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American Operational Planning and Its Pre-War Basis

Roger Cirillo, PhD

Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, Retired

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On September 2, 1945, the Japanese Empire surrendered unconditionally to the Allied Powers, represented by an array of military representatives. Formed informally in a massive L-shaped group, they faced the delegates from the defeated government and armed forces of Japan. Representing the powers that fought Japan, was an Allied Supreme Commander appointed to take the surrender and to preside over the occupation of Japan, as well as the surrender of her armed forces and their return from the mainland of Asia, and from numerous localities in the Far East and Pacific areas. He was an American, as were most of the officers present, with a representative sprinkling of Australian, British, Canadian, Chinese, Dutch, French, New Zealand, and Russian emissaries in attendance. Held on the deck of the battleship Missouri, and surrounded by the American fleet, and overflowed by hundreds of American aircraft, the ceremony was a symbol of American power and victory.

Many Americans considered the Pacific victory to be America's, and tended to overlook the roles played by millions of others to include the Chinese and Russians. China had been locked in combat since 1937, and the Russians entered the war at the first week of August, at America's request. Still the naval and air victories were overwhelmingly American, and the final destruction wreaked on Japan was the product of American bombing, including the use of two atomic bombs.¹

The war path to Tokyo Bay was the result of Japan refusing to abandon her Imperial expansion, and the acquisition of raw materials and oil, not by trade which had been previously the case, but by direct military conquest. She had no choice. All her oil and rubber supplies were eliminated by embargoes designed to modify her aims. While the nations involved had begun the war in the Pacific based on their own policies, the war was fought following basic concepts drawn before hostilities began. These plans included not only a war in the Pacific, but a war that had already engulfed Europe, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean and North African littoral, and had spread deep into Russia and Central and Southern Europe.

¹ American history books tend to ignore the war in the Far East fought by the Chinese and British Commonwealth. These books reduce the war into MacArthur's Southwest Pacific campaign, or Nimitz's Naval and Marine advance across the Central Pacific and ignore or minimize the British, Chinese, Indian and Russian contributions in fighting the Japanese. The near destruction of the Kwantung Army and the entry of Russia into the war and its part in the Potsdam Declaration, was a significant factor in Japan's decision to surrender, a factor totally ignored by many Americans. See, "Japanese-Russia Campaigns," Oxford Guide to World War II, I. C. B. Dear, editor. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 499-501.

The Great European War of 1914-1918 had reordered Empires, ending the rule of the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, ending the Kaiser's reign in favor of an elected government, and eliminating Germany's colonies in Africa and the Pacific. A revolution in Russia ended the Romanov Czar's rule with Communism as its replacement. In the ensuing two decades, Fascism rose in Italy and Spain, Nazism in Germany, and Japan fell under the control of militarists. A world depression enduring throughout the 1930's, reordered the financial strength of the British and French Empires, and left America isolationist, financially devastated, and the half-hearted occupant of possessions in the Pacific, the Far East, and the Caribbean. Additionally, it had a "treaty force" in China that dated to the Boxer Rebellion.²

American military strength shrank dramatically after the Great War. The Army during the early 1930's, ranked seventeenth in the world in size, was armed primarily with weapons left from the Great War, and its burgeoning Air Corps though always the recipient of the bulk of the army's developmental money for new weapons, was small. By the mid-1930's, its Air Corps sank its money into the development of two four engine bombers, with ranges up to 3000 miles and bomb loads exceeding 5-6000 lbs. Short ranged fighter interceptors were developed, but none could compete favorably with the more modern British and German models of the late 1930's. The Air Corps had embraced the idea of the self-defending bomber as the key to its strategic bombing theory.³

America had championed the Naval Treaties of 1922 and 1930 that shrank the battle lines of the major powers, and which limited submarines in the former German Navy. No new battleships entered the US Navy for twenty years, though five aircraft carriers joined the converted collier Langley which pioneered naval aviation in the United States. While the tiny Marine Corps conducted counter insurgencies in Central America at the behest of American economic interests, America had a maritime strategy based on an aging, obsolescent battle line based on the West Coast, and no plans or forces committed to protecting America's merchant fleet. It considered the destruction of any enemy's fleet as its primary strategic goal and the protection of overseas possessions a matter defined by supremacy at sea.⁴

American politicians sought disarmament as a way to limit defense costs. America had no defense general staff and its Army and Navy had been jointly responsible for long term planning under the individual Secretaries of War and the Navy, both who acted as heads of those services under the President who is Commander-in-Chief. Following the near debacle in mobilization and planning during the War with Spain in 1898, the Army and Navy Joint Board was created with four members from each of the two services, including the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations. They met infrequently to propose policies and present outline plans for possible emergencies, though their recommendations were subject to approval of either the President or the Service Secretaries. These "plans" were the basis

² America's non-continental possessions were the Hawaiian Islands, Wake, and Midway Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the Philippines, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, the Panama Canal Zone, and Alaska. Alaska was purchased and the remainder came from war gains or annexation and Mandates under the Versailles treaty.

³ Mauer Mauer. *Aviation in the U.S. Army 1919-1939*. Washington: Air Force Historical Program, 1987: "War Department Fiscal Expenditures, 1775-1948," in *Army Almanac: Government Printing Office, 1950, p. 693*.

⁴ *US Navy At War. 1941-1945. Official Reports by Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N.* Washington: U.S. Navy Department, 1946, pp. 4-30.

for operational plans, though most were never developed into actual service plans that assigned specific forces and tasks.⁵

President Wilson forbade “War Planning” prior to America’s entry into World War I, but the undermanned, and less than fifteen-year-old Army General Staff and its naval counterpart cooperated ineffectively, as both grappled with modern technological war with aircraft, machineguns, motorization, tanks, and submarines.⁶

With war’s end, great strides were made in reorganizing each service, especially the Army, with permanence given to aviation, the tank corps, and a centralized approach to Reserves and the National Guard. What legislation did not do, was create a Joint Staff. This left the coordination of national defense between the cooperation of the War and Navy Departments, with separate plans having to be approved for each. The surfeit of weapons left to be stored convinced Congress that no new weapons needed to be purchased, and development while essential, could be paced to lower budget priorities as no threats to the nation were seeable in the future. America had reneged on its international responsibilities, refused to ratify the League of Nations, and grew more isolationist than internationalist in its politics and beliefs.

While war planning was overseen by the Army-Navy Joint Board, war in Europe in 1939 quickly split the services in their priorities. The Army sought to support US policy as then pronounced, while the Navy looked ahead to Japanese aggression and repeatedly downplayed the primacy of Hemisphere Defense falling back on the results of past annual fleet problems based on the defense of the Panama Canal Zone or a simulated advance to contact across the Central Pacific.⁷

The Naval Limitations treaties restricted naval competition and a niggardly Congress refused even to build a fleet to match its Treaty-authorized strength in the decades after World War I. The treaties limited Japan to three-fifths the tonnage and battle line of each authorized to the Americans and British, an insult to Japanese militarists, and a guarantee that in a war with either or both, the Japanese would begin at a great naval disadvantage.⁸

The US Army fared worse even without an international disarmament treaty. It shrank in size and was forced to ignore modernization including general motorization, based on diminishing budgets. The army held the belief that a trained army using old weapons is better than sacrificing forces to design and upgrade a continually diminishing force lacking the size to provide a cadre for a national mobilization in time of emergency. Training of officers for staff and command, and developing a body of

⁵ Note the Air Corps was then part of the Army, and the Marine Corps has always been part of the Navy Department. For war planning background, see Steven T. Ross. *American War Plans. 1941-1945*. London: Frank Cass, 1997, pp. xiii-xx; see also Mark S. Watson. *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*. Washington: Chief of Military History, 1950, Chapter III, “The General Staff: Its Origin and Powers.”

⁶ The US Army has no permanently assigned officers to a “General Staff Corps,” but details officers from various branches to duty either as “General Staff with Troops,” or the “Army Staff”. Washington assignments to the General Staff are traditionally limited to five years, with exceptions made for the Chief of Staff, Vice Chief, and certain members made by Congress on an individual exception basis.

⁷ Albert A. Nofi. *To Train the Fleet For War. U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923-1940*. New port: Naval War College Press, 2010; Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild. *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*. Washington: Office of Chief of Military History, 1960; Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engleman, Byron Fairchild. *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964.

⁸ See U.S. Navy at War, PLATE 1, for a graphic depiction of the Navy’s lack of shipping which had fallen far below Treaty Authorizations by type and tonnage.

noncommissioned officers was seen as the great deficiency of America's 1917-1918 Army. These could be addressed only by maintaining forces to train, and by assigning selected officers to repetitive school assignments at increasingly higher levels of study.

The Army's role was primarily Continental Defense, which included manning coastal batteries around America's major ports, patrol of the Mexican border, and garrisoning overseas possessions, primarily Hawaii and the Philippines. Defense of the Panama Canal was a major mission for the Army, which maintained coastal and air defense batteries there, and a small ground garrison. An understrength regiment served in China, based on international agreements stemming from the Chinese Boxer Rebellion.

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Aviation was an international fixation, a belief granting the Army Air Corps both funding and at least verbal support. While the aviators wanted "independence" from the Army, both the cost of creating a separate service with all its support structure, and the true role of the airplane as a weapon of war, were both still hotly debated. Of the major nations, only America and Japan retained both Army and Naval aviation, and while those subservices acquired both advanced aircraft and skills, the belief that they could be anything but a supporting arm for surface forces was easily disputable due to the technical limitations of aircraft in existence.

Claims made in air doctrine were "visionary" and often technically unachievable. The Navy managed to maintain that aircraft were a part of naval warfare; the Army Air Corps disputed that the airplane was part of ground warfare, but claimed it was an independent capability that should be aimed at the enemy's heartland. It nevertheless maintained aircraft for "observation and attack," that would be dedicated to ground force support.¹⁰

The American military view of its future was divided sharply by service responsibilities and prejudices. The Army-Navy Board had numerous "Color Plans" maintained as contingencies against war with major powers. These were all defensive in nature. Major nations, including England, had colors assigned to designate them as the subject "enemy." Geography and potential threats lay at their root. These plans were created based on correlating major forces and without regard to perceived intent. The belief was simply that America had to match and prevail against the largest military powers in the world, nearly all of whom were former allies.

