia. His plan allowed for both air and naval operations, but was decidedly land-centric and highly reflective of his German military education.

Neither Wedemeyer nor the War Plans branch could adequately predict the Army’s deployment. This included a wide deployment of about 350,000 men to cover all of Hemispheric Defense, and almost a million in the Continental United States for defense or training. These numbers would change rapidly as much of the deployment to South or Central America never took place, and that the continental based units deployed as the land war never approached US shores. The Army would eventually consider as theaters, the European Theater of Operations (ETO), the North African, Middle Eastern, Italian, China-Burma India, Southwest Pacific, South Pacific, Central Pacific, and North Pacific, all of which absorbed troops and units. Thirty-six named campaigns took place in these.²³⁷

The fact that the war began almost immediately after the publication of the Victory Plan, and only six months after the ABC Staff Conversations meant that detailed concepts for deployment and study of the various theaters had not been able to be accomplished. Also, the fact that neither the War or Navy Department had assumed that the size of the Pacific defeats which they had isolated into being applicable mainly to the Philippines, had not be theorized as part of planning. Nor had the War Department understood that it would be forced to accommodate the Chinese or British in the Middle East as part of

²³⁵ *“Victory Program,” op. cit., p. 104;*

²³⁶ *Op. cit., pp. 109-110.*

²³⁷ *Army Almanac, op. cit., pp., Part IV, Chapters 3, 4.*

their war planning. This was the undergirding reason that OPD and the Navy Department resisted GYMNAST so heavily.

The troops and units assigned were taken from the overall troop basis for the Army and assigned. The Army itself, was never built based on a “requirements plan” using a campaign plan structure.²³⁸ This technique was used by the Air War Plans section to justify the size of the Air Force and to create an adequate mix of bombers, fighters, and auxiliaries, including a robust training command as well as planning for a new long range bomber type to be used in the latter stages of the bomber offensives. Augmentations were made as needed, based on a correlation of friendly vs. enemy strength, and military judgment. Two thirds of the Army’s strength was allocated to the ETO/Mediterranean, and one third, to the Pacific by the end of 1945 where it was planned to have no less than 34 divisions, and 6 Marine Divisions early 1946, following the end of the war in Europe.²³⁹

The Air Corps provided a detailed “requirement basis,” this was based on making an actual bombing campaign plan using the latest intelligence concerning Europe from Royal Air Force intelligence sources. The Navy program was based on the Joint Board assessment used to compile a two-ocean naval building plan but was heavily influenced from years of gaming and modifying the ORANGE Plan. The Army’s estimates were more esoteric, but based on the following assumptions. These were an air war campaign, and a decisive campaign in Northwest Europe. The scope and thrust of this plan did not reach a tangible operational design until SHAEF created a Post OVERLORD concept in May, 1944.²⁴⁰

The Victory Program “Troop Basis” continued to live into 1942, and those planning for worst cases, used it to theorize the size of the Army based on known enemy divisions in existence, and assuming disasters such as the withdrawal of Russia from the war, and the non-participation of Britain till the end, based on exhaustion.

Using these fears, the G-3 extrapolated an army of 350 divisions, and noted a rise in Army strength to over 13 million by the end of 1948 should the war continue due to the non-continuance of the Russians or British, and the survival of Germany and Japan as combatants. While the JCS categorically refused to accept such figures, they did permit a growth of the Army Air Forces to 273 groups in 1944. Army strength in fact was curbed after the defeat of Germany, despite the expected invasion of Japan slated for November, 1945.²⁴¹

Always unspoken was the problem of a democracy in a protracted war. Both the war production board and war shipping board fought expansions beyond the basis troop basis outlined in the Victory Program which was an estimate, not because they were against a certain strategy for the war, but because manpower, materials and production would be expanded beyond what was tolerable by their views of society. This would be total war, which Roosevelt and others had hoped to shift partially onto the backs

²³⁸ Wedemeyer used a rough divisional calculation of enemy divisions but had not done detailed studies on how or where the army would be employed. Heavily impressed by the 1940 campaign, he had allocated 60 armored divisions into the force, a complete underestimation of the shipping needed to deploy such a heavily mechanized force.

²³⁹ *Reports of General MacArthur, Volume 1, op. cit., plans OLYMPIC and CORONET.*

²⁴⁰ See SHAEF, RG 331, National Archives, Post OVERLORD 381 Planning. Brooke had complained that ROUNDUP as created by the Americans had no strategic goal. OVERLORD was not given a goal, to seize the Ruhr, until early February, 1944.

²⁴¹ Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.*, p. 352

of the Chinese, Russians and British at the expense of American production, a factor which none of them would ever admit. Full employment with minimal societal strain was permitted. Mass deployments and millions of casualties as the great powers had suffered in the Great War, were never to be approached in initial planning, but a factor for continual mobilization to maintain a certain strength level was permitted, thus increasing the total numbers that served during the war to 16 millions.

While staff generals could float huge estimates, the JCS could never take these to the President or the Congress. The Victory Program was acceptable with a bit of inflation; it could not be doubled or grown into a larger, more costly endeavor. America never asked its population to suffer what Britain, Russia, China or the losing powers did in the terms of conscription, mobilization of women, and rationing which far outshone that endured by Americans.

This war vision underwrote mass bombings of civilian housing and the total destruction of enemies' infrastructure. Enemy society, not simply forces, were considered the mainstay of a longer, bloody war. Technology did not moderate the devastation of war, it magnified it, and gave indiscriminate use of firepower a wider justification under the guise of destroying the economic power of combatants. The ability to focus simply on combatants was blurred by the lack of precision in attacking economic targets. Between Germany and Japan, almost a million civilians were killed by bombing.²⁴²

Limiting the length of the war, seemingly counterintuitive to Unconditional Surrender, but led to a desire to end the war by one year after D-Day in Europe, and one year after Victory in Europe in the Pacific Theater. These were political goals based on Roosevelt's view, possibly of his own reelections. World victory would have to occur before the end of his fourth term. No one questioned this. The great problem was Britain and the Commonwealth falling aside due to war exhaustion, and Churchill who was a willing ally, losing power. Even the military accepted this as a necessity for strategic stability. Democracy cannot afford to change policies or strategies in mid war. The Allies were fortunate in the continuity of the political leaders.

The War Department continually revised the troop distribution plan, granting more men to the air corps and army service forces as requirements for air units and the necessity of providing service troops for all elements increased. By war's end, the number of divisions would fall as the total equivalent force for a division, or division slice, reached about 67,900 men per division. This reflected the highly technical nature of weapons, but also the necessity for a mobile, flexible transportation and supply system to be maintained.²⁴³

The question always loomed, how were units going to be deployed and then supported. On any given day, more than 1500 ships moved or carried supplies for divisions deployed.²⁴⁴ Sending divisions committed not only ships for the deployment, but built in a shipping requirement to maintain those forces overseas that could not be ignored. Deployment, thus, became a permanent drain, which could not be easily decreased or removed, and became a factor affecting world-wide strategy and commitments. Like Lend Lease commitments, the ability to defeat the U-boats that were sinking hundreds of thousands of tons monthly had to be reversed, both by construction, and the aggressive destruction of the enemy

²⁴² Strategic Bombing Survey overall reports for Europe and the Pacific.

²⁴³ *Global Logistics and Strategy, op. cit., p. 839, and appendix E-1, pp. 839-841.* Average divisional force totals varied among theaters. This was Army-wide total.

²⁴⁴ *Op. cit., Appendix F, p. 842 "Merchant Shipping."*

submarines themselves. America was saved in this war, by its massive ability to replace the 2500 merchant ships sunk by German U-boats, about 14 million tons of ships, as well as their ability to stop the drain of tonnage by destroying the U-boat force.²⁴⁵

As late as early 1944, the Army still intended to create an additional 100 plus divisions beyond those 90 already organized. Two considerations caused the program to stall: allocations of manpower were not approved by the President who did not wish to strain the industry sector, though magnificent work by women, and training unskilled labor had proven to be decisive. Moreover, the production of Lend Lease to ship weapons to include airplanes, tanks and trucks to our allies pinched the allocations to create a larger force. The greater problem, shipping, to transport and then support more units, as well as the allocation for additional support elements in combat support and combat service support, would have broken the manpower ceiling.