No plan to fight France, America's oldest ally, apparently was drawn. Plan BLACK, a dusted off plan to counter a German threat to Mexico and the southwest, concerned the large number of posts on the Mexican border, kept there to prevent border excursions from the 1880s according to Plan GREEN, a war with Mexico. Plan RED, a theoretical war with Britain based on Britain's naval supremacy as being a potential threat, involved primarily naval engagements and if necessary, an invasion of Canada to seize her Atlantic coast. While some plans such as RED were cancelled or shelved in the 1930's, America's possession of the Philippines, due to be granted independence in 1946, was seen as a magnet for Japanese

⁹ John Jordan. *Warships After Washington. The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930*. Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 2011. For the problems of the Army and its philosophy of modernization. See Annual Reports of Chief of Staff, 1931-1935, in *MacArthur on War*. Frank C. Waldrop. New York: Duell, Sloane and Pearce, 1942, pp. 34-307.

¹⁰ *Mauer Mauer, Army Air Service, op. cit., passim.*

aggression. Thus, Plan ORANGE, a war with Japan, was seen as most probable, but was viewed differently by the two major services, the Army and the Navy.¹¹

Plan ORANGE sacrificed the Army Philippine garrison to a siege and holding Manila Bay, not holding any other posts in the Philippines. The Navy deploying from the west coast, was to mount a counteroffensive. Two variants existed at one time or another. One was a bold thrust to deter and destroy Japan's fleet expected to be operating from the central Mandate islands of the Marshalls, or a more methodical island seizing campaign to gain forward bases, and provide for a sustained advance. This included carrying a large Army-supplied expeditionary force, and ended in a Super-Jutland type naval battle. No invasion of Japan or even sustained blockade of Japan was envisioned to gain victory from Japan. The ORANGE war was conceived as requiring two or more years to gain victory, primarily based on the mobilization and shipment of large forces to capture island bases to sustain the fleet. The bombing of Japan was never envisioned during the interwar. The large "Fleet Train" of oilers and supply and maintenance ships to support either offensive, were in short supply and were unfunded to maintain the large battle line.¹²

The Navy embraced ORANGE, practiced it in large floor-model war games, and used its basic tenets to support annual Fleet Exercises, several of which used Pearl Harbor as its designated game target. The requirements of ORANGE also justified the Fleet, identified the type ships needed, and dominated naval tactical thinking. While the Army had residual responsibility for defending Hawaii and the Philippines, the Army was a junior planner in ORANGE as all transportation of its air and ground elements were based on naval operational plans.¹³

The Army, apart from its role in ORANGE, had a prime responsibility for Continental Defense. Its mobilization of an "expeditionary force," was to fight a continental type war in an area that would be defined by a future emergency. Its Air Corps, taught the role of strategic bombardment at its Tactical School, and preached the capability to destroy any modern economy, using New York City as its "theoretical target" and proof that heavy bombers would destroy a nation's capability to fight a war. No target folders existed for foreign targets, and apart from the study of aviation used in Spain, Ethiopia, and China, no real military lessons could be applied beyond those learned in World War I.¹⁴

The Army meanwhile had prime interest in "Hemispheric Defense," any intrusion by a foreign power against the American tenet of the Monroe Doctrine, that is, the prevention of foreign incursions into North and South America. These concerns were acted on in 1938, by a detailed study tasked to the Army War College for the requirements needed to protect Venezuela. Pro-fascist or Nazi communes were seen as possible to be installed in Argentina or Brazil, and these would require containment. These plans required not only garrisons to defend key points, but defensive counterattacks if necessary. Heavily included in such plans, would be the four engine and two engine bombers of the Air Corps, which could attack enemy fleets at sea, though the US Navy worked hard to get the Army to deny its antishipping capability by gaining agreements that would limit the distance at which bombers could operate over

¹¹ Ross, *American War Plans*, op. cit., pp. 1-19; Watson, *Chief of Staff, Prewar*, op. cit., passim.

¹² Edward S. Miller. *War Plan ORANGE: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945*. Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1991, passim.

¹³ John M. Lillard. *Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Naval Preparations for World War II*. Nebraska: Potomac Books, 2016, passim and Nolfi, *To train the Fleet*, op. cit., passim.

¹⁴ *Lectures of the Air Corps Tactical School and American Strategic Bombing in World War II*. Edited by Phil Haun. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2019. Passim.

water. Despite the fact that its prime 4 engine bombers used the navy's developed Norden Bombsight, Army bombers never practiced bombing ships underway as a target.¹⁵

The onset of World War II changed these plans and provided a focus for future operations. The President declared a State of National Emergency in September 1939 following the invasion of Poland, and the Joint Board had already begun their abandonment of most of the Color plans for new strategic concepts resulting from their perception of international threats.¹⁶ These new plans were drafted sequentially and called the RAINBOW Plans to reflect their combination of multinational concerns, not pertaining to a sole course of action, and were promulgated in July, 1939, before war clouds covered Europe.¹⁷

As a result, these outline statements of probable danger revolved around the major threats to democracy, primarily from the members of the Axis powers, which would be most threatening in a future confrontation. During 1938 and early 1939, the Joint Board agreed upon a list of potential threats requiring outline plans, as well as a shift in priorities which had solely been concerned with the ORANGE Plan. As published in June, 1939, these were with their major tenets:

RAINBOW 1: "[to] *Prevent the violation of the letter or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine by protecting that territory of the Western Hemisphere from which the vital interests of the United States can be threatened, while protecting the United States, its possessions and its sea-borne trade....*"

RAINBOW 2: Provided for missions listed in RAINBOW 1, and "*Acting under the assumption that the United States, Great Britain, and France are acting in concert, on terms where the United States does not provide maximum participation in Continental Europe, but undertakes as its major share in the concerted effort, to sustain the interests of Democratic Powers in the Pacific, to provide for the tasks to sustain these interests, and to defeat enemy forces in the Pacific.*"

RAINBOW 3: Carry out the missions of RAINBOW 1; [and to] "*Protect United States' vital interests in the Western Pacific by securing control in1 the Western Pacific...*"

RAINBOW 4: [and to]" *Prevent the violation of the letter and spirit of the Monroe Doctrine by protecting all the governments of the Western Hemisphere against external aggression....*"

RAINBOW 5: To follow provisions of RAINBOW 1, and "*Project the armed forces of the United States to the Eastern Atlantic and to either or both the African or European Continents.....in order to effect the decisive defeat of Germany, or Italy, or both. This plan will assume concerted action between the United States, Great Britain, and France.*"¹⁸

Characteristically, President Roosevelt did not sign or officially acknowledge these plans. They were signed by his Secretaries of War and the Navy. While two plans heavily endorsed Western Hemisphere Defense, two laid the path for an ORANGE war per navy plans. Only RAINBOW 5, named Germany and Italy as potential enemies in the Atlantic-Africa-European zones.

¹⁵The interception of the Italian liner Rex, 757 miles off the coast of Central America was often cited as proof that heavy bombers could defend America's shore. The navigator for that mission, was Lt. Curtis E. LeMay, whose bombers in World War II, destroyed 66 Japanese cities.

¹⁶ David Kahn. "*United States Views of Germany and Japan in 1941,*" in *Knowing One's Enemies. Intelligence Estimates Before the Two World Wars*, Ernest R. May, editor. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 476-501, passim.

¹⁷ Watson, *Chief of Staff, Prewar*, op. cit., pp. 103-104.

¹⁸ Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning, 1941-1943*, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

While ORANGE gained emotional prominence due to the war in China, the Army had been forbidden by both the Secretary of War and Congress from adding forces or fortifications to the Philippines, though after 1940, Hawaii did receive upgrades in antiaircraft, aviation, and coastal defenses. The Philippines was seen as doomed in a war, and any attempt to defend the islands was futile without a heavy reinforcement of the garrison and a large addition to the Asiatic Squadron, a task that the Navy denied was possible. While training of the Philippine militia proceeded, no change in her defense status was seen until mid-1941.¹⁹

In 1940, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill exchanged military missions between America and Britain. The American Special Observers Group sent to London in the summer of 1940 obtained detailed information about the air war raging over England, as well as current military information that increased American intelligence knowledge of the Germans. Additionally, the Observer's Group obtained detailed information from the British on military materials and products desperately needed that would form the basis for later purchase, though the British Military Mission in Washington was the official channel for requesting aid. The US Observers essentially became both intelligence collectors and endorsers of Britain's needs as well as her ability to hold out.²⁰

While the attack on Pearl Harbor is normally considered by Americans to have triggered the war, the fact is that America had already coordinated a war strategy with its main ally, England, and was not an unexpectant victim. War had already come to Western Europe, and China had been at war with Japan since 1937, though it had lost Manchuria to Japan in 1931. With France defeated and occupied, and eastern Europe under German attack, and England's Mediterranean possessions under attack primarily by Italy, the American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, felt that America could not avoid entering the war and supporting England. He stressed, however, that he would never declare war, but would "wage war," by granting assistance, and awaiting the Axis to attack America.²¹

President Roosevelt leaned heavily towards supporting England, and prompted by the fall of France, became more active in providing war aid to England by obtaining legislation to bypass the Neutrality Laws and support her with war supplies---the Lend Lease act. He then called for America's first peacetime conscription, the Selective Service Act to build a large cadre of trained personnel. Besides expanding the authorized size of each service, he federalized the 18 Divisions of the National Guard for one year of training, and passed the Two Ocean Navy Act, the first peacetime naval construction act aimed at providing a sizable fleet in both the Pacific and Atlantic. Keels were laid for a modern battle line to replace the World War I dreadnoughts, as well as more modern aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers. By mid-1941, Roosevelt transferred fifty retired destroyers of Great War vintage to England which was

¹⁹ Louis A. Morton. *The Fall of the Philippines*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1952, Chapters 2 and 3; Watson, *Chief of Staff Prewar*, op. cit., Chapter XIII.

²⁰ MS, Center of Military History archive, *Administrative and Logistical History of the European Theater of Operations. Part II. Organization and Command in the European Theater of Operations. Volume 1. Military Observer's Group and ETO*. Historical Section, US Army Forces, European theater, (USFET), 1946, Chapter 1. Heritage of Special Observers and US Army in British Isles.

²¹ *Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence. 3 Volumes*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Roosevelt had initiated this correspondence while Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty. In it, Churchill both asked for assistance and attempted to get Roosevelt's commitment to war. Roosevelt refused, but offered aid short of war. He said America could fight if attacked and committed America to a course that would indicate that neither Germany nor Japan could count on America staying out of the war. This was a continuing theme in the correspondence until December, 1941.

desperate for convoy escorts in return for long term leases on bases in the Caribbean and North Atlantic. The bulk of the ships in his "Two Ocean Navy," would not see its largest ships start coming down the ways until late 1942 or 1943.²²

Throughout 1940, the world situation and continuing meetings of the Joint Board analyzed the world situation, as well as holding meetings with the President who was frank in his support of the British war effort. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, assessed the world situation believing that the United States would be forced to fight in both oceans, against both Germany, and Italy in the Atlantic theaters, and the Japanese in the Pacific. With Roosevelt pressing the Japanese to withdraw from China, he saw a naval showdown in the Pacific as logical, but with American aid for Britain, he had no doubts that Germany would seek war to fight in the open. General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff agreed.²³

Stark's recommendation to the President, and to the Joint Board, was agreed by the principals concerned. In the case of a war against the axis powers, Europe would be considered the primary theater, and the Pacific would be fought initially from a defensive stance. This added Japan to the RAINBOW 5 contingency and posited the idea of "a Two Ocean war."²⁴ "Europe first" immediately affected the Navy. It meant that not only would an augmentation of the Atlantic squadron be made giving it full Fleet status, but that American troops would fight overseas against either German or Italian forces. In 1940, the creation of an expeditionary force was a major task, exactly where it would be employed was unknown.

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In 1941, Roosevelt divided the "United States Fleet" into three fleets, Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic, doing some cross leveling while the new construction gained from the Two Ocean Navy bill and crews became available under Navy manpower expansion. While the Pacific fleet remained the largest, it forward deployed from San Diego to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, as a counterweight to Japanese moves in Asia. The Asiatic Fleet based in the Philippines, gained cruisers and submarines to its former squadron size, giving a force of 2 cruisers, 13 destroyers and 17 submarines, only 11 of which were modern boats. The Atlantic Fleet gained 3 battleships, 3 carriers and 51 modern destroyers and 30 older destroyers aimed at influencing Germany. The main force, 9 battleships, 3 carriers, 16 cruisers, 41 destroyers, and 32 modern submarines, plus 6 older boats, were kept in readiness against a Japanese threat in the Pacific Fleet.²⁶

The Selective Service Act, and the Federalization for training of the National Guard gave the army nominally nearly thirty divisions, but all were in need of organization, supply, and training. The burgeoning Air Corps flexed to a strength of 151,125, and aimed to have 67 groups by the end of 1941.²⁷

²² *Selective Service, United States*, OXFORD Digest of World War II, op. cit., p. 775 and also "USA" pp. 919-942 detailing US preparations, military status and economy.

²³ "Plan Dog, November 12, 1940," in U.S. War Plans 1938-1945. Steven T. Ross, editor. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002, pp. 55-66.

²⁴ "RAINBOW 5, Revised, November 19, 1941" in *American War Plans*, op. cit., pp. 135-160.

²⁵ Louis Morton. "Germany First: The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War II," in *Command Decisions*, Kent Roberts Greenfield editor, Washington: Center of Military History, 1987, pp. 1-48.

²⁶ Admiral King's Report, *US Navy at War. Reports Of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King*. Washington: Navy Department, 1946; Ibid. plus "Principal Disposition of US Naval Forces" Chart, July 1941, Miller, *War Plan ORANGE*, p. 278.

²⁷ *Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, World War II*. Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 1945, p.15. See also "First Report of the Commanding General Army Air Forces to the Secretary of War, Gen. H.H. Arnold, January 4, 1944 in

From January to March, 1941, designated Army, Air, and Naval leaders from both the United States and Britain met to agree to a common concept for a fighting a world war as allies. By this time, no senior American officer believed that America could avoid entering the war. The major unknowns were how and when. In this mindset, ABC-1, the American British Staff Conversations, provided a prescriptive list of concepts, forces, and defined areas of interests upon which planning and command could be based. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister signed the final report. RAINBOW 5, the basic strategy followed that would undergo a detailed revision to reflect war against the major Axis powers.²⁸

ABC-1 as a foundational document was crucial. ABC-1 was attended by nine senior American war planners and five British planners. They had been given detailed written instructions on the parameters of U.S. intentions by President Roosevelt, and likewise had been backed by detailed policies by the British War Cabinet. The ABC-1 Report details their instructions and explains their findings:

- (a.) *“To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and British Commonwealth, with its present Allies, could defeat Germany and the Powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.*
- (b.) *To coordinate on broad lines, plans for the employment of the forces of the Associated Powers.*
- (c.) *To reach agreement concerning the methods and nature of Military Cooperation between the two nations, including the allocation of the principal areas of responsibility, the major lines of Military strategy [to be} and forces which each may be able to commit, and the determination of satisfactory command arrangements, both as to unify of field command in cases of strategic or tactical joint operations.”²⁹*
- (d.) ABC-1 specified areas of paramount interest to both America and Britain, and admonished that each would provide forces and actions including the assistance of US Naval Forces in maintaining the sea lines of communications to the United Kingdom through Atlantic waters on her northwestern approaches. Noteworthy is the comment that, *“It will be of great importance to maintain the present British and Allied position in the Mediterranean basins, and to prevent the spread of Axis control in North Africa.”* It further specified that, *“The principal defensive roles of land forces of the Associated Powers will be to hold the British Isles against invasion; to defend the Western Hemisphere; and to protect outlying Military Base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack.”* As a key component of this strategy it noted, *“United States Army air bombardment units will operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against German Military power at its source.”³⁰*
- (e.) The planners designated a policy for strategic command of overall forces operating in an area of special interest. These specified that each country’s own forces would remain under their own national command, though overall command of all forces operating in specified areas

War Reports, op. cit., pp. 300-354. Neither the Navy nor Marine Corps received personnel from the draft until later in the war, and increased in size from voluntary enlistments, many to avoid being drafted into the Army.

²⁸ *“United States-British Staff Report, ABC-1, March 27, 1941, in American War Plans, pp. 101; Chief of Staff Prewar Plans, pp. 370-375.* See also RAINBOW 5, which was formally modified after ABC-1, though Stark had recommended its provision to include all Axis powers in December and these provisions were added to the guidance given to the members of the ABC-1 committee.

²⁹ *U.S. War Plans, 1938-1945, op. cit., pp. 67-68; Mark S. Watson. Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans, op. cit., pp. 367-377.*

³⁰ *Op. cit., pp. 79-80.*

will be under strategic direction of the power designated by specific agreements³¹ While military intelligence was to be shared, the Joint Military Mission of the British would coordinate directly with the United States in Washington, DC. Specific military areas were designated by latitude and longitude and estimates of forces needed for these were drawn up. These areas divided the Atlantic, Pacific, Far East, Australia and New Zealand areas, and the Mediterranean and Middle East along with the forces required to operate in each.³²

The combined group decided upon priorities and forces needed for a war on multiple fronts, and had divided the world into areas of prime concern for command purposes. With Selective Service and the mobilization of the National Guard, the Americans in essence, had already begun to both mobilize and place itself on war status, giving immediacy that a compatible strategy was already in motion. America's actions in fact, convinced Japan to strike America. Also, Hitler had already decided that Roosevelt's violation of America's own Neutrality Laws and its frenetic attempts to provoke German reactions by extending the limits of their "Neutrality Patrols" escorting British convoys, had determined that Germany would have to fight the United States which was no mere bystander, but a participant already most of the way through the war's portals. Japan's attack, and Germany's Declaration of War, were neither strategic surprises, nor illogical in their reality. Both felt that engaging the US before she was fully mobilized and armed, outweighed the risk of early commitment.

American policy was carefully steered by the President, who often circumvented his own State Department organization by using his personal representative, Harry Hopkins, as an emissary, and also bypassing his own Secretary of State, in favor of Sumner Welles or others, who could do his bidding. Most influential was the President's self-initiated correspondence with the then British First Lord of the Admiralty of Britain, Winston Churchill, who became Prime Minister in May, 1940. This began in September, 1939, only a week after Britain had declared war on Germany.³³

With the approval of his Prime Minister, Churchill bared some of the War Cabinet's inner thoughts and needs, and Roosevelt responded with both encouragement and promises of aid. By the end of 1940, then Prime Minister Churchill counted more heavily on America's entry into the war, and both governments coordinated their views of a Grand Strategy, and began formal planning towards a coordinated Grand Strategy. This correspondence reacted to events stating policy options and granting a shared understanding of each other's concerns that the military leaders often failed to develop in meetings. Their messages, sometimes several daily, continued throughout the war.

Both men had been cabinet ministers in the first war and had seen the military leaders run roughshod over governments whose policy was no more astute than 'go win.' They obviously vowed this would not again happen. Churchill had seen the fallibility of the Supreme War Council, and he intended to hold the reins tighter which was a factor that already ruled Roosevelt's control of policy. While World War I often seemed to be a war steered by military decisions, World War II would be one shaped by the heads of government.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Op. cit. pp, 80-99.

³³ *Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence. 3 volumes.* Warren F. Kimball editor. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

With the two heads of state, there is an interesting difference in authority. As Prime Minister and self-appointed Defense Minister, Churchill wielded great authority, but it was not that of a dictator. He had to obey the rulings of the War Cabinet and therefore, Churchill conducted an endless oratory and harangue, to air his thoughts and gain consensus. He often aired ideas as “trial balloons,” and wanted every side of a course of action aired and debated. He was not the final authority except in those military affairs he oversaw as Defense Minister. His own military Chief of Staff noted, “Not once during the whole war, did he overrule his military advisers on a purely military question.”³⁴

Roosevelt, by tradition and Constitution, was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces with untrammelled authority except that forbidden by law. He was comfortable in the job, and had watched Wilson close up in the Great War, and had learned what not to do. He was the sole arbiter and decider of Foreign Policy, and held few cabinet meetings and rarely yielded to counsel on things he felt strongly about. He overrode the service chiefs on a number of matters during the war, and established primacy early on.³⁵ Roosevelt’s critical and cranky cousin, Alice Roosevelt Longworth, Teddy’s daughter, tagged his Presidential style best according to his numerous critics, “Fuhrer, Duce, Roosevelt.”³⁶

The American federal government expanded in authority and coordination of national effort in World War I, and this manner of centralized bureaucracy, was increased during the depression under Franklin Roosevelt, who sought federal control over domestic issues. This expanded further to cover the mobilization for war, by the control of finances, raw materials, and industry which in essence had taken over to produce war materials. Britain had done this far more effectively as its war experience was far longer and spread over multiple theaters than the American war effort which needed both foreign weapons and shipping for it to deploy its half trained army to France in World War I. Roosevelt prevented this situation from repeating in World War II.

In World War I, Churchill had been First Lord of the Admiralty, Minister for Munitions, and Secretary of State for air for the new RAF, and had seen how the war was managed. He also spent some time in the trenches as an Army battalion commander. Roosevelt had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy for a Secretary who essentially had Roosevelt run the Navy. Thus, both had extensive government experience in a World War. Besides presiding when he wanted to, over a wide variety of committees, Roosevelt had a far more informal use of a cabinet, but a very hands on interest in the war, particularly in the naval aspects where for the first three terms of his presidency he had selected senior admirals and took an intensive interest in shipbuilding programs.