As Wedemeyer had greatly underestimated the need for replaceable manpower, the shipping, transportation, and specialized units such as tank destroyers, tank battalions, communications, and supply would have lengthened the deployment process. Most of these units were “pooled” and distributed in support during ongoing operations. These were organizational designs created in 1941 and 1942, and not considered in the Victory Program. This gained efficiency, but made sure that divisions were never out of the line and needed a steady influx of replacements, as the “wastage” level due to casualties and combat exhaustion was high.²⁴⁶

In the final event, the Army finished its European deployment of units in the spring of 1945, only to immediately conduct an emergency shift of units back to the United States for trans-shipment to the Pacific for the scheduled invasion of Japan.²⁴⁷ Marshall relented, halting army growth and saying that it was easier to provide replacements for divisions to keep them constantly in combat, than to shuffle new divisions to the front to relieve combat worn organizations.²⁴⁸

The Victory Plan authorized a naval establishment of over 1 million men; it would grow to 4 million including a 600,000-man Marine Corps. The Navy had already created a construction plan, the Two Ocean Navy bill that would both expand and modernize the fleet. Allocation of ships eventually devolved to the major fleets created, which were in turn replaced during the war by numbered Fleets under admirals executing ordered plans or missions. The Victory Program included larger numbers, about 170 major ships beyond the more than 400 ships already ordered and being built in shipyards. About 1600 ships were added to the Navy, and 2661 Liberty ships were added to either the Maritime Commission roles or given to allies to replace lost tonnage. Major losses were about 170 ships including 4 Fleet carriers, 2 battleships (never recovered and rebuilt at Pearl Harbor), and 82 destroyers and 52 submarines.²⁴⁹

Other than War Plan Orange, the navy had no prewar plan. The Navy’s shipbuilding plan was based on the general board’s recommendations for a two ocean war, and the types and numbers of ships

²⁴⁵ More than 2700 Liberty Ships alone were produced, in addition to other ships and landing craft.

²⁴⁶ Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley. *Organization of Ground Combat Troops*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1947.

²⁴⁷ *Procurement and Training*, op. cit., Marshall, *War Reports*,

²⁴⁸ *Ibid*

²⁴⁹ Mark E. Stille. *The United States Navy in World War II*. New York: Osprey, 2021, pp. 276, 290; King, *US Navy at War*, op. cit., pp. 284-305. King’s final report lists all losses of all types, including landing craft, and auxiliaries, by name or hull number.

were highly influenced by Admiral Ernest J. King, who had served in surface, submarines, and air billets and was best suited to understand the complexity of fleet operations under all but amphibious operations. While the Pacific was typified by Fast Carrier task forces, amphibious operations, and submarine operations, the North African, Mediterranean, and European waters predominated in convoy escort or amphibious operations conducted under different conditions than those conducted in the Pacific. After mid-1943, the Navy was predominately covered by its own aviation, and never lacked for escorts, gunfire support or fleet replenishment ships. This was a vastly different capability than that which was sunk in Pearl Harbor, and which seemed to spell the doom of the Navy's capabilities in the Pacific.²⁵⁰

As the Navy operated in all theaters, its plans though reminiscent of the ORANGE plan for the Far Western Pacific, were not predictable in detail. Furthermore, it participated in major invasions in Africa, Sicily, Italy, France, and more than 70 landings throughout the Pacific from small operations to major operations in the Philippines and Okinawa. While only TORCH and the major landings in the Mandates and Lingayen Gulf might be traced to prewar concepts, the development of basic amphibious warfare concepts and ships had preceded the war, but these were expanded and improved in both theaters. Landing operations were conducted mainly at dawn or night against Continental objectives and in daylight against islands that could be isolated from enemy assistance. The extent to which naval gunfire and aerial preparations would participate in these operations were not foreseen before the war.²⁵¹

The Air War and its unpredicted costs and benefits

Throughout the interwar, air power leaders had predicted that "air dominance" would be necessary to win a future war. While numerous theories existed, and observations from Spain and China indicated that large scale wars in Europe or the Far East would require large air elements, the rapid development of air weapons and their use made pre-war theories unrealistic. By September 1942, the AAF gained a new organizational model---for 273 groups more than doubling Arnold's early allocation and recognizing that air power was needed world-wide in numbers unpredicted by early plans.²⁵²

Marshall had hoped that his plan for SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP would cease world-wide dispersion of forces, for a near total focus on Europe. As predicted in the Victory Plan, substantial forces would neither be equipped or trained before 1943, and that the rush to conduct decisive operations in 1942 were impossible for the newly named Army Air Forces. The AAF, however, was content for piecemeal commitment of units to gain experience, knowing full well that full scale operations by 8th Air Force could not begin in Europe before the end of 1943, and that many of the "experienced crews" arriving in the first increments, by then would be casualties or replaced under the system of "combat limits" by number of sorties. It was summer, 1944, when the 8th reached its maximum strength. The massive air training

²⁵⁰ *United States Fleet in World War II* Samuel Eliot Morison. *United States Naval Operations in World War II. Fourteen Volumes.* Boston:

²⁵¹ Russell Weigley. *The American Way of War. A History of United States Strategy and Policy.* New York: Macmillan and Company, Inc, 1973, Chapter 12 passim.

²⁵² Maurice Matloff. "The Ninety Division Gamble" in *Command Decision.* Ed by Kent Roberts Greenfield. Washington: Center of Military History, 1987, pp. 365-381; Marshall War Report, July 41 to July 43, in *War Reports, op. cit., pp.104-140; Victory Program, op. cit, passim, and Hansell, Air War Plan, op. cit., passim.*

program kept pace with, and exceeded air crew losses, and new models of aircraft were rapidly absorbed into the system. Generally, more planes existed in the system than combat ready crews in Europe.²⁵³

In 1941, before America entered the war, Arnold understood that the current cutting edge, the B-17 and B-24 would soon be outmoded and published requirements for a very long range bomber of greater range and carrying capacity to be delivered in 1943. Two were built, the B-29 and the B-32, and the better of the two, the B-29 was adopted and sent into combat in the Far East in 1944, to begin bombing Japan from China. This foresight, plus the industrial capability to build special factories to provide these while maintaining a large fleet of B-17s and B-24 to replace the thousands shot down, damaged or outdated, showed the complexity of the war, but also the ability of the civilians overseeing production to expand to larger challenges. No nation could compete with this unforeseen type of expansion. A separate Air Force was created to employ the long range B-29, the 20th.

General Spaatz resentfully told the Secretary of War in May 1942, that the air war planners had conceived of “air power supported by ground forces, [that] it is now air power supporting ground forces.”²⁵⁴ Spaatz was reflecting on the multiple versions of the Air War Plan, produced in his own Plans division by Lt. Col. Harold L. George, had in fact produced something akin to a campaign plan, listing both target systems, priorities, and expected results to be achieved over a specified time. At the heart of this, was a period of massive buildup, a second period of pinpoint strike on key industries, and then following the diminution of the enemy’s ability to produce and sustain a war economy. The air elements would shift to supporting the direct assault of invasion forces, whose role would be to complete the victory made inevitable by bombing. Early plans showed this period to be roughly in six month increments, of buildup, bombing, and ground invasion. The airmen had considered “the surface campaign,” as something indecisive.²⁵⁵

Maj. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell had been part of the Special Observers Group in the UK during the Battle of Britain, and had returned with detailed intelligence on German industry, targets, and the economy, the only real “target folders” then possessed by the Army Air Corps. These became the basis for Air War Plan 1, a basic requirements plan produced first to provide data for the Victory Program, and later modified to become AWP-4, the basic campaign plan that the Army Air Forces intended to execute in Europe. Spaatz, the designated air commander would first activate 8th Bomber Command with four bomb groups, and follow with 8th Fighter Command and a Service Command. In late fall, he would depart for TORCH, the invasion of North Africa, taking half of the 8th’s force, to create the 12th Air Force, and in mid-43, would poach more bomb groups to form the kernel of the 15th Air Force in southern Italy.

Army Air Forces troop distribution, the total “slice” needed for an operational air force came under fire from the War Department as early as 1942. The ground authorization in mechanics, support in ordnance and signals, called for an Eighth Air Force of 600,000 men. Marshall told Arnold that he could not afford the shipping for such an organization, or the ground divisions for ROUNDUP would never be

²⁵³ Matloff, *Strategic Planning, 1944, op. cit., see chapters XXI and XXII*. King ran the Pacific war as he almost as he wished, though he was forced to accept MacArthur’s theater due to domestic politics, and Roosevelt’s pledge to support the Philippines. Roosevelt had to make good on this in 1944, which was an election year. The Army and Army Air Forces mounted significant operations in the Pacific and dominated the supply, transportation, and air operations of many of the island bases.