Both men were extremely sensitive to manpower issues as both the industrial and economic health of the nation depended upon ensuring industry was not affected in their productivity by shortages of workers. Women were employed extensively to free men to fight, though American agriculture did not use the woman power Britain did in their “Land Army,” that had greatly increased the amount of land under cultivation to free up shipping space for war goods. Both leaders were sensitive to national morale, having seen both Germany and Russia collapse internally to different extents, and both sought popular

³⁴ Lord Ismay quoted in Roger Parkinson. *Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat. From Dunkirk to Alamein—The Inside Story Based on the Hitherto Secret British Cabinet Papers.* New York: David McKay Company, Inc. 1973, p. 6.

³⁵ Kent Roberts Greenfield *American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration.* Malabar, Florida: Kreiger Publishing Company, 1982, pp. 80-84, passim.

³⁶ Marc Wortman. *1941: Fighting the Shadow War. A Divided America in a World War.* New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2016, p. 87.

support, particularly of labor unions. Britain, longer in the war, and under bombardment and blockade since 1940, was both a greater physical and moral challenge to lead and motivate, and Churchill was sensitive to this making frequent visits to bombed areas and also visiting the armed forces. Roosevelt, limited by physical disabilities, used radio broadcasts and frequent press conferences in his office to shape national opinion.³⁷

The Fall of France and the isolation of the United Kingdom, both in the Atlantic theater and the Mediterranean, was partially solved by the voluntary alliance of the Commonwealth Nations that unstintingly provided manpower, weapons, and supplies to Britain. These were significant in the Battle of the Atlantic and later in the Mediterranean and Far Eastern Theaters. While virtually half of the Commonwealth's ground forces were not British, and a large number of antisubmarine forces came from Canada, Britain needed American industry, ships, and in the long run, her air forces and ground forces. America supplied large amounts of food, civilian goods, and ammunition and weapons that were essential to off-balance Germany's industrial might which had taken over the industries of the nations that it occupied.³⁸

Crippling German industry became a prime target, and Germany was far less susceptible to blockade than she had been in World War I. This disparity in German war making capability became clearer later in the war as the Air Forces claimed enemy industries as their dedicated target. Their wide dispersion controlled by Germany, of industries throughout western, eastern, and southern Europe meant not only was a Germany capable of matching allied production, but the destruction of German industry foreseen in a combined allied bomber offensive, was unlikely to occur in any but a protracted, and massive bombing campaign.³⁹

Two things followed the ABC-1 discussions which immediately drew the attention of the two heads of state. Hitler had pressured Vichy to permit transit of troops through Morocco to reach Spanish Morocco for an assault on Gibraltar. This request failed and was reported both through diplomatic and intelligence channels. Roosevelt cautioned the French that any cooperation with the Nazis against the British would be serious. Additionally, the Germans unsuccessfully petitioned France for use of Dakar as a naval and air base. This would both help to close the South Atlantic and would pose an immediate threat to northeast Brazil, a violation in American eyes, of the Monroe Doctrine. This sent War Department planners scurrying for appreciations on a military occupation "by invitation" of course, of Venezuela or Brazil. In the event, none of these threats materialized, but French West Africa clearly became a source of concern to both Roosevelt and Churchill that would remain.⁴⁰

The second issue was the attack on Russia, an operation which Bletchley Park's decryption operation had warned, and which both Roosevelt and Churchill had tactfully warned Premier Stalin was

³⁷ Daniel Todman. *Britain's War. A New World 1942-1947*. London: Penguin, 2020, *passim*.

³⁸ *Germany and the Second World War. Volume V. Parts I Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power, Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources 1939-1941; and II Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower, 1942-1945*. Edited by Militargeschliches Forschungsamt (MGFA) German Military History Institute. Oxford: Oxford University Press, *passim*.

³⁹ Both the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the US Air Corps planned strategic bombing operations, but at this time in the war no attempt was made to combine or coordinate their ideas. Moreover, prewar and early war assessments of the target destruction requirements to cripple or even diminish German war production were wildly inaccurate and far underrated German production and resilience.

⁴⁰ George F. Howe. *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1957, pp. 3-14.

possible. Upon Germany's attack, Churchill immediately declared Russia a co-belligerent against the Axis, and pledged material support. America soon was enticed to include Russia into Lend Lease support, though America seems to have imposed no "lease" or return of goods, or any repayment by the Russians. Supplies in reality became grants of foreign aid to Russia, a privilege not extended theoretically to any other ally, all of whom became debtor nations to the United States.⁴¹

Roosevelt and Churchill met in August, 1941 in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, holding their conferences on HMS Prince of Wales and the USS Augusta. The sole purpose of the conference was to provide Roosevelt with the moral authority to support his war policy, as well as his intention to inform the British and French, that a new world order based on "Four Freedoms" would underlay all US action.⁴²

Roosevelt intended that the Four Freedoms would not be ignored as Wilson's Fourteen Points had been, and his invention of "the United Nations" would immediately be announced upon the United States entering the war. The formal signed document, known as the Atlantic Charter listed eight provisions: (1) that both nations foreswore any territorial aggrandizement; (2) that any changes in territory would be governed by popular consent of the people; (3) that self government would be given to those who had been deprived of it; (4) that all nations would be given access to world trade; (5) that all peoples would be granted improved labor standards; (6) that the destruction of Nazi rule would be aimed at granting freedom and safety to the people within those borders under Nazi rule; (7) that freedom of the seas would be given to all, (8) nations will abandon force as a means of policy.⁴³

Certainly, one important point emerges from 1941. Grand Strategy would be debated and decided not on an inter-Allied basis but between America and Britain, first in conversation, and then later between the two powers and Russia. The members of the Commonwealth were to be compliant to their alliance, and odd members like China and France, had to be sponsored by one of the Big Three, as advocating their claims to policy. Roosevelt fronted for Nationalist China, and Churchill, who wished the restoration of France as a major power, supported France which was internally divided by strong personalities and complex differences in authority. Had a truly representative Allied council existed, it is doubtful that a harmonized response could have been achieved. This problem occurred in World War I with the Supreme War Council, and Churchill and Roosevelt recognized early, that democracies might make war, they couldn't effectively wage it in a coalition where strategic direction was debated by a large group.⁴⁴

Churchill and Roosevelt discussed Africa, particularly Dakar, during their Atlantic meeting though no military discussions were permitted by Roosevelt between the Chiefs of Staff except for British requests for aid. Roosevelt wanted no "collaboration for war" to be announced as a result of his meeting.

Churchill and Roosevelt also drafted a joint letter to Premier Stalin offering a guarantee of war aid to fight the Germans. This eventually led to a three power meeting at which representatives, not the principals met. A guarantee for military aid in the nature of planes, tanks and trucks was made. This "First Protocol," is the first signed policy document for the three powers in the war, and the basis for considering Russia to be key in fighting Germany. With over 160 enemy divisions already on the eastern front, both

⁴¹ Britain for instance, paid her last Lend Lease loan to the US in 2006.

⁴² These are Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Worship, Freedom from Want, and Freedom from Fear.

⁴³ "Atlantic Charter," *Oxford Guide*, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

⁴⁴ Sir Frederick Maurice. *Lessons of Allied Cooperation. Naval, Military and Air 1914-1918*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942.

Roosevelt and Churchill recognized that fighting a German Army of 200 divisions in Western Europe was something that would strip both nations to the quick. While Russia's maintenance was a partial solution, both leaders would lean toward a massive air campaign as a substitute for another Western Front event like World War I. Aircraft production would be prime considerations for US and British industry.⁴⁵

The Americans became aware in time of GYMNAST, a British plan to occupy French North Africa as a result of a German-Italian withdrawal from Libya towards Tunisia. This permitted US cooperation if the French could be seen "to invite" an American occupation to prevent their colonies from being occupied and used for war purposes by the Germans. The American part of GYMNAST was seen as the occupation of Morocco and Algeria, with Tunisia being taken probably from Gibraltar by the British or by land from Egypt.

Roosevelt and the Army viewed a North African expedition an essential part of Hemisphere Defense, closing the narrow gap in the South Atlantic between Brazil and French West Africa, as well as assuring the air route from North America to South America and then to India and Australia or China. Both leaders feared that Petain's Vichy government would be forced to grant German basing rights there for both submarines and air to close South Atlantic shipping routes vital to the war effort. Dakar was viewed as the main object of this operation.⁴⁶

While the aims of the Atlantic meeting were supposed to undergird the Grand Strategy of the Allies, it became clear that Roosevelt intended to apply these rules to the detriment of the existing French and British Empires, and this became part of the increasing pressure he put those allies under, though never applying these rules to the Soviets who subscribed to the document after they were attacked by the Germans.⁴⁷

While the service Chiefs of both America and Britain may have skirted political issues as much as possible, the American service chiefs held strictly to the idea that the war was not to save colonial powers, but to defeat the Axis powers. This complicated things as Britain's Empire provided over half its manpower, and most of its bases and economic goods. Its entire commercial and economic base was reliant on the members of the Commonwealth. Britain had nearly half a billion subjects in its Commonwealth, and covered 13.4 million square miles of the world's 54 million square miles of land. Its overseas possessions and interests needed 80,000 miles of sea lanes for intercourse. Without its Empire, the United Kingdom was but an island.⁴⁸

The attitude that our allies were somehow not as pure as Roosevelt's policies, gave rise to American military intransigence at any endeavor might be construed to favor the British Empire, and would cause bitter debate even after political decisions were made. Britain did not fight to disestablish

⁴⁵ *The Churchill War Papers. The Ever Widening War. 1941. New York; W.W. Norton & Company, 2000.* This source contains all correspondence among the three war leaders, beginning in 1941. In most cases, their correspondence supplants actual diplomatic treaties or agreements, and provides a running commentary of their policies and actions.

⁴⁶ Center of Military History Archive Ms, *The Torch Operation*; George Howe. *Northwest Africa*.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* this essentially constituted a total condemnation and opposition to Britain's and France's colonial policies.

⁴⁸ Mark A. Stoler. *Allies In War. Britain and America Against the Allied Powers 1940-1945. London: Hodder Arnold, 2005, passim*; Maj. D.H.Cole. *Imperial Military Geography. 8th Edition. London: Sifton Praed & Co., Ltd, 1935, p. 1.*

her Empire; America fought because it was attacked and her military leaders often used politics as cover for their own Anglophobia which was pronounced in a number of US senior officers.⁴⁹

To senior officers, this ruled out US participation in operations in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa, and with the exception of supporting China, Roosevelt's personal crusade, and to giving as little as possible in Far Eastern operations as this was also a British preserve. This supported the land war in Europe to fight Germans idea held by Maj. A.C. Wedemeyer, who was to rapidly become one of the key strategists in the War Department. To what end would the war be fought? American generals believed America would simply then go home, with no involvement. This had been the lesson of World War I. A six month to a year occupation was Marshall's planning guidance.⁵⁰

While the American military leaders viewed the upcoming war as a professional event, Roosevelt and Churchill had already staked out their intentions in written debate. Their correspondence was not trifling, but a detailed discussion of policies, requests for aid, and the foundation for a military alliance. Roosevelt informed few of his decisions, and often passed guidance to his Service Secretaries or military chiefs as *fait accompli*, or requests for detailed information. That the major strategic priority of the war, and which theater to consider the most important, was made before American became engaged, and plans were put in place to support it before the war, was significant.⁵¹

What was America's strategic interest? For the planners a straight crayon mark from the East Coast of the US through the UK to Germany, and from Hawaii to Japan, these lines focused their attention. Everything else, had to be justified as supporting these drives. Even the liberation of lost American ground like the Philippines had to be argued for within the plans shops of the Army and Navy. Allied interests were deemed irrelevant, regardless of what they were supplying in the joint war effort. The American military view was that simple. Roosevelt set to destroy post war British and French claims to areas, and held no public view on Soviet interests which he catered to as a means of keeping them in the war. America's Grand Strategy therefore was to win quickly, and the United Nations would establish the means and policies for a new global order.

Major Albert C. Wedemeyer, a graduate of the German Kriegsakademie in Berlin's 1938 class was tasked to compile basic requirements, a document later known as "The Victory Program." Using the ABC-1 report to both create a multiple theater model and assign forces for each, he received basic estimates of forces needed from the Army War Plans branch, the Air War Plans branch of the Air Corps, and the US Navy War Plans sections. By allocating a ten percent share of estimated man power for direct mobilization into the armed forces, he produced a basic estimate of numbers of divisions by type, air force units, and

⁴⁹ These themes can be found in John S. D. Eisenhower. *Allies: Pearl Harbor to D-Day*. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1982; Mark A. Stoker. *Allies in War. Britain and America Against the Axis Powers*. New York: Hodder Arnold, 2005; General Albert C. Wedemeyer. *Wedemeyer Reports!* New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958; Andrew Roberts. *Masters and Commanders* London: Allen Lane, 2008; Nial Ferguson, *Yanks and Limeys. Alliance Warfare in the Second World War*. London: Jonathan Cape, 2015.

⁵⁰ Forest C. Pogue. *Marshall. Interviews for Forest Pogue. The Marshall Foundation*.

⁵¹ Nigel Hamilton. *Commander-in-Chief. FDR's Battle with Churchill, 1943*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2016, *passim*. See also Alex Danchev. *Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance. The War Diaries of Brigadier Vivian Dykes*. London: Brassey's (UK), 1990, *passim*, and Danchev, *On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations*. London: Macmillan Press, 1998. See especially, Kent Roberts Greenfield. *American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration*. Malabar, Fla: Robert E Krieger, 1982. See appendix to Chapter 3 for detailed list of Roosevelt's decisions overriding Military Advice.

fleet allocations by type ship and crews and support. A large training base, and logistical base would comprise at least thirty percent of the force. Deciding on the type forces needed would define the numbers of men needed and the type of equipment, both would be determined by the type war envisioned and where it would be fought. The “program” was a compilation of needs, not a strategy for action.⁵²

Meanwhile, America began the early stages of mobilization though still at peace. Industry had already begun a wartime expansion plan based not only on Lend Lease, but on the requirements to supply and support the greatly expanding US Armed Forces including creating a two ocean Navy and a greatly expanded “Army Air Forces.” Many of the US Army’s basic weapons were replaced with modernized models, and a 100 percent motorization plan eliminated the horse from the army except in a very few small units by 1943. The Marine Corps, once a small contingent, was expanded and eventually reached a force of six divisions, plus a large overhead. Included were a number of Marine Air Wings that supported the divisions, and in a few cases, flew as shipboard members of navy air groups.^[RC1] The US Army with about 30 Divisions by the end of 1941 including the federalized guard divisions, doubled by 1942’s end and tripled by 1944, ending at 90 divisions and numerous non-divisional elements in the Ground Forces, that were “pooled” for use when a mission required special task organization. Not wishing to repeat the problems of having men and not equipment that complicated training in World War I, men were acquired by selective service as equipment became available and training cadre were assembled. A massive building program for barracks to accommodate several millions was undertaken, as Army bases expanded, and airfields were built. Accessing men in “waves” by year groups also eased the requirement of having trained cadre for new units created.⁵³

At the national level, two types of manpower had to be allocated and procured. First industry had to be sated, or nothing could be produced. The Armed Forces could then be allocated a share, based on the projected needs of the theaters of operations as theorized. Roosevelt had approached this through the back door of asking “how much, and what” would have to be procured to supply the armed forces and all of its allies, which now included Russia. Roosevelt managed industry through a War Production board and a series of civilian committees all of which could be overruled and frequently were bypassed by Hopkins for Lend Lease allocations. A separate board allocated materials, the final arbiter of how much could be produced over time. As to America’s military efforts, this was rationalized by a composite summary of service needs as they themselves stated them. There was no civilian oversight or limit placed on what they felt they needed beyond the Service Secretaries. A variety of boards reporting to the President, and interfacing with the Secretaries of War and the Navy, provided legislation, money, and guidance to harmonize a national, centrally managed effort.

Fleet requirements were provided by the Navy and given a share half the size of the Army, a good ratio from World War I standards. Only the service planners could provide an outline of these ideas, and together they could comprise a “program,” essentially an estimate that would be modified as Grand

⁵² “the Victory Program, September 11, 1941,” in *American War Plans, op. cit., pp. 103-134.*

⁵³ General of the Army George C Marshall, General of the Air Force Henry H. Arnold, and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. *The War Reports of General Marshall, General Arnold, and Admiral King.* Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1947, pp. 264-274. The Army activated 90 divisions, but inactivated one division to create logistical troops in Italy, giving a total of 89 divisions at war’s end, 87 of which saw active combat. Only one division in Europe and one in the Pacific failed to be committed into combat. In both cases, the campaign ended before the division could be used. The United States had a population of 131 million, and the United Kingdom its major ally, 46 million persons.

Strategic Decisions and the outcome of operations played out, and as the full requirements for Lend Lease developed, requiring about 20 percent of America's total production.⁵⁴

Wedemeyer provided the first, basic estimate for manpower use and production of weapons. Next to ABC-1, it was the most important strategic planning document of the war.⁵⁵ Its results, transcended nations. The manpower allocations proved essentially correct mainly by the President's refusal to increase them. The specifics of maritime service requirements was first expanded, but later cut after German U-boats lost their lethality edge in mid-1943. But, initially important, was the limit placed on new equipment for growing the Army as Lend Lease to the fighting fronts was often given top priority. This was an unseen complexity, that in the long run favored America. In the end, shipping became the prime determinant of what could be deployed or given in Lend Lease, not the forces desired as optimum by planners. This totally resized and shaped the army.⁵⁶

Most important, was that the Victory Program was a first estimate, that would constantly be updated to meet major decisions. Of its major premises, only the total number of mobilizable men under arms remained a near constant, its general assumptions on the troop distribution and numbers of aircraft necessary to produce became the necessary starting points for planning, and reasonable goals to execute a Grand Strategy.⁵⁷

Russia fixed no less than 200 German and Fascist allied divisions on the Eastern Front, and China would hold the attention of more than 2 million Japanese. The Mediterranean theater would hold no less than a dozen Italian and German divisions at the time, all fighting the British at a 1:1 ratio, a factor that would double as the war progressed, while the ratio remained the same. This permitted America's army to be raised and deployed in a broader time sweep, with Africa and the Mediterranean being the first campaigns against Germany. Wedemeyer, believed that the Army would be ready to fight in the decisive theater by July, 1943.⁵⁸

This proved to be too optimistic not only due to diversions to the Pacific and Mediterranean, but due to the fact that the massive air force required had not been fully trained, and that landing craft were not produced in the quantities needed. Both the size of the air force and amphibious forces though stated plainly in the strategy, had not been forecast for the long haul. Industry had to be reprioritized to fill the needs of the immediate situation. Lend lease also had made deep inroads into the equipment needed to fully mobilize the army, whose size did not reach full authorization until mid-1944. Allied ship construction did not equate to shipping losses until early 1943, and until the Atlantic campaign was reversed, no real headway could be made on overseas deployments of both men and material. Shipping restrictions would

⁵⁴ Charles E. Kirkpatrick. *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present. Writing the Victory Plan of 1941*. Washington: Center for Military History, 2011, passim.

⁵⁵ "The Victory Program, September 11, 1941. In *American War Plans*, op. cit. pp.103-134; Charles E. Kirkpatrick. *An Unknown Future and Doubtful Present. Writing the Victory Plan of 1941*. Washington: Center of Military History, 2011; *Wedemeyer Reports!*, op. cit., pp. 63-76; *Chief of Staff, Prewar*, op. cit., pp. 331-336.

⁵⁶ See both volumes of *Global Logistics and Strategy* in the US Army In World War II series, US Army Center of Military History.

⁵⁷ Kirkpatrick, op. cit. Note the attrition of equipment was difficult to estimate though the air force maintained from the first a very large "wastage" rate due to accidents, battle damage, and total loss due to operational use.

⁵⁸ John Ellis. *World War II: A Statistical Survey*. New York: Facts on File, 1993; "Victory Program," *US War Plans*, op. cit., pp. 103-134.

cut armored authorizations by two thirds, and the trucks needed for a fully mobile army were cut due to shipping space, not industrial capacity.⁵⁹

The complexity of the mobilization can only be understood not simply in fulfilling the initial outline, but in skipping forward a bit to see how the military and navy requirements of war had been predicted, and how they finally were modified. The World wide war demanded both flexibility and improvisation, and control of the system demanded great changes.

The United States Army was reorganized in March, 1942 by executive order, creating the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces. Together, these had authority over all organized units of the United States Army and their manpower and equipment authorizations, and gave all inclusive authority over all Army personnel to the Chief of Staff who served under the Secretary of War. The Operations and Plans Division was designated as the “command post” for the Chief comprising both plans and operations, and the Army Staff kept its directive authority over all functions within the army at home and abroad.