²⁵⁵ Maj. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell. *The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler*. Atlanta: Higgins-McArthur, 1972.

deployed. The Air inspector found support in local British industry or in sharing support throughout an area comprising several bomb groups. This further strained the belief systems of those who saw the Air Force not as independent, but an expensive freeloader passing on the necessary but undramatic drudgery of "combat service support" to others, uncredited when the show's cast appeared in Playbill. The 8th Air Force requested more planes and crew without ground echelons intending to slide them into overburdened groups for the sake of providing more aircrew to share the risks of loss and therefore lowering the average loss rates in crews.²⁵⁶

Since all the early groups had to conduct extensive basic training of gunners, mechanics and non-aviator crewmen, the payback of more crews in the mix further clouded the brew. While air crew training improved significantly based on experience and the assignment of crews "graduating" from the air war and returning home, the shipping cost remained significant especially since missions flown by two or three hundred machines used a million gallons of fuel, 800 or more tons of bombs, hundreds of thousands of machine gun bullets, and thousands of man hours in mechanical and technical servicing to get the air craft in condition for flight. This problem increased as the missions became larger and were incrementally 4 to 6 times larger after 8th Air Force reached peak strength in June 1944.²⁵⁷

Arnold's manpower and aircraft authorizations had only reached half of what was needed when Spaatz talked to Stimson. Late in 1942, the "Group authorization" was increased, with a commensurate doubling of air crew training. Air crews took approximately one year to train first in their basic skills, and then to train together in a specific type aircraft, which had to be capable of functioning as a member of a larger squadron and group. Two numbered air forces dealt specifically with individual and crew instruction, the 2nd and 3rd Air Forces, while the coastal Air Forces the 1st and 4th provided continental air defense and antisubmarine patrol. Air Groups were graduated together until the mobilization quota was filled, and full replacement crews deployed individually with their new aircraft to far flung theaters.²⁵⁸

The fledgling Army Air Forces' trained combat groups were soon sucked into the vortex of a world-wide losing war with newly graduated air crews picking up factory fresh, and unproven aircraft to fill in units. These crews generally possessed only basic flying, bombing, navigation, and gunnery skills. While the British prepared airfields or conditioned Royal Air Force fields for immediate handover to the larger squadrons and groups of the newly organized Eighth Air Force, the six-month buildup would soon be stretched to more than a year and a half before Eighth Air Force had its full authorization of groups combat ready in England. This organization virtually was build up under fire, as the Eighth began flying combat missions after the first four groups had arrived.²⁵⁹

Assets to support the Air War Plan in Europe can be seen by Eighth Air Forces summary of operations. Its first heavy bomber group mission in August to Rouen, only put up 12 aircraft. By the end of August 1942, it dropped 1751 tons of bomb at the cost of 2 bombers. By years end, it would lose 34 aircraft to all causes, and 1128 more in 1943 suffering a 5.1% loss rate. Eighth Bomber Command grew

²⁵⁶ *The Mighty Eighth and The Mighty Eighth War Diary.*

²⁵⁷ Eighth Air Force Statistical Digest.

²⁵⁸ Craven and Cate, AAF, volume 1, passim. See also volume 7,

²⁵⁹ *Mighty Eighth War Diary.* This details every one of the more than 1000 operational missions flown by Eighth Air Force to include order of battle, losses, and enemy loss claims.

from 227 heavy bombers in December 1942, and 1556 a year later. It dropped 49, 468 tons of bombs in 1943.

By the time of Spaatz's return to the UK at the end of 1943 to take over direction of the Strategic Air Forces, Eighth Air Force now under Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, had 25 full bomb groups and would peak by D-Day at over 40 ½ heavy bomber groups, 15 fighter groups, and 2 photo reconnaissance groups.

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Eighth Air Force lost only 32 planes in 1942, a reflection of the small numbers and limited missions flown. 1943 saw more than 49,000 tons of bombs dropped by a force reaching 150,000 men with more than 25 bomb groups and 11 fighter groups. Loss rates climbed to over 5% per mission, with losses of over 20 percent on very deep penetration missions. A total of 970 bombers were lost in 1943, along with nearly 12,000 aircrew failing to return from missions.²⁶¹

Arnold's airmen were fighting a campaign as large and as costly as any ground campaign, though their goal was far more ambitious. Maj. Gen. Ira Eaker wrote a summary of the aims of both American and British Bombing called the "Combined Bomber Offensive." This was briefed and introduced the term, "Bombing Around the Clock" to characterize US day operations and Royal Air Force night operations. This was further reduced to a CCS Directive drafted by Air Marshal J.C. Slessor and promulgated by Air Chief Marshal Portal in the name of the CCS, as POINTBLANK. It became famous as the "Casablanca Directive," though it was finally published several months after the actual conference.²⁶²

The Combined Bomber Offensive of the RAF Bomber Command and Eaker's Eighth Air Force operated under POINTBLANK, that adjusted targets based on a scientific analysis of the German economy and its "pinch points" where key components could block the production of end items. Ball bearings, aircraft airframes, oil and other items moved up and down the priorities list based on intelligence estimates. The basic directive reflected both prewar thinking and updated assessments:

*To conduct a joint United States-British air offensive to accomplish the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. This is construed as meaning so weakened as to permit initiation of final combined operations on the Continent.*²⁶³

²⁶⁰ Headquarters, Eighth Air Force. *Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force 17 August 1942-8 May 1945*. CARL Digital Library.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate. *U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II: Volume II. TORCH to POINTBLANK. August 1942-December 1943*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949.

²⁶³ Hansell, *Air Plan, op. cit.*, p. 168; W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate *op. cit.*, Volume II. Chapters, 9, 11, and 20, passim. Air doctrine purists, claim that this line ignored the war winning capability of an extensive bomber campaign, and diminished this by the direct support desired under the Transportation Plan. The interpretation of "weakened" summarizes the major divide between the Supreme Allied Commander tasked with invading the Continent and the Bomber Commanders who believed that bombing would make the invasion an anticlimax.

The last line underscored the priority that American strategists gave to the Cross Channel attack, and also the concern that the British leaders held concerning both the forces needed, and the losses to be suffered, in taking on the German Army head on in prepared positions on the coast of Europe. While commanders such as Spaatz, and Britain's Arthur Harris repeated spoke their opinion that air power would make an invasion unnecessary or merely a "ROUNDUP" off the enemy as the early British draft of that plan stressed, the daily results of fighting first in Africa and the Mediterranean, and also in the Pacific, indicated to the Army's leaders that a larger and more ambitious program of strategic bombing was necessary to prepare every kind of operation. The pre-War Air Plan 1 had not predicted such a long or costly campaign.

That this followed the Army Air Forces endless quest for the "independence" of a separate service was understandable, it also required a shift in manpower and production away from ground forces to create larger air forces. It also commensurately increased the Army Service Forces as airplanes were support intensive, both in tonnage of supplies and large numbers of technical personnel needed to maintain air units in combat. This resulted in the almost even distribution of personnel among the three components of Marshall's total force, the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces, all of whom made a maximum contribution to the total military effort.²⁶⁴

American airpower had one great structural problem that had to be remedied before daylight bombing could proceed with the type effect its doctrine claimed. Long range escort fighters had not been developed during the 1930's when the four-engine bomber had both the speed and altitude to make enemy interception ineffective. Radar, in fact, had not been invented at this point. This doctrine of bomber superiority, also led to the slower training and activation of Fighter Groups, and their smaller numbers being shipped to the UK in comparison to heavy bombers.²⁶⁵

Heavy bomber losses were sustained in 1943, that made sustained bombing prohibitive for the investment in lost crews and aircraft. The introduction of the P-51 long range fighter, and later model P-47's with greater reach and fuel carrying capacity in large wing tanks, reversed this trend. Increases in fighter strength permitted far ranging by fighter groups, replacing the previous tactic of close escort. By early 1944 Spaatz's bombers fought a sustained air campaign designed to destroy the German aircraft industry and to attrit its fighter forces in the air. Spaatz intended to bleed the Luftwaffe of its veteran pilots by sustained attack. This won air superiority for the allies over the continent, and made OVERLORD, ROUNDUP's replacement, possible.²⁶⁶ The size of the aerial offensive grew to decisive proportions which by the last year of the war, was seen mounting operations with 1400 bombers, and 800 fighters against single important targets. Eighth Air Force mounted operations on a total of 459 bombing days.²⁶⁷

Not all of the bomb groups flew every mission mounted by Eighth Air Force as both the demands of rest and maintenance, as well as aircraft availability greatly affected operations while the force was still small. Of the 986 major missions mounted, the earliest arriving groups if serving till the end of the campaign, averaged participating in about 325 of the missions, though one group, the 93d flew 396 missions, including 41 while on loan to the North African mission to fly the August 43 Ploesti oil strike. This group, the 93d, flew 8169 sorties, dropped 19,004 tons of bombs, and lost 100 B24 aircraft in combat

²⁶⁴ Marshall, War Report, 1945, op. cit.

²⁶⁵ The ratio of bomber to fighter groups was 2.5:1 in 8th AF, and during its early operations 4:1.

²⁶⁶ Craven and Cate, op. cit., Volume 1, pp. and Volume II, TORCH to POINTBLANK, passim.

²⁶⁷ *Eighth Air Force Summary of Operations; Mighty Eighth War Diary.*

and an additional 40 written off as operational losses. VIII Fighter Command flew a number of sweeps and deep penetration missions independent of the main force, bringing the total of Eighth Air Force missions well over one thousand.²⁶⁸

The Pacific wide deployment of Air Forces, the 5th, 7th, 11th, 13th, 14th and eventually the “Superfortress” 20th Air Force, was not foreseen and as carefully planned as the Europe based Strategic Air Forces. Many of their aircraft had been rejected for use as “inferior” in the primary theater. The total aircraft of all types in the Pacific peaked at a handful more than 12,000 planes. This compares to the 13,500 in Europe and 8,500 in the Mediterranean at their peak strengths.²⁶⁹ While Pacific operations were characterized by harsh climates, long over water flights, and primitive jungle air fields, they also saw aircraft flying anti-shipping strikes at wave top level, close air support of invasions and jungle forces, and long ranged strategic bombings of Chinese, Japanese, or island targets. Crew combat tours in the Pacific were generally longer than their European counterparts, due to the longer transportation requirements to reach the Theaters. While the Pacific Air Forces were smaller, their loss rates were comparative.

The vast array of targets or type missions in the Pacific could not be calculated as the AWPD-1/4 plans against economic systems of modern countries. Instead, many of the targets were tactical in support of ground forces or antishipping against Japanese merchant or naval vessels. Only the Superfortresses hit Japan in any great strength and the most effective of these weren’t precision strikes, but area bombing of cities using incendiaries, at night and from low altitude.²⁷⁰

Arnold, along with then Col. Ira Eaker outlined his views and design for a modern air force at war in *Winged Warfare*, in 1941. The AAF that Arnold commanded, lived up to his boss’ predictions in both effect and numbers.²⁷¹ These ideas predated any war plan. While airmen could claim “Billy Mitchell,” and others as prophets, Arnold, Eaker, and to an extent Claire Chennault, published and the practiced the type operations that had been published before the war. No enemy should have been surprised by what the American air force did, but were generally surprised at both the numbers and quality of both pilots and the various type aircraft introduced by the AAF simultaneously all over the world.

The Army had been carefully designed in the Victory Program to provide for 61 armored and motorized divisions of the 215 envisioned. This eventuated at 16 armored divisions, 4 airborne, and 69 infantry divisions for the 89 finally in service by mid-1944. Partially, this was due to Lt. Gen. McNair’s lack of faith in having armored corps as the Germans did, but also in basic structural differences required by having a pool of specialized units, as well as the problem of overseas shipment of the vehicle heavy armored force, though the standard armored division had only 2650 vehicles of all types, and 2012 vehicles of all types, for a standard infantry division, both in standardized tables of organization and

²⁶⁸ Roger A. Freeman. *The Mighty Eighth: A History of the Units, Men and Machines of the US 8th Air Force*, London: Arms and Armour Press, 1970, *passim* and p. 244 and Freeman, *Mighty Eighth War Diary*. London: Janes, 1981. This is a comprehensive reproduction of the data in the Eighth Air Force, War Diary of operations and major activities.

²⁶⁹ Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, op. cit., pp. 165, 162, 159.

²⁷⁰ Craven and Cate, Volume V

²⁷¹ Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold and Col. Ira A. Eaker. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941, *passim*.

equipment for July, 1943. Massive numbers of trucks were required to support forces, as much of the rail in war zones had been destroyed by either bombing or ravaged by a retreating enemy.²⁷²

The Limits of Military Science: How the War was Fought After the Plans Were Fulfilled

The United States entered World War I unprepared and with no plans coordinated internally for its own mobilization and use of production, and no war plan or agreed tasks with its Allies. Refusing a signed treaty, America was an “Associated Power” whose value lay not only in its manpower, but its acceptance that the Grand Strategy of the War would be dominated by a Supreme War Council, of which it possessed only Associate Membership.

Due to the foresight of President Roosevelt and his military chiefs, this was avoided. A sound set of strategic goals, a command construct, and the increasing mobilization of production and manpower was underway when the war began for America. Yet what it found was, despite careful preparation, neither the state of its defenses nor its ability to positively influence the overall situation was at its call. The facts of coalition war which had mainly been borne by few senior American military officers in World War I, now predominated in Washington, forcing cooperative solutions both within the Joint Chiefs and with the Combined Chiefs.²⁷³

Yet, World War II’s “Grand Alliance,” was a “marriage of convenience” linking the three Great Powers, the United States, The British Empire, and Soviet Russia. Any study of the conduct of the war must account for political necessities, and the massive differences in war aims of the three countries. While the Combined Chiefs tailored military directives to the Grand Design decided upon by the two Democratic Heads of State, the need to support a totalitarian power, Russia, cannot be ignored. Moreover, the barely revivable French Empire, the complexity of the British colonial position along with the sometimes strained relations of her “Dominions, “ Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and the near feudal society of Nationalist China which was in a state of suspended civil war with Mao Tze Tung’s Communist Forces. With the exception of the Soviet Union, none of these powers achieved their total war aims, and the western powers found itself soon in a Cold War and a number of “hot” limited wars with the Chinese, Vietnamese, and North Korean Communists. France was restored as a Republic, and the British evolved into a Commonwealth, while the bulk of Asia and part of South Asia became Communist. None of this was predictable in the early planning before the war.

Modern communications revolutionized the war. The two heads of state were in virtual daily contact on the war, and thus influenced events constantly, a factor unseen by America in its history. Both embraced the idea of personal diplomacy and though they used ambassadors and personal

²⁷² George Forty. *US Army Handbook, 1939-1945*. New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1979. See detailed discussions in *Organization of Ground Combat Troops, op. cit. ETO Transportation*

²⁷³ Of the senior Army generals, only Lt. Gen. Hugh Drum, Lt. Gen. Stanley Embick, and Gen. George Marshall were in senior headquarters in World War I, but only Embick had personal experience with the Supreme War Council. In World War I, the American First Army was assigned to a French Army Group, and the US II Corps served under both Australian and British command. Ten divisions were “trained” by the British, and most of the early arriving divisions received training and were “blooded” in French commanded sectors. However, the personal experience of dealing with Allies was intermittent. The fact that the Allies pressed to amalgamate US soldiers as replacements for battle losses within Allied formations was successfully countered, but left a bitter legacy that was known, but not personally experienced by those remaining and became Second World War’s senior serving officers save Lt. Gen. Embick whose service at the Supreme Allied Council left him prejudiced against at least one Ally.

representatives, neither surrendered their own personal control of policies and constantly interacted at various levels both to assure their understanding of events and to impel action in the direction they desired. This personal approach shaped Grand Strategy.

The United States devised its plans based on service doctrines and the service cultures of the individual services. These were loosely compatible. Joint Warfare was not formally addressed by any of the services except in the realm of “cooperation,” a process found ineffective by virtually all the old-school stalwarts. Personal friendships, rather than effective cooperation was found to be a poor substitute, one of the findings of the Pearl Harbor investigations concerning the actions of the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii.²⁷⁴

Crippling to the effort at the war’s outset, was the lack of a “Central Intelligence Agency” that assessed and analyzed world events and the military forces of potential adversaries. While America had tremendous success at breaking Japanese codes, after Henry Stimson had inactivated the “American Black Chamber” in the 1920’s, poorly sourced service intelligence bureaus did basic work, assembling gazetteers and maps from open sources, and learning what could be inferred from keen eyed Military, Air, and Naval Attaches in their guided visits among the military by the host nations they were assigned to. Building back to even a basic intelligence capability, became hard during the depression, and fortunately began before 1941.²⁷⁵

While reporting from the war theaters provided updated current events, the total picture of the enemy’s military and economic situation was in large measure, obtained by America from its major ally, England. At the war’s beginning, the British provided a treasure trove of usable intelligence on everything from geography to enemy weapons and doctrine, and provided the expertise and technology for the secret intelligence war in Europe using decryption, deception, and agents.²⁷⁶ While the United States created the Office of Strategic Services working for the White House and JCS, though the Army-Navy intelligence unit at Arlington Hall, Virginia, and the British effort at Bletchley Park, was far more significant both in establishing ways and means for intelligence, and especially in its effective distribution of intelligence to senior headquarters. British intelligence made a significant contribution to the Allied war effort.²⁷⁷

From the beginning, the Victory Program had been created as a “design your own war,” for each service. Each service had provided its needs, but the conceptual understanding of how they would be used was totally absent. While there was recognition of the need to cooperate with allies and to create

²⁷⁴ Gordon Prange and Goldstein and Dillon, *Pearl Harbor: The Final Verdict of History*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1988, Chapter 31 and Appendix 1, *passim*.

²⁷⁵ Possibly the most successful of these was, Colonel Truman Smith who arranged for several visits by Charles Lindbergh, an Air Corps reserve officer, to visit the Luftwaffe, to fly some of its planes, and to visit German aircraft industry. On the enemy side, Minoru Genda, saw the Battle of Britain unfold, as well as studying the British air attack on the Italian Fleet at Taranto, ideas that were included in his planning for the attack on Pearl Harbor. See Henry G. Gole: *Exposing the Reich. Col. Truman Smith Inside Hitler’s Germany*. University Press of Kentucky, 2013.