“OPD” however, became a super general staff with executive authority to order, task, or allocate resources, and did direct coordination between the JCS staff, and also the Theaters. The intent of the “Marshall Reorganization,” was to streamline staff processes, and to expedite decisions and planning to meet the requirements of a world-wide war. This prevented the arguments and waste seen by the Army in World War I, when a system evolved from the Civil War model, failed to provide equipment and overseas transport for the Army, both of which had to be heavily subsidized by the Allies.⁶⁰

Theater Commanders were created directly reporting to the Chief of Staff, or the Combined Chiefs of Staff if a Combined, or Allied Headquarters. These positions were first named in ABC-1, and later strongly advocated by General Marshall who emphatically demanded them at the ARCADIA conference. This prevented the problems seen in the Civil War and World War I between the roles of the Commanding General of the Army and the Commanders of Armies in the field. It also left Grand Strategic planning to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), and created a direct chain of command from the Combined Chiefs and their American members, to forces fighting overseas as part of an Allied Theater.

Organizations such as the European Theater of Operations (ETO) or the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater, were primarily administrative and logistics organizations, though in the case of the CBI it maintained an operational grip on all Army and Air sub-elements. The ETO primarily dealt with the Army Service Forces, and maintained the Communications Zone, its rear area. Operations were delegated to the field organizations who also reported to the Allied Supreme Commander who was dual hatted to be also the senior American. While these organizations were essential to decentralize execution suited to local conditions, the staff officers needed and the overhead of the administration grew to large proportions.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell Wiley. *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*. Washington: Historical Division, US Army, 1947, passim.

⁶⁰ James E. Hewes. *From Root to McNamara. Army Organization and Administration: 1900-1963*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1975, Chapter II, passim.

⁶¹ Op. cit., Chapter III, passim. US Commanders commanding Allied Theaters normally also commanded all US forces in the Theater for administrative and logistical purposes. Legal jurisdiction for such commands normally

This streamlining of authority made the execution of the Victory Program flexible and directly responsive to each Service Chief who was responsible for providing forces to the theaters to execute the directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This permitted the Secretaries of War and the Navy to perform their jobs of civilian control for the raising and maintenance of forces, and for initiating the authorizing legislation necessary for the President's war program to be funded and approved by the Legislative branch. The plan itself, essentially became the basis for change to every year's authorizations and plans. The distribution of troops, that allocated forces remained remarkably constant, with enlistments and mainly draftees, keeping positions filled as a large hospitalized or non-duty population existed mainly due to wounds, medical retirements, or administrative reorganizations. Training or administration absorbed everyone not in unit positions or support positions.

How Was the Army Built

Military manpower use was complex due to the changes in Army organization that created ground forces, air forces, and service forces in March, 1942, as a way to simplify both administration and command. Allocations for "type" units changed as wartime needs exposed requirements, and more effective equipment was developed. Additionally, the Marine Corps was expanded over 300 percent of its early estimate.

The Army, the largest force, had several crucial plans that were the foundation for all mobilization. These included a "Protective Mobilization Plan, "created in the early 1930's that framed a structure of Armies, Corps and Divisions that would form, train, and be ready for overseas commitment to a designated theater. Based on the lessons of the Great War, it relied heavily on conscription to control the intake of soldiers, and allocated men and equipment to raise the units and their support echelons in a smoothly coordinated pattern. Drafted men immediately had to be equipped, which paced the draft intake to meet production deliveries. The interwar period had been a time of planning, and designing a force structure for future emergencies. As part of this, a comprehensive study of industry, its capabilities and capacities, and its manpower requirements had to be accounted for to provide both the civilian and military manpower. World War I equipment, stored for use, became the basis for training and raising the Army in 1941, with nearly all of it replaced by 1943.⁶²

This mobilization plan helped to create the rationale for the Selective Service Act of 1940, the first peacetime conscription act ever passed, and which gave the Army its inflow of trainees for all branches.⁶³ The call to Federal Colors added 18 National Guard divisions in various states of manning, and draftees were assigned both to train with and to fill out their ranks. The call to colors of thousands of reserve officers both with World War I experience, and younger graduates of the Reserve Officer Training Corps, provided a cadre of officers with various grades and a wide base of experience and education. These became the foundation for the expanded officer corps, with long serving regulars providing senior staff

resided with the senior service commander in Theater. See Forest C. Pogue: *The Supreme Command*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951.

⁶² *History of Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945. Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-212.* Department of the Army, November 1955; Elberton Smith. *The Army and Economic Mobilization*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1959; Maurice Matloff. "The 90 Division Gamble." In *Command Decisions*. Edited by Kent Roberts Greenfield. Washington: Center of Military History, 1987, pp. 365-381.

⁶³ "Selective Service Act," in OXFORD GUIDE to World War II. I.C.B. Dear editor. New York: Oxford, 1995, p. 775. Eventually, ten million were inducted, or two thirds of those who actually served in the war.

and commanders for units created to match the divisional and support requirements called for by updated the planning of the Army General Staff. Without this seedbed of National Guard and Reserve “retreads,” the Army mobilization could not have been accomplished in the time needed.⁶⁴

The Army had relied heavily since the Revolutionary War on the traditional “expansible” army system of citizen soldiers filling a structure led by trained professionals. Moreover, it kept the World War I system of Regular, National Guard, and National Army (Draftee) divisions intact though Regulars would be used to supplement both the newly raised units and replace unqualified National Guardsmen or Reservists whose age, health, or military experience did not meet current requirements. The divisions, however, were streamlined into a “triangular” division requiring specialized combat and combat service support units to be assigned from the “Army-level pool,” to perform specific missions. This saved both shipping space and personnel billets, while keeping the divisions more maneuverable and supportable. Eventually, the organizational design of virtually every element and unit of the Army, Air Corps, and Navy, would be both streamlined and remolded to meet modern war requirements.⁶⁵

During the interwar, the US Army not only created and expanded a series of branch schools to provide technical and tactical training for career officers, but also expanded staff college classes and also created an Industrial College to study both manpower and industrial mobilization. The Army also created an Air Corps Tactical School that began writing its own doctrine of air warfare, and trained mid-level air corps officers in basic staff and command. These schools permitted the branches to operate in unison with minimal direction.⁶⁶

In the peacetime budget juggle for personnel authorizations or new equipment, the service judged that the maturation and training of experienced leaders outweighed new systems that might be obsolete if war came and they became subject to replacement. The Great War had shown that trained leaders and staffs were needed for a large army. This gave a priority to schooling officers at varying levels based on the future needs of an expanded force. The virtual legion of fiftyish officers in the field grades with several levels of professional schooling were virtually catapulted into higher positions three to five grades above their prewar rank. Virtually all of the division commanders by mid 1943, had been majors or newly promoted Lt. Cols. in 1939 or 1940. Schools had filled in for the absence of experience at higher levels.⁶⁷

During the interwar, the structure of army and corps areas provided staff experience, even if those elements operated as only skeletons for understrength units. As the Army’s principal shortfall during the Great War was trained senior officers and staffs unused to planning for and handling large units, these positions proved to offer the best preparation for a massive mobilization of a force that eventually

⁶⁴ Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, William R. Keast. *Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1948, passim; Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley. *Organization of Ground Combat Troops*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1947, passim; Robert T. Finney. *History of the Air Corps Tactical School 1920-1940*. Washington: Center for Air Force History, 1992, passim.

⁶⁵ *War Reports, op. cit.*, See the Reports of the Chiefs of Staff, primarily for the periods 1939-1943.

⁶⁶ Robert R. Palmer, Bell I Wiley, William R. Keast. *Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troop*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1948; Christopher R. Gabel. *The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1991.

⁶⁷ The post World War I Chiefs of Staff beginning with Pershing had built a branch school system to close the gap in experience that massive mobilization had produced in World War I.

expanded to more than forty times its prewar strength. Implicit in the Army's mobilization problem, was the training of individuals, units and staffs to create not only complete divisions, but also the more than 1000 different type units, elements, and detachments that comprised the entire force. Additionally, units needed to exercise a full complement of soldiers of divisions in rigorous combat maneuvers. Specialized training for amphibious warfare was also needed for designated assault divisions.⁶⁸

It is telling that Wedemeyer's "Program" needed to win the war did not account for replacements. He no doubt assumed that monthly needs would be handled by conscription of the "annual classes" as they came of age, and those not deferred for essential industry, would be inducted, trained, and provided to units to fill empty files. What also is telling is that he rolled logistics into the ground forces. In the event, the complexity of waging a war simultaneously in multiple theaters and providing Lend Lease armaments and supplies would have to be centrally controlled.

Marshall opted to create a special world logistical command, Army Service Forces, which like the Army Air Forces, took approximately a third of the Army's personnel spaces. Besides supply in the theaters up to the ports, and "Service of Supply areas," they also managed the 1517 supply ships assigned to Army control for streamlined shipping of troops and their supplies. In the end, the Army created less than half the divisions theorized in the Victory Program in order to provide effective support world wide, and less than a third of the divisions the war department staff thought would be necessary for world wide victory.⁶⁹

Also unidentified within the Ground Forces was the requirement to add a specialized branch to assume half the duties of the Quartermaster Corps-----the Transportation Corps, which handled everything from small trucks and trailers to the sea-going Maritime Service that crewed Troopships. The transport and distribution of weapons and supplies, was far more complicated than their production, and getting thousands of parts, end items, and supplies to many fronts required specialized organizations to provide support for operations as well as to deliver Lend Lease materials to our allies, an operation run by the War Shipping Administration which allocated tonnage.⁷⁰

Besides the previous architecture of command for ground forces from squad to army, new organizations were added including specialized weapons such as the Tank Destroyers, and a host of Continental Service Commands, Defense commands, and specialized units had to be created. One, such unit masquerading as the "Manhattan District," with engineer Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves in command, was tasked to create the world's first Atomic bombs.⁷¹

Building the Two-Ocean Navy

⁶⁸ See MacArthur Reports as Chief of Staff in *MacArthur on War, op. cit., passim. Army Almanac*, pp. 479-488 lists all of the army's "Table of Organization" units.

⁶⁹ John D. Millett. *The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1954., Lt. Col. Randolph Leigh. *Farty eight Million Tons To Eisenhower. The Role of SOS in the European Theater*. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1945, passim. See Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton. *Global Logistics and Strategy 1943-1945*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1968, appendices D and E.

⁷⁰ *Army Almanac*, 1950, op. cit., pp. 143-145.

⁷¹ Vince C. Jones. *MANHATAN: The Army and the Atomic Bomb*. Washington: Cener of Military History, 1985; No war plan existed to cover the deployment and use of the A-bomb. Originally conceived to be used against Germany under the assumption that Germany was building its own bomb, a correct but in the event, unnecessary assumption, it was deployed to the Pacific and dropped on order of President Truman, who only learned of its existence after he replaced President Roosevelt in April, 1945.