²⁷⁶ See *British Intelligence in the Second World War series*, 5 volumes, edited by E.F. Hinsley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979-1990.

²⁷⁷ For example, the British provided the majority of topographic maps for the European, African, Middle East, and Burma. They also provided a large number of captured Enemy manuals taken in the first three years of the war, as well as their technical data on enemy equipment and aircraft. Order of battle data was provided by the military intelligence branch. Special intelligence, gathered from signals decrypts were provided extensively.

Combined Headquarters, there were no Joint Service headquarters proposed, and the only real recognition of this was later demonstrated in theaters where the service with the predominant interest commanded, but a senior service headquarters for each other service was present. Of the primary theater headquarters, only MacArthur's was not a joint headquarters. He preferred to issue orders directly to senior naval and air commanders and permitted their staffs to liaise with his staff. While effective, this was not efficient. He also did not establish a Combined Environment, with no allied officers save a liaison officer serving directly within his Headquarters.²⁷⁸

While theater commanders did their best to get along, service policies were tightly controlled from Washington and theater staffs had to bargain with other services for support. The Army Air Forces supported the Army tactically very well, but strategic air power was considered controlled by Arnold at Headquarters, AAF, and he commanded directly as Commanding General, Army Air Forces. The CCS essentially coopted strategic bombing by its issuance of POINTBLANK. Tactical air forces were attached to theater headquarters, but served under operational command rules and served jointly with their equivalent Army headquarters.

The principle that Allied Supreme Commanders received their CCS directives directly through the Service Chief they served under, reinforced division of services. Arnold to some extent, controlled Air Forces' logistics, not Army Service Forces who delivered goods, fuel and bombs, but Air Force end items were ordered, and sent from the Air Forces supply stockage. The Air Force had the most expensive end items except the Navy which ordered thousands of ships.

Service cooperation was the result not only of individual perspectives, but resulted from the nature of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which was a committee with no single head of service deciding on a combined decision. Unanimous decisions were required and were made based on compromise. Grand Strategy was also a product of compromise. National ideas were always blamed for decisions unpopular by either America or Britain, but that distillation of national concerns requiring attention had been listed in ABC-1, a document virtually un-referenced to as the war went on, as new national concerns arose. The airmen believed that bombing should be the predominant force to render the enemy unable to resist, a strategy that cost time and industrial resources second only to ship building. The two "surface forces," the Army and the Navy, reflected the method of war reflecting national experience. Compromise, not a single integrated operational design, was inevitable except in invasions, which were commanded and controlled by an admiral until the ground forces established a primary headquarters ashore, and the admiral released control of the troops to the senior ground commander.

Plan ORANGE remained the most significant case in point. To this day, US naval historians trumpet its superiority without reflecting on the fact that it did not address the war found, as opposed to the war desired. It failed to use the Southwest Pacific area and its two major bases, Australia and New Zealand; failed to plan for a long range bombing of Japan; and it was based on ships that had already been proven to be limited, the ten new battleships and 13 rebuilt battleships that were lugged around by both carrier

²⁷⁸ MacArthur was an anomaly. Despite a bad start, his subsequent operations were both effective and efficient and his personal ability to absorb the principles of modern war, and his personal interface with senior commanders overcame the lack of a combined staff. His allies were not, however, happy. See Australian Official Histories. One senior British general arrived at MacArthur's headquarters as liaison, but he was killed in a kamikaze attack on the ship in which he was "observing" an invasion.

and amphibious task forces. It never stressed the most potent killer of Japanese supplies, the Fleet Submarine, who fought their own war independent of theater war plans.²⁷⁹

The massive logistical cost of the ORANGE plan had prewar estimates for logistics, all of which were obsoleted by the change in naval warfare. Not only did the carrier task force become the center piece for any long range operations of the Fleet, but its accompanying task force dedicated to protecting the carrier, required at sea replenishment for the smaller ships, namely destroyers, which provided both an antiaircraft and antisubmarine screen for the larger ships in contested waters. The amphibious task force, the necessary organization for “island hopping,” required a large sustainment and protection package, as well as a large amount of dry supplies to be offloaded on captured islands to form airfields, the logistical base, and ship repair facilities. An entire sea borne engineer command to construct these bases relied heavily on a massive tonnage of airfield planking, steel for base fuel pods, and mobile hospitals and communications centers. Unheralded in victory, was the massive sea train of support ships that serviced and supplied the ships, and made all operations possible.²⁸⁰

The fact that ORANGE focused on the Central Pacific meant literally capturing a series of “lily pad” bases to extend the fleet’s bases, all providing overwatching air cover over the seas and neutralized Japanese island strongholds. ORANGE had variants to seize the Philippines, but not one which required a northward move from Australia, requiring a separate campaign and additional logistical resources. ORANGE predicted strikes from the sea, but not division and corps-sized military maneuvers from the sea, a technique developed by MacArthur’s forces, not Nimitz’s. While ORANGE and the Southwest Pacific campaign linked logically at Luzon, the additional forces for both theaters eventually involved 27 divisions, 21, in the Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific from the Army, and 6 Marine Divisions dedicated to the South and Central Pacific.

Lacking ports and continental roads and rails, every item originated from the west coast of the United States. Neither the RAINBOW 5 nor Victory Program assumed two almost coequal wars, one in the Europe-Mediterranean, and one in the Central and Southwest Pacific. While Lend Lease, the Air Offensive, and the larger number of divisions sent to the EAME (European-African- Middle East Theaters) required a larger number of ships to deploy and support, the Asiatic-Pacific theaters required virtually twice the turnaround time for each ship. The massive pool of amphibious ships of all sizes dwarfed the number used in Europe. This is demonstrated in the fact that the Central Pacific operation did not move rapidly before late 1943, and the Southwest Pacific before early to mid-1944. Shipping and logistical requirements, had to be solved in order to mount these campaigns.²⁸¹

Air War Plan 1 was created to justify an independent air force, whose power to destroy the enemy’s economy reduced the effect of a powerful air-ground team. The basic strategy of the Allied powers, to encircle and weaken the enemy before a major invasion required a balanced force. Air War

²⁸⁰ Rear Admiral Worrall Reed Carter. *Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil. The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat In the Pacific During World War II.* India: Pravana Books, n.d.

²⁸¹ Coakley and Leighton. *Global Logistics and Strategy 1943-1945*, op. cit., “Part V: The War Against Japan, 1943-1944,” passim. Note the US Army sent 61 divisions plus attachments to the ETO, and 7 divisions to the Mediterranean. The Asiatic Pacific absorbed 27 divisions up till August, 1945. US Army troop strength peaked in ETO at over 3,000,000 in March 1945, and peaked at almost 1.6 million in the Pacific, in September, 1945. See Chart, Army Deployment, in Coakley, *Ibid.* p. 836. See also Appendix F, “Merchant Ships.” Losses of merchant ships and construction is covered in John Ellis, *World War II: A Statistical Survey.*

Plan 1 and its subsequent designs used the bulk of forces to attack the enemy air force and its industry, and only late in its execution did it attack oil, and transportation. It was very late in attacking transportation within Germany, which might have stopped the flow of war goods and made cities unsupportable for living.²⁸²

The high losses suffered by strategic bombing forces were only palatable if huge air fleets reduced loss percentages, not loss numbers. The inability to hit targets and the need for thousands of bombs to smother large areas to guarantee target destruction make the term “precision bombardment” a twisted concept, the parallax view offered by the airmen to justify their force. Not only were increasingly larger formations justified to guarantee destruction of a target, but larger formations made losses lower in percentage if spread over more aircraft sorties.²⁸³

The bomber war fought by the Allies proceeded in definable phases, each characterized by increased sortie and bomb tonnages delivered, and characterized by a more refined selection of targets based on ongoing economic and military analysis. Two characteristics of the daylight bombing campaign converged, the larger numbers of bombers applied to each target, and the increased range of escort fighters appearing in large numbers. These compounded enemy damage on the ground and began the fatal attrition of the German day fighter force. The Germans were forced to commit 800,000 persons to the air defense of Germany, using upwards of 20,000 guns. The massive weight of fire used daily against the Allied air fleets, along with the manning of those guns, constituted the equivalent of another separate campaign.

The airmen shifted to the support of the invasion by pre-landing bombing of the rail systems of France, Belgium and western Germany. After the Normandy campaign, these shifted from theater support back to strategic targets, which focused heavily on oil production and distribution.²⁸⁴

Grand Strategists had decided, right or wrongly, to destroy enemy surface forces by direct attack in their main theater of war. This was the purpose of the large ground army projected by Wedemeyer. Ideological or psychological means or blockade and bombing were abandoned for attrition. The major attrition of the German force was accomplished by brute force in the east. The German force met at even odds in the west, an Allied force that relied most heavily on artillery, infantry attacks supported by tanks, and primarily air interdiction which limited reserve movements in daylight but which never completely isolated the battlefield from its supplies and reserves. Air power was apportioned in dollops, with the air generals avoiding close support in most cases, saying that close support is an artillery function. This meant that overwhelming power was rarely applied to a ground battle and losses in casualties among the defense rarely were higher than the attacker. Only large-scale surrender at the end of the war changed the loss ratios which mostly remained at 1:1 or lower in favor of the German defense during most of the ground campaigns fought.²⁸⁵

²⁸² See the United States Strategic Bombing Survey individual reports, also, USSBS, *Air Attack Effect on the German Economy, 1945*.

²⁸³ *AAF Statistical Analysis, op. cit.; Eighth Air Force Summary of Operations, op. cit., passim.*

²⁸⁴ Craven and Cate, *AAF in WWII, op. cit., Volume III, ARGUMENT to D-Day, passim.*

²⁸⁵ For German losses see Martin K. Sorge. *The Other Price of War. German Military Losses and Civilian Losses Resulting From World War II.* Westwood: Greenwood Press, 1986. For total losses, see Ellis, *Statistical Survey, op. cit.*

Politicians wanted the war to end quickly to prevent psychological breakdown of their populations, and the replacement of democratic governments. This lent to a strategy of a “disassembly” of the German position from all sides as the most favored strategy. It pitted strength against geographic and military weakness in the Mediterranean, and only settled on a direct landing in France when favorable odds were achievable. It also recognized that after five years of war, the UK could not stand more than another year of maximum effort. Britain’s army had no replacements to equalize its losses, and its army was viewed “as a wasting asset,” growing fewer in units as elements were broken up to maintain infantry strength in fewer units. Its airpower was large, but had suffered heavy losses. It had settled on area bombing as the most effective way of dropping production days of German industry, not due to a nonrecognition of key target systems, but as recognition that de-housing millions of workers, turning large urban areas into unlivable rubble, would force a compression of German industry into smaller areas, and lower production.²⁸⁶

The US Army Air Forces was the most expensive of the US armed forces not only in technology cost, production support, and fuel and materials, but in accessing the healthiest, best educated, and most capable men, even as minor technicians. It left the lowest standard men to fight on the surface, to man ships, to fight in or support the ground forces, and to man the essential and near helpless merchant ships. It also suffered a death rate almost as high as the ground forces, though a remarkable number of shot down airmen survived to be prisoners of war.

It is telling that the aircraft replacement requirement theorized for 1944 was 770 four engine bombers per month, a force twice the size of the actual 8th Air Force at any time in the first half of 1943. The airframe endurance rate due to damage and use was far less than the survival rate of aircrews after spring, 1944. Aircrews took a year of comprehensive training from basic flight, gunnery and navigation, to actual commitment as bomb groups or as replacement crews. Infantry was produced in less than six months, four if actual basic and advanced training was counted. Due to lower losses and the lack of replacement crews, the bomber tour for crews was extended in the 8th Air Force from 25 to 35 missions. Most crews returned either to training assignments, or to be retrained as B-29 Superfortress crew members for redeployment to the Pacific.²⁸⁷

POINTBLANK, however, was put on hold from April to September, 1944. This decision resulted from the diversion of bombers to attack transportation targets affecting movement of German reserves and supplies towards the invasion areas. Its temporary replacement, The TRANSPORTATION Plan, reflected the fact that the invasion, scheduled for 1944, had priority over the air campaign, which the air planners now claimed needed six more months of bombing. Without direct air support, this would have relegated the invasion to a 1945 spring date, a delay that was unpalatable to both the Prime Minister and President and all the non-air members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The TRANSPORTATION plan verified, that the invasion was now the center-point for all European operations.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁶ Harris, *Despatch on Bomber Operations*, op. cit., passim.

²⁸⁷ *Army Air Force Statistics passim and Richard G. Davis. Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992. See also, *Reports of General Arnold*, op. cit., passim.

²⁸⁸ See Walt W. Rostow. *Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategy. General Eisenhower’s Decision of March 25, 1944*. Austin: University of Texas, 1981. Gen. Spaatz viewed the invasion as unnecessary and recommended an invasion of Norway to free his bomber force and give the armies a place to liberate using the least diversion of air effort. King who had been forced into a naval commitment for D-Day would have been enraged due to the large diversion

In the American forces, targeting priorities were established by the civilian Committee of Operations Analysts, essentially economists and industrialists who prioritized strike plans to cause industrial bottlenecks and to induce total collapse. They directly advised Gen. Arnold who submitted targets to the CCS to include in Portal's bombing directives. While Bomber Command theoretically was responsive to priorities identified by the Ministry Of Economic Warfare and incorporated into directives by the Director of Bombing at the Air Ministry, Air Marshal Harris exercised the power of choice in most situations and picked area targets that would offer the widest array of industry and housing targets that would give a cumulative effect, and optimize destruction while permitting a lower percentage of loss to permit the survival of his force. During the TRANSPORTATION bombing, these targets were picked by rail experts to create bottlenecks and to cripple major lines of supply.²⁸⁹

Much of the effort used in bombing was wasted. This was especially true in the bombing of the aircraft industry. Germany ran out of pilots primarily due to attrition and lack of gasoline to train; it never ran out of airplanes, the aircraft industry having been both dispersed and placed in underground facilities. Yet oil, a universally essential product, was not attacked in large measure till the summer of 1944, a year after the 8th Air Force began its strikes against the German aircraft industry, and four months after air dominance was obtained by the widespread deployment of long-range escort fighters to attack German fighters, and shield the bomber force from prohibitive losses. The major reason for the lateness in attacking oil, was that Italy had to be developed as a bomber base in late 1943, and the early missions flown from there supported either the isolation of Italy from Germany or the OVERLORD TRANSPORTATION PLAN. The Romanian oil fields were devastated in a month long attack in July, 1944. The Germans had spread their artificial production of oil from coal throughout a large number of plants and these were not prioritized until major air craft plants and some ammunition and vehicle industries had been hit. These were not hit in numbers until late 1944 and early 1945.²⁹⁰

Eisenhower refused to countenance an oil versus transportation plan due to the length of time it would have taken to eat down German oil reserves and the resultant lack of decisiveness it would have had in supporting OVERLORD. Destroying rail would have an impact on slowing the concentration of German reserves against the invasion, an essential consideration for a seaborne force attempting to penetrate against a continental based army.²⁹¹

Much of the destruction and dislocation of German industry was done after the German armies began to fail due to attrition, and being overwhelmed by larger, combat capable forces. Skill and technology which had predominated early in the war in German forces, had been overturned by attrition,

from Pacific operations. Hansell the unreconstructed supporter of bombing, believed that air power was misused in supporting the invasion and the strategic air forces should not have been used, only the two tactical air forces. This was at the insistence of the Supreme Commander General Eisenhower. Neither the Prime Minister nor the President could support denying the Supreme Commander forces he believed necessary to support the invasion. See Allied Expeditionary Air Forces. *Support for Operation Neptune, September, 1944, CARL Digital Library*. Ploesti, the most significant oil source, cost over 220 heavy bombers in no less than 13 raids, most in July, 1944. A month later, Romania fell to the Red Army. See also Strategic Bombing survey study No. 46. *Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Logistics*. Military Analysis Division, November, 1945.

²⁸⁹ Rostow, *Pre-Invasion Bombing*, op. cit.

²⁹⁰ Oil Report, op. cit.

²⁹¹ Eisenhower's decision

exhaustion, and the inability to procure prime manpower, not merely the too young, the too old, and the too limited which predominately filled in the depleted ranks of German units in the last year of the war.

While naval technology took longer to develop, battleships needed more than two years to build, aircraft carriers almost as much, and sailors had to be trained for at least four months before being absorbed into a crew where training never ceased outside of battle.

Modern war required air, ground, maritime and naval forces, as well as the specialized skills of intelligence, logistics and armament to maintain. While Germany failed to adequately develop or employ jets, rockets, and chemical weapons which they introduced, the allies produced only three great technological advances, radar, computers, mainly used for decryption, and atomic weapons which were used only three times, once in testing.

It was the nature of the democratic system to let each service shape its own destiny as long as they supported the Grand Design of the national leaders. Both the President and Prime Minister were hands on decisionmakers approving and often reshaping details of force design, manpower allocations, and looking to create an economy for the total national strategy. Tactics, force design, and general operations were, however, totally in the hands of the professional soldiers, sailors and airmen. In the end, it was the civil leaders who bore the responsibility for the cost of the war, both in blood and treasure. It was also the civilians that shaped a victorious Grand Strategy.

As a result, it can be easily understood that each service would be tasked to do its utmost in their areas, but that each would not be denied its maximum demonstration of capabilities at the expense of other services. The great lesson of World War I was that financial, emotional and manpower exhaustion would topple governments and reduce armies' effectiveness. The democracies sought to end the war before population lethargy set in.