The Navy had gone farther in its prewar thinking as it had an actual war scenario to base its thinking on, and an assumed enemy to provide a detailed correlation of forces. Moreover, despite the priority given to the European theater, the Navy did not put the bulk of its efforts, ships, and landing craft in Europe. Rather, they supported the ORANGE war as theorized as much as the Joint Strategic Planning Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) could feature. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, personally allocated shipping, construction and the essential assault and landing craft, most of which were sent to the Central Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas.⁷²

Always to be considered was the Navy's prejudice instilled by its self-proclaimed doctrine for the ORANGE war. Naval officers attending the Naval War College which hosted two levels of junior or senior courses suitable for midlevel officers studied the problems of war with Japan. While academics were the center of the course, most challenging and noticeable was the annual wargame of fleet vs fleet pitting the major weight of US forces against one of its largest peers, either the British or Japanese fleets. While the United States drafted theoretical war plans against both, the likelihood of a US-British skirmish grew less likely after World War I and Japanese burgeoning sea power posed a real threat.

-The War College games posed both strategic and tactical problems. More influential, were annual Fleet Problems based on maneuvers identified as relating to current plans. These were also informed by problems and solutions suggested in war gaming. As part of the results, the Navy board often added ship requirements, and naval designs were affected. Moreover, the problem of a trans-Pacific war was examined in detail, and many of the lessons were translated into ship design, force requirements, and a plan for fleet sustenance at sea.⁷³

United States possessions in the Pacific, the Philippines, Guam, Wake, Midway, and Samoa also posed possible targets for Japanese aggression. As a result, Plan ORANGE, a theoretical war against Japan was perfected and due to the Navy's inability to relieve or supply the Philippines, and the impossibility of shipping a hastily mobilized force to its rescue. The Navy theorized its recapture after a decisive naval encounter in mid Pacific and after the seizure of island bases along its route. Japan, defeated at sea, was considered to be defeated by naval blockade. The Marine Corps independently produced a doctrine for amphibious operations, though this was also closely coordinated with the Army which maintained a written doctrine by 1940 on landing from the sea, a requirement created by the ORANGE war plan. The wartime supersizing of the Marine Corps was designed solely to create total naval control over the Central

⁷² Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill. *Admiral King: A Naval Record*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1952, passim. Eisenhower who oversaw invasions in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and France, having fought each time for sufficient troop lift for assaults, did not direct any additional amphibious planning after Southern France, which was executed by the Mediterranean Theater headquarters. The British did execute an assault on Walcheren Island with its own craft to carry a Commando Brigade to speed the opening of the Scheldt Estuary and free the waterways to Antwerp. Failing to open the Brittany ports as planned, British capture of the Channel seaports and Antwerp were available as winter weather closed the over the beach landing conducted by landing craft and using small ports or the sole surviving artificial port, "Port Winston," the Arromanches Mulberry Harbor towed into place in June. See "Landing craft, and landing Ships, *Oxford Guide, op. cit., pp. 520-521*. The United States produced over 46,000 landing craft during World War II; Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton. *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1968, pp. 259-262. The discussion of how landing craft were shorted for the Pacific by construction plans made by the navy for the Pacific and the arguments not to change it is covered.

⁷³ Trent Hone. *Battle Line: The United States Navy 1919-1939*. Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 2021 and *Learning War: Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in US Navy 1898-1945*. Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 2022.

Pacific Theater, though the Navy frequently asked for Army troops and air power to serve in supporting roles.⁷⁴

The interwar ORANGE war games offered insights into not only fleet actions, but the requirements for the “Fleet Train” needed to support replenishment at sea, as well as the necessity of having intermediate bases for supplies, maintenance and repair, and the positioning of aircraft both as fleet replacements and for air patrols over the intermediate zones through which the fleet operated.

While the adherents to the ORANGE War Game have claimed that these games had essentially predicted the strategy of the Pacific War, this was not true in the matter of details. The operation of Carrier Task Forces had not been predicted as replacing the battleship as the capital weapon; the ability for extensive at sea replenishment to extend the operating endurance of vital task forces virtually indefinitely, was not practiced, and the superior killing power of the Fleet Submarine as destroying the largest share of the Japanese merchant fleet and the bulk of her oilers, had not been forecasted. Not surprisingly, the Japanese use of suicide planes, Kamikazes, had not been foreseen as a deadly threat to the fleet in the absence of air superiority permitting conventional attacks. Apart from the kamikazes, all others, had been implied as possible requirements, but the fulfillment of these in ship types, units, and doctrine had not been created until the war forced their adoption. Nor had the mass production of landing craft been factored into naval construction plans, a monumental failure that slowed the tempo of every campaign originating from the sea.⁷⁵

Often lost to analysts is the fact that Pearl Harbor had been “attacked” by American Carriers in Fleet Problems before the war, and the Japanese planners who had modeled the attack learnt from the British Carrier attack on Taranto, a fact that had been given to the U.S. Fleet Commander at Pearl. But he had discounted it, based on the extended range needed by the Japanese to travel to Hawaii undetected. It is significant that had Japan not struck at Pearl, the Admiral there was preparing the Fleet for a sortie to engage and destroy the Japanese battle line. The Carrier became the Navy’s capital ship due to the destruction of the behemoths trapped at Pearl Harbor. Carrier admirals thus became Neptune’s new royalty. Battleships were relegated to fleet protection and shore bombardment, even though ten new battleships and 13 rebuilt old battleships were in the Pacific fleet by 1944.⁷⁶

As the geography of the Pacific mandated a focus on the intermediate islands of Guam, the Mariannas, and the Philippines, so too were naval task forces and amphibious operations were launched

⁷⁴ Miller. *War Plan ORANGE*; Albert A. Nolfi. *To Train the Fleet. The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923-1940. Naval War College Historical Series, No. 18.* Newport: Naval War College Press, 2010, passim. On amphibious war, see Russell Weigley. *The American Way of War.* New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1973, pp. 254-264.

⁷⁵ Hone *Learning to Fight, op. cit., passim*; US Navy, *War Instructions, United States Navy, 1944, passim*; Lee J. Levert. *Naval Warfare: How the US Navy Fought WWII. (Originally Fundamentals of Naval Warfare. New York: Macmillan, 1947.)* Of significant value is Rear Admiral Worrall Reed Carter. *Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil. The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific During World War II.* India: Pranava Books, Reprint, n.d., original printing US Navy, 1952. The US benefitted immensely from British plans for Landing Craft, LST’s, and even the basic Liberty Ship. The fact that these were available as blueprints, even though modifications had to later be made, saved America from having to start from basic design requirements, a delay in fleet creation that would have added years to American mobilization.

⁷⁶ See *Playing War, op. cit.; Orange Plan, op. cit., To Train the Fleet, op. cit., and Alan D. Zimm. Attack On Pearl Harbor; Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions.* Philadelphia, Casemate, 2011. See also *US Navy At War: The War Reports of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. Washington: the Navy Department, 1946, passim.*

to seize those islands thus cutting off Japan from her rich oil reserves in the East Indies and from her forces deployed in China. The political imperative of liberating America's loyal colony, the Philippines, and Roosevelt's self-created crusade to provide for a "democratic Nationalist China," greatly modified Allied Grand Strategy in both the Far East and Western Pacific. Navy planners had downplayed the necessity of protecting and assisting New Zealand and Australia, and had not theorized a far reaching Japanese overwater campaign that would capture not only the Dutch East Indies, but Rabaul, and Northern New Guinea, and would extend into the North Pacific to the Aleutian Islands of Attu and Kiska. During 1942 and most of 1943, Allied operations were dedicated to rolling back these Japanese gains.⁷⁷

Creating the Army Air Forces

The AAF remained an integral part of the Army throughout World War II, though its Commanding General, functioned on the JCS as an independent service chief, while retaining his position within the Army hierarchy as both CG, AAF and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army. General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold created the force to act independently. It was eventually to comprise a force of 2, 345,068 men and women, and 72,567 planes within 267 combat groups. This force included 862 Very Heavy bombers, 12840 heavy bombers, 6254 medium bombers, 16,958 fighters, 10,299 transports, and 9,174 training aircraft.⁷⁸

Marshall and Arnold both accepted that the path to independence as a service would have hamstrung Army mobilization and could not be easily achieved by apportioning personnel, units, and bases to the "Air Force." Thus, the AAF used the bulk of its support from assigned or attached army ordnance, supply, engineer, signal and transportation units that would be part of the total AAF, while retaining their branch identities. The "Army Air Forces" was the basic organization created. These were tailored by missions. Sixteen Air Forces were created with four in the United States both as air defense and mainly for training, one in Alaska (11th), one in the Panama Canal Zone (6th), four in the Mediterranean and Africa (9th, 12th, 15th) one in UK (8th) and one later moved to France (9th). Two were assigned to the CBI, (10th and 14th), and four to the Pacific areas (5th, 7th, 13th, and 20th).⁷⁹

The 8th and 15th were strategic air forces under Strategic Air Forces, Europe, the 20th was commanded directly from Washington by Arnold to focus the effort on Japan. Tactical air commands were deployed but not assigned to the field armies in Europe from the 9th Air Force and in Italy from the 12th. Air Forces were assigned to the theaters, but the USSTAF in Europe received its basic directives from the Combined Chiefs. This structure though cumbersome, was flexible to provide an integrated operational effect to both surface force operations and the strategic bombing requirements of attacking German and Japanese industry. Over 7,952,000 tons of bombs were dropped in all theaters of war, in 2,362, 800 combat sorties were flown by all types of aircraft.⁸⁰

The Pacific benefitted from an error in air planning forethought. This occurred from the fact that the Army Air Forces had required the design of a Very Heavy Bomber of longer range and payload to support future operations, the B-29, which was produced and began to arrive in numbers in 1944. It

⁷⁷ See Louis Morton: *Strategy and Command the First Two Years. War in the Pacific Series, US Army in World War II. Washington: Center of Military History, 1962 passim*; Grace Person Hayes. *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan*. Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1982, passim.

⁷⁸ *Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, World War II*. Washington: Headquarters, Army Air Force, 1946, pp. 16, 133, 220.

⁷⁹ Mauer Mauer. *Air Force Combat Units of World War II*. Washington: Air Force Center of History, 1961, passim.