In 1944, not Roosevelt, Stalin or Churchill could afford to wait another year in the hopes that airpower would destroy Germany, and with the introduction of rockets and missiles, that might have been a decision that could have reversed the war, particularly if Germany opted to use nerve agents in warheads against the UK. This was not done out of humanity, but out of belief that retribution would be swifter than victory could be gained. This underlay the need for an immediate invasion, and not a continued bombing campaign aimed solely at destroying the enemy's morale, or its ability to produce war materials.

Finely harmonized, tuned, and skillfully executed operations did not win the war, the sum total of efforts achieving a reasonable effect over time brought collapse. Production did not win alone as claimed, but the loss of skilled manpower to use weapons, could not be discounted as decisive.²⁹² With the announced and apparently unchangeable policy of Unconditional Surrender precluding armistice or surrender (except in the case of Italy whose government was toppled and simply ended its Fascist war), total collapse by invasion, airpower, and maritime supremacy, all the components of a "B" solution were combined. Giving enemies no hope, guaranteed an opponent that would fight until overwhelmed. This was true in the case of Germany, and would have been in Japan, had not the Emperor ordered the population to surrender. The Japanese military government had intended to fight to the end.

²⁹² Philips Payson O'Brien. *How the War Was Won*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Grand Strategy and operational plans were an amalgam of capabilities, with each service participating, but not surrendering primacy except in limited time frames to permit a plan to go forward. The limits of military science, the theory of war, provided only victory or stalemate as alternatives for the leaders, and the massive losses suffered by the populations ruled out anything less than achieving something for the cost, hence the popularity of unconditional surrender and its open field for planners to continue to plan operations until they simply ran out of “red” held areas on their maps.

Despite the innovation and adoption of new techniques and weapons, for the military commanders and staff, the war was reduced to the results of their map exercises at theater and CCS level, not a flash of brilliance to end the war quickly by independent commanders. Theater commanders sent their long-range plans to the CCS for comment and approval. Strategy thus, was a product of high level decisions and only operations were subject to local command.²⁹³

While maritime supremacy was essential, it did not force anyone to surrender, even Japan. Air power can claim its air campaign over Japan, essentially by eradicating cities as dominant, but the fact is that ground overrun in Manchuria, the Philippines, and close islands of Japan, indicated that the war had been lost. Japan retained thousands of aircraft and several million soldiers in the home islands and could have chosen to fight to the end as the Germans had. In Europe, every major area held by the Germans were overrun by ground forces, and Germany fought till it ran out of space.

This author believes that there was virtually no military or moral justification for bombing in Germany after the Rhine had been crossed in March, 1945 and that the bombing of populated areas like Dresden in February of 1945, had no effect in speeding victory on the ground. The “data” gained in adding destruction, sortie rates, and minimal loss rates, however, helped burnish the Strategic Bombing Survey and British Bombing Study, helping to skew their results positively. As such, each target and the date and time it was bombed should be weighed carefully as to its contribution to reducing the enemy’s capability to resist. Doing such, the bombing of oil targets combined with rail systems, seemed to be the greatest contributor to hindering the German war effort.²⁹⁴

Air power might have been more decisive but the campaign timings desired by the CCS and the two heads of state did not recognize that the massive army and navy amassed for the European theater were “supporting” an air plan, but that the air plan was part of the theater command mission despite receiving directives from the CCS. This problem has reappeared in every war America has fought since

²⁹³ Numerous instances of this can be found in the Eisenhower Papers, especially volumes III and IV and also in *The Reports of General MacArthur; The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1963, passim. MacArthur alone of the theater commanders did not have a Joint Staff in his theater. HE dealt directly with his air and commander, and their staffs were free to coordinate with MacArthur’s SWPA staff. He gave broad directives; both his Air and Naval Command had good relations with him. Operations plans show that they were finely coordinated by his subordinate army commanders who maintained close relations with their service counterparts. The sole problem caused due to lack of Unity of Command occurred when Third Fleet operating under Nimitz in Leyte Gulf did not coordinate with Seventh Fleet under SWPA, with dire results for naval elements off San Bernadino Straits. This was the result of Admiral King’s refusal to give Army commanded theaters, Fleet Support. The result was a Fleet commander following a directive from the “Pacific Ocean Areas” command, not the Theater command in which the operation took place.

²⁹⁴ *United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Overall Report. (European War). September 30, 1945*; British Bombing Survey Unit. *Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945, n.d.*

World War I. Air power developed according to plans laid by the airmen, but its use was always in dispute.²⁹⁵

The Royal Air Force claimed it was an “independent service,” though really no service is independent of the other armed forces. This was the aim of the Army Air Forces which traded the creation of tactical air forces to avoid having its bomber force poached upon by the ground army for direct support. This truce was possible due to the massive allocations given to aviation and the cooperation of the Army Chief of Staff who did not interfere in the air force’s empire building nor its theater use. The tactical commanders displayed good cooperation with the Army though the strategic air forces were uniformly hostile to any attempt to tie their operations into a more synchronized campaign.

Naval air power has always been jealously guarded by the Navy and in the Second World War was the prerogative of the Fleet Commander to control. He might be tasked to support an operation but a tightly controlled ground-sea-air battle has always been the result of following strict guidelines as to authority and command and control. In amphibious operations, naval air and gunfire support control parties located with the supported army commander could react to specific requests for fire support. Naval Aerial interdiction of ground targets had to be closely coordinated among multiple command lines. In every case, the personal relations of all concerned made the system work. Without willing cooperation, the system is far too cumbersome to react quickly to opportunities or emergencies.

While the irrelevance of surface forces had been claimed by air enthusiasts, this was not proven to be the case. Air forces became essential for “surface forces,” with both tactical support of ground forces, and air support for surface fleets became essential not only to prevent enemy attacks, but as the long arm of those forces. This did not prevent strategic operations, but strategic operations could not replace the other operations of surface forces. Command and control, the essence of decision, was always a stumbling block in nations that possessed large air arms.

Air, Military, and Naval commanders can learn much from the strategic planning prior to World War II, but the lesson besides coordinating a national effort, is that Grand Strategy is a political art, and it is imperative for governments to decide both why and how strategy is to be determined, and that single service approaches to warfare should be responsive to the theater and national command structure. Moreover, theater contingency plans, essentially the role of the individual color plans, are essential to harmonize a nation’s capabilities and objectives, are needed before a conflict. They must be flexible enough to be modified as executed to meet unforeseen circumstances.

The Army Air Force had produced APWD-42, their own air-gospel inspired war plan which was approved neither by the JCS nor the CCS, but used to create “requirements” for aircraft production, organization of units, and deployment schemes. Amongst themselves, the Army Airmen considered it holy writ, but neither the theater commanders nor OPD considered it binding in any level of strategy.

While creating Eighth Air Force to deploy to the United Kingdom for the strategic bombing of Germany, neither the ETOUSA Commander, first Maj. Gen. Chaney, an airman, nor his replacement, Maj. Gen. Eisenhower, had much hope for an air campaign with only four bomb groups and two fighter groups.

²⁹⁵ Mark Clodfelter. *Beneficial Bombing: The Progressive Foundations of American Airpower, 1917-1945*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010; Tami Davis Biddle. *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare. The Evolution of British and American Idea About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.

Soon, three of the newly arrived bomb groups were reassigned to the newly created Twelfth Air Force, bound for TORCH, and Eisenhower, keeping his ETOUSA hat but gaining the title Supreme Allied Commander, Allied Forces, took “his planes” with him to Africa along with their commander, Maj. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz. This essentially recast the role of the Air War Plan.

Two command channels therefore appeared, one to BOLERO-SICKEL for the UK, and one directly to Algeria or Morocco to support TORCH. Eisenhower commanded both, and had the ability to reinforce one command at the cost of the other. Eventually, Eisenhower relinquished command of the ETO to be Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, and he was followed by Lt. Gen. Frank Andrews, an airman who was killed in an air crash, and then Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, who had commanded the Armored Force in the United States. Eisenhower returned, as Supreme Allied Commander, Allied naval forces had a multiplicity of commands reporting to their higher national levels, and rarely under the theater’s direct command save in the period immediately before invasions.²⁹⁶

Strategy Assessment: The Results of TORCH-Cost, Advantages, and Opportunities

OPD was quick to tally the cost of TORCH as losing the initiative to land in Europe under ROUNDUP. This added to the “US vs Them” attitude of the planners, who following Marshall’s lead were far more interested in overturning the British Mediterranean campaign, that seeking ways to exploit the landings. Moreover, the Combined Commanders Staff at Norfolk House, had already substituted new thinking to explore a new plan to replace ROUNDUP for the Cross Channel attack named SKYSCRAPER that incorporated the lessons of JUBILEE (Dieppe) and up to date intelligence on German defenses along the Atlantic Wall, and the locations of German divisions on the continent. SKYSCRAPER located the invasion in the Baie de la Seine per Paget’s recommendations, and also looked to the development of the Breton Ports and Cherbourg to bring in the bulk of the American divisions, whose follow on formations could deploy directly from the Atlantic. This would later be used in 1944.²⁹⁷

The original drive on Tunis stalled in the mud in late November, 1942, after a rapid advance by a small force. The deployment of American forces disorganized the American order of battle. By deploying regiments piecemeal from each of the American lodgments, a defense was maintained but employed the maximum of transportation that could be spared to send component elements forward to support Anderson’s advance ruled forward deployment. It also essentially “disassembled” American formations into regimental sized groups, that filled in the line as they arrived, not in a pattern designed to reassemble complete divisions. Following the logic of expediency, it was impossible for the far afield War Department to accept as anything less than a British plot. Marshall held Anderson, not Eisenhower or Clark who supervised these moves, as the one responsible.²⁹⁸

TORCH monopolized all the shipping save that used for SICKEL, Lend Lease, and the Pacific. Marshall’s attempts to implement BOLERO at lower scales failed due to shipping losses in the Atlantic and the necessity to maintain campaigns already begun in both oceans. The Atlantic remained the key. While shipping production theorized before the war was now producing maximum rates of Liberty Ships and

²⁹⁶ Forrest C. Pogue. *The Supreme Command*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954.

²⁹⁷ Matloff and Snell, *Coalition Warfare, 1942*, and Matloff, *Coalition Warfare, 1943*. Notes on Cross Channel Strategy.

²⁹⁸ Pogue. *Marshall Interviews, op. cit.*

more escorts and landing craft, the U-boats increased numbers led to higher loss rates, with the resulting loss in supplies to the UK, North Africa, and Russia.

Allied shipping losses in 1942 exceeded 7, 788,000 tons in all theaters with 6, 150, 340 tons being lost in the Atlantic, a total of 1170 ships. Regardless of advances made in Africa and the Pacific, the single overwhelming consideration for all planners remained shipping availability. Simply building ships faster, was not a permanent solution until the U-boat success trends were reversed.²⁹⁹

TORCH provided a realistic and doable strategy for the coalition in 1942. It engaged and stretched the Germans, while gaining time to defeat the U-boat menace, which was a tangible and decisive threat. It also permitted the first use of a newly mobilized citizen force, which used its time in improving tactics and technology, while also selecting a proven command team for the following more decisive campaigns. Having inflicted over 250,000 casualties in irreplaceable losses on the axis, it also drove Italy farther from full participation in the war, while clearing the essential Mediterranean sea avenues needed to support the CBI and China.

Strategy Assessment 2: 1943: the Year of Strategic Adjustment and Organization.

Roosevelt recognized that 1943 would be the year of strategic adjustment, and considered the fall of Italy and the commitment to a 1944 campaign as both necessary military and political victories. Intent on running for a fourth term as President, Roosevelt in 1944 would have landings in France and in the Philippines as symbolic of his war leadership and the approach to World Wide victory. Recognizing the value of maritime and naval power was finally on the rise in 1943; far flung campaigns could now be serviced, troops deployed safely, Lend Lease could be delivered, and the battle line and carrier decks available to the US Navy now grew exponentially. Given the time to mount, to deploy, train, supply and then conduct an assault, the invasion of Europe hoped for in 1943 replete with its 60 divisions plus reserve could not realistically have been conducted until spring of 1944. Likewise, the 40 plus bomber groups and like numbers of long range fighters needed for air superiority were also in combat in 1944, not 1943. The weaker force available in 1943 would have been both outnumbered and overflown by the Luftwaffe in 1943. This was not true in the Mediterranean, but was true in Northwest Europe.

It would seem that the politicians, not the generals were right in their assessments in 1942 and 1943, that not only would forces be available, but Italy would yield vital air fields, the Mediterranean would be cleared for passage to the Far East, the Navies would come through with a winning force over the U-boats, and strategic bombing would yield both air superiority and vital blows to the oil industry. As both the former Navy administrators understood, that shipping would pose “a stranglehold on offensive operations,” a problem that could not fixed without both lowering the sinking rate of merchant ships, as well as increasing the production of liberty ships and other types needed to satisfy transportation needs.³⁰⁰ The defeat of the U-boats in the North Atlantic cleared them from the main convoy routes to the UK, but also reversed their losses decisively. Despite the addition of German boats to the U boat fleet, submarine losses outpaced their building and allied shipping losses fell to record lows while new shipping built rose. Late 1943, therefore permitted the full deployment of BOLERO and SICKEL units to fulfill the intent of the original invasion and air war plans. Eighth Air Force would grow from 300 bombers to 2500

²⁹⁹ *World War II Statistical Summary, op. cit., p. 267.*

³⁰⁰ C.B.A. Behrens. *Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War. Second World War Series.* London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1954. See especially, Chapter XII-XVII.

by spring 1944, and the introduction of long-range fighters would win air superiority over the continent by the Allies in the spring of 1944. All of these victories had been based on the conferences held in 1943.

1943 proved to be the foundation year for Germany First. Africa was liberated and the Mediterranean, was cleared. The U-boats were defeated and withdrew from the North Atlantic, though the bases in the South Atlantic gained in TORCH, helped to close the air gap and made the South Atlantic as deadly for U boats as the North had been. Conferences approved not only OVERLORD, but it laid the groundwork for Italy's defeat, the liberation of Italy and establishment of critical bomber fields to attack the German oil supply directly. The Italian campaign created a base not only to fix two dozen German divisions away from the decisive landings in France, but also the addition of a twelve division French force to the Allied cause. Unconditional surrender was announced, it ideologically fit the American progressive view of all or nothing. China was bolstered with more aid and more aircraft, and the Pacific was given a larger portion of arms, which was tailored to the new arms production and lack of shipping losses. The final Allied victory came at great human cost to every nation involved. Its strategic lessons, however, were very clear. The mobilization and capabilities of the free nations were shaped by the emergency but based on changes to prewar plans, the possession of which provided both the first forces and which greatly determined actions in the first half of the war. Mobilization of manpower and industry, and the use of natural resources to support every plan required early estimates of forces and equipment to be created. From these early production and manpower plans, changes to meet clear challenges were possible, and the final shape given to strategy. It is quite possible, that lacking plans and a two year head start in mobilizing and expanding industry, that the Allies might have lost the war, so great was the aid of Lend Lease, and the eventual force of arms which America finally wielded.

In the end, the British Empire was rent by dissension, and the though it did not survive except as a Commonwealth, nor was the free world that Roosevelt had foreseen achieved either, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990.³⁰¹ This was not a function of the pre-war plans, but developed mainly from the campaigns authorized by the two heads of state, and the Combined Chiefs, which focused on the defeat of Germany, and which left the political determination of states in the hands of the victors that conquered lands. In the case of Eastern Europe, it was Stalin, whose controlled the occupation of the Eastern European nations, and unsurprisingly, did not live up to the hopes and desires of Roosevelt in granting democracy to the areas conquered by the Red Army. Grand Strategy might be easy to conceive, but its operational designs come from intensive analysis of realistic factors. Europe First and the eventual fall of the Japanese Empire may have appeared to be based on unchallengeable logic, as the final victory may attest, but its variances in decision and execution were forced by the reality of all the participants. Each participant, whether Allied or Axis, was forced by their own circumstances, to limited choices, with results gained providing further contingent capabilities to move on to future operations. That each nation chose its own line of operations based on what it perceived to be national interests was expected in coalition warfare. That evaluations of the results are clouded by the same national interests will always sway analysts, uninterested in attempting a cold measure of what was achieved. Without detachment, attempts to find lessons or errors will always diminish what happened to meaningless facts.³⁰²

³⁰¹ Raymond A. Callahan. *Churchill: Retreat from Empire*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, Inc, 1984.

³⁰² The *Churchill Documents* and Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence, as well as the official histories on Grand Strategy, and Logistics and Coalition War published by both the United States and Great Britain both document

and dispel any illusions on the actual conduct of the war by the Heads of state and their senior military commanders. These are an essential corrective to biographies whose focus is outward from the point of view of an individual and also dispel some of the “controversies and arguments” stressed by national historians. Recommended also is the extraordinary, *Stalin’s War* by Sean McMeekin which provides a critical look at Stalin and his relationship with the Allies. No one doubts that Russia was the prime contributor in the destruction of German military power, and permitted the western allies to endure a prolonged campaign using fewer troops and suffering fewer casualties than the Red Army and Russia’s population. Japan likewise had its army fly-trapped in Asia, though the efforts of the US navy’s submarines and carriers permitted it to be cut off from its resources. The relative roles of Burma, China, and the Central and Southwest Pacific axes, like the allied campaigns in Western Europe and the Mediterranean continue to be controversial mainly by exponents of naval or air power. These two can only be studied by a detailed study of the Official History as a basis as well as a critical analysis of the Strategic Bombing Survey individual studies.