⁸⁰ Op. cit., p. 133, 220.

operated not in the European theater, where its design was planned to support from North African bases, but in use against Japan both from East China and later Guam, Saipan and Tinian in 1944 and 1945. Reaching a total of almost 400 operational bombers, the Twentieth Air Force commanded from Washington by the Commanding General of Army Air Forces, 'Hap' Arnold himself, mounted heavy incendiary bombing missions that ravaged sixty-six of Japan's cities, and completed their operations with the first use of atomic weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.⁸¹

Air planners had planned the bombing of Tokyo as early as 1941, and in 1942 provided a small force to do so, but it was absorbed into the Middle East and Far East fighting. Bases in China were first theorized by Maj. Gen. Claire Chennault to be part of his China Air Task Force, but supply over the Himalayas prevented serious consideration until the acceptance of the B-29 in 1943. No planners until 1943 had recognized the necessity of a long-range bombardment of Japan from the Central Pacific islands as the aircraft granting this capability was still a blueprint in 1942. China was always considered as the primary base for air bombardment operations against the Japanese main islands.⁸²

The Total War Effort From Plans

Thus, America's mobilization and force creation was planned in 1941 and 1942, for fulfillment in 1943, 1944 and 1945, and was often based on emerging technology or production of ships and aircraft.⁸³ The total output and extent of Lend Lease was impossible to gauge or program in the early war years, and it increased as the Americans refit the French Army, supplied the Commonwealth, and increasingly provided major end items such as tanks, trucks and airplanes to the Soviet Union. The flexibility built into the Victory Program and Industrial mobilization plans permitted this, recognizing that global logistics as well as units had to be deployed by shipping, which governed the tempo of campaigning.⁸⁴

While the two Heads of State created a general policy concerning their future intentions in August 1941, the British military and naval leaders attempted to purchase both current and future weapons and material aid. This concerned the serving officers of the United States, who saw their own ability to mobilize, expand, and to build a capable modern force was at risk of being deprived of needed equipment.⁸⁵ Inevitably, Roosevelt supported the British and fired his Secretary of War, Harry H. Woodring, for opposing weapons transfers as dangerous to US security. While British requests gave

⁸¹ Arnold "commanded" the Twentieth to prevent their being used by theater commanders. Operationally they were commanded by Major Generals K.B. Wolfe, Haywood Hansell, and eventually Curtis E. LeMay who was most successful. Nathan Twining replaced Arnold as Commanding General in August, 1945, after Gen Spaatz relocated Strategic Air Forces, Europe Headquarters, to the Pacific.

⁸² History of *The Twentieth Air Force: Genesis*, US Army Air Forces Reference History Study No. 112, US Air Force Historical Research Agency. See also Haywood S. Hansell. *The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan*. US Air Force Museums and History Program, 1986, passim. The belief in 1943 and early 1944, was that the main body of bombers used in Europe would redeploy to China and be used against Japan. This proved to be logistically infeasible.

⁸³ Robert W. Coakley *Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955, passim; Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley. *Global Logistics and Strategy 1943-1945*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969, passim.

⁸⁴ Ms, *Lend Lease: The US Army in World War II Statistics*, passim. Combat Arms Research Library, USACGSC.

⁸⁵ Henry H. Arnold Diaries. *American Air Power Comes of Age: The Diaries of Gen. H.H. Arnold*. Edited by Maj. Gen. John W. Huston. Volume 1. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2002. See comments on Atlantic meeting, August 1941, pp. 207-263.

reason for massive US industrial expansion in arms and goods, Roosevelt tried to balance US needs with British essentials, an assessment not always in line with his own Service Chiefs advice.⁸⁶

Despite his early recognition of the threat of Nazism and Fascism, Roosevelt was intransigent towards his opposition towards Japan's expansion in the Far East and her relentless prosecution of war on the China mainland. Realizing his lack of general support for war at home, he roundly condemned the Japanese, and then pursued a policy of economic isolation in an attempt to stifle Japanese behavior. This policy was pursued despite America's unreadiness for war, and particularly her weakness in the Philippines and Guam, the latter essentially defenseless.

Churchill and Roosevelt coordinated a stance against Japan in the Far East, with Churchill attempting to slow Roosevelt's moves against the Japanese, which were made without previous consultation of the British, Dutch, French or Australia and New Zealand, all of whom would immediately bear the consequences. The Philippines, a US possession, was expected to provide troops and simply fall into line, a position not favored by their President Manuel Quezon, who favored neutrality. Though Churchill repeated earlier British attempts to obtain US ships to be based at Singapore to assure its defense, the Americans held against such action, though Roosevelt considered the forward basing of the newly designated Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor as a military deterrent to Japan.⁸⁷

Both General Marshall, Chief of Staff, and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, pleaded with Roosevelt in an early November, 1941 memo, to ease diplomatic and economic actions against Japan at least until the United States could reinforce its Pacific garrisons. Roosevelt claimed he would suspend actions for six months, a time period that later framed US intelligence estimates of when Japan would strike, and which fueled Marshall's attempt to reinforce the Philippines and much of MacArthur's optimism. This did not happen, as the Secretary of State pushed Japan until US intelligence warned she was breaking diplomatic relations. With no encouragement of a lessening in US embargoes, the attack then proceeded according to Japanese laid plans. America was not ready to defend its far-flung possessions, nor to project significant power into Europe or Africa per ABC-1.⁸⁸

Pearl Harbor was the starting gun that put America into the race. Yet she was not alone. Eight other countries fought in the Pacific, and while the American fleet was joined by other naval elements, the Pacific was an Allied war. As England provided a base for America to fight in Europe, so too did India, Burma, China, Australia and New Zealand provide crucial bases for allied campaigns against Japan. None of these were minor contributions. Canada which had no troops in the later Far East Commonwealth commitments, had contributed men lost in the defense of Hong Kong. One thing typified all these Allies. Their forces were not trained to a fighting pitch, and unlike the Japanese, they had not been face-hardened in the hard school of war. Allied combat performance early in the war was often dismal with

⁸⁶ Arnold Diary, *ibid*. The U.S. service chiefs frequently forgot that their allies were facing the bulk of the axis and for half the war.

⁸⁷ David Reynolds. *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance. 1937-1941. A Study in Competitive Cooperation*. London: Europa Publications, Limited, 1981, *passim*; Christopher Thorne. *Allies of A Kind. The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978, *passim*.

⁸⁸ Memorandum of 5 November, reproduced in Bruce R. Bartlett. *Cover-Up: The Politics of Pearl Harbor, 1941-1946*. New Rochelle: Arlington House Publishers, 1978, pp. 46-47; Pearl Harbor Hearings, Volume 14, pp. 1061-1062.

the exception of the pilots who held their own at Coral Sea, and who struck a devastating blow to Japanese navy plans at Midway.⁸⁹

RAINBOW 5 specifically designated priorities for the Atlantic-European Theater, but the reality of the Post Pearl Harbor situation in the Pacific, was to prove far more flexible in its interpretation, not simply over the immediate year following the Pearl Harbor disaster, but throughout the war.⁹⁰

Yet the war's results might have differed. Campaigns are not always guaranteed of success, no leader assured that he would remain in power, and as Petain, Mussolini, Quezon, and President Roosevelt proved, no leader was guaranteed to remain to the end. National will had to be tempered for the long haul. Peoples have got to support a war. Allied victory was not foreordained in either theater due to numbers or industry solely, but was also due to the contingencies created by bad decisions, luck, and battles that might have turned with different results. National policies could have been different or changed based on early results. Of the three major Axis powers, only Germany was overrun physically before its surrender, nor was Italy's exit from the war to conform to the image of Unconditional surrender, but more an armistice and change of sides after which it provided forces that served on the Allied side.⁹¹

Understanding the limits of variability in situations, offer not only alternative courses of action, but offer some key as to why things failed or succeeded. No prewar plan became a blueprint, unalterable, or perfect in conception. Differences in outcomes also produced far different requirements. Basically, the assumptions upon which everything relied, changed. So too the solutions changed, though they stayed remarkably within the parameters defined in ABC-1 for Grand Strategy, but only in gross terms, for the Victory Program and its undergirding plans, such as AWPD-1, and troop deployments by type, that also changed to accommodate circumstances.

Of the prewar bases for the Victory Plan, the most contentious is the air plan known as Air War Plans Division-1 (AWPD-1), and AWPD-4.. Allied airmen such as Harris, Eaker, Spaatz and Hansell argue that the air campaign if pursued without diversion and earlier, would have been more decisive. Yet the campaign required thousands of bombers, needing hundreds of clear "bombing days" in weather. Neither were available in 1942 and 1943. While the Strategic Bombing Surveys after the war indicated critical damage and shortages created, Germany was overrun before its economy collapsed. Likewise, Japan, which had lost all her outer defenses, had been cut off from oil and rubber, and her economy in decline, still was expected to fight on. Fanaticism, not simply fire bombing, might have prevailed, had not Hirohito overruled his warlords and directed surrender.

Air power greatly supported victory, it did not cause it. Though the two atomic bombs gave Japan an excuse to surrender, the entry of Russia into the war certainly had greater effect than Americans ever credited. In the end, it was a political decision, made by the Emperor, that brought the war to an end.

⁸⁹ Dallas Woodbury Isom. *Midway Inquest. Why the Japanese Lost the Battle of Midway*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007.

⁹⁰ Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953, passim.

⁹¹ Arguments that production wins, and numbers win have been made by Philip Payson O'Brien. *How the War Was Won*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, passim; and John Ellis. *Brute Force* New York: Viking, 1990, passim. See also Michael W. Myers. *The Pacific War and Contingent Victory: Why Japanese Defeat Was Not Inevitable*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015, passim.

Political decisions at every level, may have caused different sequential decisions in virtually all of the Grand Strategic Decisions of the war.⁹²

Thus, by the end of 1942, the prewar plans had been modified to such extent, that Grand Strategy and basic operational plans were created for new situations, and to meet the decisions made by the Big Three, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. The Casablanca Conference, became the second watershed Conference, which considered the views of Churchill and Roosevelt and input from Stalin, and wherein the Combined Chiefs of Staff now issued operational directives based on mutually agreed plans submitted by Theater Commanders based on general guidance through their own service chiefs in the name of the CCS. Grand Strategy became more a give and take, with the final authority resting at the Heads of State level, and the overall strategic design for each theater approved by the Combined Chiefs for elaboration and execution by the Theater Commanders.⁹³

⁹² Hansell, *Strategic Air Power in Germany and Japan*, op. cit; US Strategic Bombing Survey *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy, 1945; and the Effects of Air Attack on Japanese Urban Economy*. Summary Report, 1947; Sir Arthur Harris. *Despatch on War Operations. 23rd February 1942 to 8th May 1945*. London: Frank Cass, 1995.

⁹³ Stalin personally attended Conferences at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. His views were always included based on correspondence or through the Ambassadors. Chiang Kai Shek was present at ,,,,,,, and he met with Churchill and Roosevelt, but never Stalin.